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EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF FOSSIL FUEL SUPPLY
PROJECTS ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER NEPA
MICHAEL BURGER* & JESSICA WENTZ**
ABSTRACT
Despite the high certainty of our looming climate catastrophe, fossil
fuel production and consumption, and the greenhouse gas emissions that
result, are increasing. In the United States, fossil fuel production reached
record levels in 2018, and oil and gas pipelines are being constructed at an
unprecedented pace. The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
provides the legal framework for the federal government to evaluate the
climate impacts of these supply projects, such as leasing public lands and
approving pipelines and export terminals. Yet, while federal agencies
have begun to analyze how such projects impact climate change there are
major inconsistencies in agency practice as well as questions about the
accuracy and integrity of these assessments. Some agencies are seeking
to avoid any meaningful analysis of GHG emissions, others are down-
playing the significance of GHG impacts, others are claiming that the
impacts are too uncertain to inform the agency’s decision. There is no pro-
grammatic analysis that evaluates the cumulative effects of U.S. fossil
fuel policies. The result is a patchwork of project-level analyses that pro-
vides fragments of useful information.
Evaluating the Effects of Fossil Fuel Supply Projects on Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and Climate Change under NEPA argues that agencies
are too often short-changing the public by seeking to limit the scope of
their environmental assessments and to elide the central question of the
significance of fossil fuel supply projects, and that more comprehensive
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analyses are necessary in order to draw meaningful conclusions about
the effect of government decision-making on fossil fuel use and climate
change. After a brief introduction, Part I provides a statutory and factual
context. Parts II and III examine recent trends in environmental review
and NEPA litigation; analyze nuanced questions of the scope and signifi-
cance of fossil fuel supply projects’ climate change impacts, the assump-
tions and analytical techniques that have factored and should factor into
NEPA analysis, as well as the core question of whether and to what ex-
tent NEPA requires agencies to look at the cumulative effects of multiple
fossil fuel leasing and transportation approvals; and propose best prac-
tices for agencies seeking to inform themselves and the public about the
climate impacts of our nation’s fossil fuel decisions. This Article concludes
in the last few paragraphs.
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INTRODUCTION
The world is at a critical juncture in the fight against climate
change. When the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015, the nations of
the world agreed that we must limit global warming to “well below” 2°C or
preferably 1.5°C above pre-industrial temperatures, recognizing that this
would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.1 But
the window of opportunity for meeting these targets is quickly closing.
1 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, annex I, art. 2 (Dec. 12, 2015).
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In 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) pub-
lished a report in which it found that global greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions must be reduced by nearly 50 percent by 2030 and reach net zero
levels by 2050 to have a reasonable chance of meeting the 1.5°C target.2
Reducing emissions at this speed and scale would require massive and
unprecedented changes in energy infrastructure and most critically a
rapid phase out of fossil fuels. Indeed, the vast majority of known fossil
fuel reserves must be left unused to have a chance of meeting the Paris
Agreement targets.3
Despite widespread agreement on the need for immediate and far-
reaching action, global GHG emissions and fossil fuel consumption con-
tinue to increase and the world remains on track to significantly exceed
2°C of warming.4 While many jurisdictions have enacted demand-side
policies aimed at regulating the end-use of fossil fuels,5 far less attention
has been given to supply-side policies aimed at limiting the production
of fossil fuels and the expansion of infrastructure intended to transport
those fuels to markets. To the contrary, governments continue to autho-
rize and even subsidize the development of new fossil fuel reserves as
well as the expansion of fossil fuel transport infrastructure.6 This is the
2 IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, AN IPCC SPECIAL
REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS
AND RELATED GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING
THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY (V. Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018).
3 GREG MUTTITT ET AL., THE SKY’S LIMIT: WHY THE PARIS CLIMATE GOALS REQUIRE A
MANAGED DECLINE OF FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION 20 (Collin Rees ed., 2016); Richard Heede
& Naomi Oreskes, Potential Emissions of CO2 and Methane from Proved Reserves of Fossil
Fuels: An Alternative Analysis, 36 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 12, 17 (2016); Christophe
McGlade & Paul Ekins, The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When
Limiting Global Warming to 2 °C, 517 NATURE 187, 187 (2015).
4 Nina Chestney, Climate policies put world on track for 3.3C warming: study, REUTERS
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-accord-warming/cli
mate-policies-put-world-on-track-for-3-3c-warming-study-idUSKBN1OA0Z2 [https://
perma.cc/V5ZU-F5ZY]; Kyla Mandel, World ‘not on track’ to stop 1.5 degrees of global
warming warns UN Secretary General, THINKPROGRESS (May 12, 2019), https://thinkprog
ress.org/world-not-on-track-to-stop-dangerous-climate-change-warns-un-secretary-gen
eral-58797036970f/ [https://perma.cc/276H-QLBX]; 2011 Warming Projections, CLIMATE
ACTION TRACKER, https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures [https://perma.cc
/2E7C-86TQ].
5 EPA, CUTTING POWER SECTOR CARBON POLLUTION : STATE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 8,
25, 32 (2016); David Roberts, It’s time to think seriously about cutting off the supply of
fossil fuels, VOX (May 31, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/4/3
/17187606/fossil-fuel-supply [https://perma.cc/9NKP-SF53].
6 The United States and other governments also continue to subsidize fossil fuels through
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case in the United States, where fossil fuel production reached record
levels in 2018,7 and where oil and gas pipelines have been constructed at
an unprecedented pace.8 There is a pressing need for the United States
and other governments to re-evaluate their position on fossil fuel supply
infrastructure in light of the growing threat of climate change.
In the United States, the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) provides the legal framework whereby the federal government
must evaluate the climate impacts of fossil fuel leasing and transport
proposals to make informed decisions about whether and how to proceed
with these proposals.9 Driven by litigation and public pressure, federal
agencies have analyzed how fossil fuel supply projects affect fossil fuel
use and GHG emissions in some of their NEPA reviews, but there are
major inconsistencies in agency practice as well as questions about the
accuracy and integrity of these assessments. In some instances, agencies
have sought to avoid any meaningful analysis of GHG emissions, down-
playing the significance of GHG impacts, or claiming that the impacts
are too uncertain to inform the agency’s decision about whether and how to
proceed with individual fossil fuel leasing or transportation proposals. At
the same time, the federal government has never conducted a program-
matic analysis to evaluate the cumulative effects of its leasing decisions
or transport approvals on fossil fuel use and GHG emissions. The result
is a patchwork of project-level NEPA documentation that provides only
pieces of insight on how federal decisions about fossil fuel supply infra-
structure affect fossil fuel use and GHG emissions.
policies such as tax breaks for fossil fuel exploration and low royalty rates for fossil fuels pro-
duced on public lands. See David Coady et al., Global Fossil Fuel Subsidies Remain Large:
An Update Based on Country-Level Estimates 23, 35 (IMF, Working Paper No. 19/89, 2019).
7 EIA, APRIL 2019 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 3 (2019), https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy
/data/monthly/archive/00351904.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2K8-7YJF]; EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2019, 12, 16 (2019), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/aeo2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X6AK-2CSL].
8 The United States is outpacing any other country in terms of pipeline development: over
50 percent of all oil and gas pipelines in preconstruction or construction stages are located
in the United States. See TED NACE ET AL., GLOBAL ENERGY MONITOR, PIPELINE BUBBLE:
NORTH AMERICA IS BETTING OVER $1 TRILLION ON A RISKY FOSSIL INFRASTRUCTURE BOOM
3–5 (2019), https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/GFITPipeline
Bubble_2019_v6.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ85-J2QA]; Global Fossil Project Tracker, GREEN
INFO. NETWORK, https://greeninfo-network.github.io/fossil_tracker/ [https://perma.cc/47MS
-D5XM] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
9 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012); Summary of the National
Environmental Policy Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-national
-environmental-policy-act/ [https://perma.cc/8RCE-SJXB] (last updated Aug. 15, 2019).
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Litigation has played a major role in prompting more thorough
analysis of GHG emission impacts.10 Our 2017 article, Downstream and
Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review,
analyzed whether NEPA required agencies to account for emissions from
activities that occur “upstream” or “downstream” on the fossil fuel supply
chain as indirect effects of proposed projects, and concluded that it does.11
Here, we focus on recent trends in environmental review and NEPA
litigation and examine some of the more nuanced questions of scope and
significance, related to agencies’ assumptions and analytical techniques,
as well as the core question of whether and to what extent NEPA re-
quires agencies to look at the cumulative effects of multiple fossil fuel
leasing and transportation approvals. We argue that agencies too often
short-change the public by seeking to limit the scope of their environ-
mental assessments and to elide the question of significance, and that
more comprehensive analyses are necessary in order to draw meaningful
conclusions about the effect of government decision-making on fossil fuel
use and climate change.
In our view, full compliance with NEPA’s requirements matters.
Critics may contend that NEPA is merely a “paper tiger” in that it im-
poses significant procedural obligations without any substantive require-
ment to mitigate or avoid adverse environmental impacts.12 But the NEPA
review process can lead to improved environmental decision-making, par-
ticularly when the statute’s procedural mandates are fully implemented
and enforced.13 The disclosure of environmental impacts makes an agency
10 There is a growing body of research on what NEPA requires in this context. See, e.g.,
Michael Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation for Fossil Fuel Extraction On Federal Lands,
42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 295, 313, 326 (2017); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Role of NEPA in
Fossil Fuel Resource Development and Use in the Western United States, 39 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 283, 285 (2012); Jessica Wentz, Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change on
the Built Environment: A Framework for Environmental Reviews, 45 ENVTL. L. REV.
11,015, 11,017, 11,019 (2015). See also James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars:
Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L.
REV. 119, 121–22, 126–27 (2018); James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building
the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 266, 304 (2019).
11 Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Emissions: The Proper
Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 181 (2017).
12 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Keith Mosman, The Overlooked Role of the National
Environmental Policy Act in Protecting the Western Environment: NEPA in the Ninth
Circuit, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 193, 198 (2012).
13 See id. at 195–99; Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger Awakens: North American Envi-
ronmental Law After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 395, 409, 425
(2001); Raymond Laws, NEPA and the Northern Integrated Supply Project: Wielding the
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accountable for those impacts, thus placing pressure on the agency to
mitigate or avoid adverse impacts which cannot be justified by the pro-
ject’s benefits or are otherwise unacceptable to the public. This appears
to be true for the fossil fuel supply proposals discussed in this Article: the
fact that agencies have tried to limit their GHG disclosures and down-
play the significance of GHG emissions suggests that they are concerned
about the potential consequences of such disclosure. But this practice
cannot continue. The federal government needs to assess and disclose the
emissions impact of the fossil fuel production and transportation infra-
structure that it authorizes, not only to support informed decision-making,
but also to ensure that the public has access to this information and can
meaningfully engage with policymakers on appropriate supply-side poli-
cies for fossil fuels.
Part I provides a factual and legal background. It discusses the
rationale for critically evaluating fossil fuel supply projects in the context
of climate change goals and policies, explains the scope of U.S. federal
authority over fossil fuel extraction and transport proposals, summarizes
NEPA requirements that are relevant to the U.S. government’s review
of such proposals, and reviews the evolution of federal practice and policy
on fossil fuel development and NEPA reviews. Part II summarizes and
synthesizes recent case law on the scope of GHG emissions that must be
disclosed as effects of fossil fuel supply projects under NEPA, focusing on
emissions which qualify as indirect effects, cumulative effects, and effects
of related actions. Part III examines new and emerging legal questions
that pertain to GHG emissions analysis under NEPA, particularly the
reasonableness of agency assumptions and findings related to (i) the
effect of fossil fuel supply projects on energy markets and fossil fuel end-
use, and the net emissions impact of the proposal in light of those market
impacts; (ii) the significance of GHG emissions impacts; and (iii) the
evaluation of alternatives and mitigation measures that would reduce
GHG emissions. The Conclusion includes a summary of key points and
recommendations on how agencies can best satisfy their NEPA obliga-
tions in this context.
I. BACKGROUND
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (“IPCC”) special
report on Global Warming of 1.5°C and the U.S. Global Change Research
‘Paper Tiger’ in the Tenth Circuit, 27 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV.
101, 102, 108, 111 (2016).
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Program’s (“USGCRP”) Fourth National Climate Assessment recognize
that rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will be needed to limit
global warming to 1.5°C or “well below” 2°C.14 Even if we attain this am-
bitious goal, the world will still experience a wide range of significant and
adverse impacts from climate change, but the potential impacts of 2°C or
3°C of warming would be dramatically worse.15 But despite broad scien-
tific consensus on this imperative and national commitments to address
climate change, GHG emissions and atmospheric concentrations continue
to increase, breaking records in both 2018 and 2019.16
Globally, fossil fuel combustion remains the dominant source of
anthropogenic GHG emissions as well as the primary driver of recent
emission increases.17 The growth in fossil fuel emissions actually acceler-
ated in 2017 and 2018 notwithstanding the adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment.18 In the United States, fossil fuel emissions increased by 2.7 percent
in 2018, the second-largest margin in twenty years, after three years of
decline.19 This increase occurred despite a steep drop in coal use because
the reductions in coal-related emissions were more than offset by signifi-
cant increases in oil and gas consumption.20
There is still a very narrow window of time in which action could
be taken to meet the Paris Agreement. One study found that it may still
be possible to limit global warming to 1.5°C if all fossil fuel-powered
infrastructure (power plants, factories, vehicles, ships, and planes) are
replaced by zero-carbon alternatives at the end of their useful lives and
no new fossil fuel–powered infrastructure is constructed, but the world
14 IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO
THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE
POVERTY v–vi (V. Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018); USGCRP, FOURTH NATIONAL CLI-
MATE ASSESSMENT VOL. II: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1351
(D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018).
15 IPCC, supra note 14.
16 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GLOBAL ENERGY & CO2 STATUS REPORT 2018 3 (2018); Global
Carbon Budget 2018, GLOBAL CARBON PROJECT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.globalcarbon
project.org/carbonbudget [https://perma.cc/996P-F43T]; Global Monthly Mean CO2, NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/global.html
[https://perma.cc/2CW2-56XN] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
17 See sources cited supra note 16.
18 Travis Houser et al., Final US Emissions Estimates for 2018, RHODIUM GRP. (May 31,
2019), https://rhg.com/research/final-us-emissions-estimates-for-2018/ [https://perma.cc
/QG94-TGN8].
19 Id.
20 Id.
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would likely exceed that target if this phase-out is delayed until 2030.21
This is in line with the IPCC’s findings that limiting global warming to
1.5°C would require “rapid and far-reaching” changes across all sectors,
particularly the energy and transport sectors.22
A. Thinking Critically About Fossil Fuel Supply and Climate Policy
To accelerate the fossil fuel phase-out, many advocate for supply-
side policies aimed at limiting fossil fuel extraction and the expansion of
infrastructure to transport fuels to end-users—the central message to
governments being to “keep it in the ground.”23 These advocacy efforts are
grounded in scientific research on fossil fuels and the global carbon bud-
get, most notably a 2015 study which found that the world would need to
leave at least 80 percent of the remaining known fossil fuel reserves un-
used in order to have a 50 percent chance of limiting global warming to
2°C.24 It is not just undeveloped reserves that need to be left in the ground:
another study on developed reserves found that the potential carbon emis-
sions from the oil, gas, and coal in the world’s currently operating fields
and mines would take us beyond 2°C if those reserves are fully exploited,
and that developed reserves of oil and gas alone are enough to push the
world beyond 1.5°C of warming even if coal is phased out immediately.25
Governments have been slow to enact supply-side restrictions, in
part because fossil fuel extraction and trade are viewed as central to
economic development and energy security, and in part because supply-
side actions are sometimes viewed as ineffective in a global market-
place.26 One critical question is whether government approvals of new
fossil fuel supply projects are fundamentally at odds with the imperative
to phase out fossil fuel use. The answer to this question may seem obvi-
ous, but different projects may warrant different conclusions: a proposal
21 Christopher J. Smith et al., Current Fossil Fuel Infrastructure Does Not Yet Commit
Us to 1.5 °C Warming, 10 NATURE COMM. 101 (2019).
22 IPCC, supra note 14.
23 See generally Kate Schimel, How the Keep it in the Ground movement came to be, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (July 19, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/how-the-keep-it-in-the-ground
-movement-gained-momentum [https://perma.cc/G4M2-ZXWT].
24 McGlade & Ekins, supra note 3, at 187.
25 MUTTITT ET AL., supra note 3.
26 For a more in-depth analysis of why supply-side policies have not been widely used to
date, see Michael Lazarus & Harro van Asselt, Fossil Fuel Supply and Climate Policy:
Exploring the Road Less Taken, 150 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 1–2 (2018); Michael Lazarus
et al., Supply-Side Climate Policy: The Road Less Taken 14 (Stockholm Environmental
Institute, Working Paper No. 2015-13, 2015).
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to exploit new coal reserves may be totally at odds with climate goals,
whereas a natural gas pipeline might be justified if there is sound evidence
that it will reduce coal use among end-users—but such a justification would
need to be supported by an analysis of whether there are alternatives to
coal and gas for meeting energy demand, such as renewables or efficiency
improvements, and whether the investment in new natural gas infra-
structure will “lock in” reliance on natural gas rather than carbon-free
energy substitutes. Upon careful assessment, decision makers may find
that the expansion of any fossil fuel production or transportation infra-
structure is irrational and imprudent in light of the need to immediately
and rapidly phase out fossil fuel use and the prospect that such invest-
ments may result in stranded assets within the next several decades.27
A related question is whether supply-side restrictions are both
effective at reducing fossil fuel use and in alignment with other policy goals.
Here, again, the analysis is complicated. Critics have argued that such
policies may be ineffective, economically suboptimal, and may threaten
energy security.28 But there is a growing body of research suggesting that
supply-side policies can and should be integrated into the portfolio of
government responses to climate change.29 For example, one study found
that “restrictive supply-side policy instruments (targeting fossil fuels) have
numerous characteristic economic and political advantages over otherwise
similar restrictive demand-side instruments (targeting greenhouse gases)”
including: (i) low administrative and transaction costs, (ii) higher abate-
ment certainty, (iii) comprehensive within-sector coverage, (iv) advanta-
geous price/efficiency effects, (v) the mitigation of infrastructure “lock-in”
risks, and (vi) mitigation of the “green paradox”—that is, the risk that poli-
cies reducing the value of fossil fuel resources will cause an increase in
consumption of those resources.30 Other studies have found that constrain-
ing fossil fuel production and supply can significantly increase fuel prices
27 For more information on stranded assets, see BEN CALDECOTT ET AL., STRANDED ASSETS:
A CLIMATE RISK CHALLENGE (Ana R. Rios ed., 2016); J.F. Mercure et al., Macroeconomic
Impact of Stranded Fossil Fuel Assetts, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 588 (2019); NACE ET
AL., supra note 8.
28 See, e.g., Michael A. Levi, The Environmental and Climate Stakes in Arctic Oil Drilling,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. BLOG (May 13, 2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/environmental
-and-climate-stakes-arctic-oil-drilling [https://perma.cc/W97S-Q2U2] (arguing that supply-
side restrictions on fossil fuel supply in one jurisdiction are ineffective due to global trade
in fossil fuels).
29 Fergus Green & Richard Denniss, Cutting With Both Arms of the Scissors: The Eco-
nomic and Political Case for Restrictive Supply-Side Climate Policies, 150 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 73, 78 (2018).
30 Id. at 73.
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thereby reducing consumption vis-à-vis lower carbon energy sources.31 In
particular, a 2018 study found that ceasing the issuance of new leases for
fossil fuel extraction on federal lands and waters in the United States
would reduce global CO2 emissions by an estimated 280 million tons annu-
ally by 2030, which would be comparable to the effects of other major
climate policies adopted or considered by the Obama administration.32
B. Federal Authority Over Fossil Fuel Extraction and Transport
The U.S. federal government oversees the leasing of coal, oil, and
gas reserves on public lands, which contain more than one quarter of the
country’s known fossil fuel reserves.33 The Department of Interior (“DOI”),
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), U.S. Forest Service (“USFS”),
31 Peter Erickson & Michael Lazarus, Would Constraining US Fossil Fuel Production
Affect Global CO2 Emissions? A Case Study of US Leasing Policy, 150 CLIMATIC CHANGE
29, 34 (2018) [hereinafter Erickson & Lazarus]; Taran Fæhn et al., Climate Policies in
a Fossil Fuel Producing Country—Demand Versus Supply Side Policies, 38 ENERGY J. 77,
83 (2017); Filip Johnson et al., The Threat to Climate Change Mitigation Posed by the
Abundance of Fossil Fuels, 19 CLIMATE POL’Y 258, 266 (2018); Lazarus & van Asselt,
supra note 26, at 5; Philippe Le Billon & Berit Kristoffersen, Just Cuts for Fossil Fuels?
Supply-Side Carbon Constraints and Energy Transition, 0 ENV’T & PLAN. 1, 4 (2019);
Georgia Piggot et al., Swimming Upstream: Addressing Fossil Fuel Supply Under the
UNFCCC, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 1189, 1190 (2018); Jianliang Wang et al., The Implications
of Fossil Fuel Supply Constraints on Climate Change Projections: A Supply-Side Analysis,
86 FUTURES 58, 66–67 (2017); Peter Erickson, Confronting Carbon Lock-In: Canada’s Oil
Sands, STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST. 7 (2018); Peter Erickson & Michael Lazarus, How Limiting
Oil Production Could Help California Meet its Climate Goals, STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST.
2 (2018); see Cleo Verkuijl et al., Aligning Fossil Fuel Production with the Paris Agreement,
STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST. 3 (Mar. 2018); Lazarus et al., supra note 26, at 6. Much of this
research focuses on the effects of constraining fossil fuel production, but imposing such
constraints on fossil fuel transportation infrastructure is also a supply-side approach
which would affect fuel prices, demand, and consumption. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED DEMAND FROM THE ELECTRIC
POWER SECTOR v–vi (Feb. 2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/02/f19/DOE
%20Report%20Natural%20Gas%20Infrastructure%20V_02-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QVS
-CRJS] (discussing how natural gas transmission constraints can increase prices); LESSLEY
GOUDARZI & FRANCES WOOD, ONLOCATION.INC, THE IMPACTS OF RESTRICTING FOSSIL FUEL
ENERGY PRODUCTION i (Apr. 2017) (finding that a U.S. policy consisting of restrictions on
both extraction and transport projects would result in economy-wide emission reductions
approximately 10 percent greater than a reference case without that policy).
32 Erickson & Lazarus, supra note 31, at 36–37.
33 Approximately one-third of known coal reserves, one quarter of crude oil reserves, and
one quarter of natural gas reserves are located on public lands and managed by the
federal government. MARC HUMPHRIES, U.S. CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
IN FEDERAL AND NONFEDERAL AREAS 2 (June 22, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R424
32.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ72-UG6J]; ROBERT H. NELSON, THE USE AND MANAGEMENT
OF FEDERAL COAL 9 (2017).
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Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management (“BOEM”), and Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (“OSM”) all share authority
over fossil fuel leasing on public lands and act as lead agencies in NEPA
reviews for these activities.34 The Mineral Leasing Act and other statutes
grant broad discretion to these agencies to decide how and whether to
lease federal lands for fossil fuel development, and the agencies can and
must account for environmental effects when making decisions about the
location and amount of lands made available for leasing.35
The federal government also has considerable authority over the
construction of infrastructure that is used to transport fossil fuels to do-
mestic and international markets. The Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (“FERC”) has authority over the siting, construction, and operation
of interstate natural gas pipelines, liquified natural gas (“LNG”) export
terminals, and associated infrastructure such as liquefaction facilities.36
In addition, Department of Energy (“DOE”) authorization is required for
LNG exports.37 The Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) has exclusive
licensing authority over the construction and operation of rail lines,
which are the primary mode of transport for coal.38 The federal govern-
ment does not have equivalent authority over the construction of oil
pipelines—however, such pipelines frequently require federal approvals
that trigger NEPA requirements.39 The statutes authorizing these agen-
cies to approve this infrastructure also require consideration of environ-
mental impacts and the responsible agencies have broad discretion to
deny approvals based on environmental impacts or other issues pertain-
ing to the public interest.40
34 Which agency oversees fossil fuel leasing depends on where the leasing occurs. For a
more detailed discussion, see ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40806, ENERGY
PROJECTS ON FEDERAL LANDS: LEASING AND AUTHORIZATION 4–12 (2012); Burger & Wentz,
supra note 11, at 116–26.
35 See VANN, supra note 34, at 4–12; Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 116–26.
36 LAWRENCE R. GREENFIELD, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 10 (June 2018), https://www
.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does/ferc101.pdf [https://perma.cc/G62N-8U76].
37 Liquified Natural Gas (LGE), DEP’T ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/fe/science-innova
tion/oil-gas/liquefied-natural-gas [https://perma.cc/R2G3-RVWA] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
38 49 U.S.C. § 10901 (2012) (establishing that a person may construct or add to railroad
lines only if authorized by the Board).
39 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012) (requiring a permit under Clean Water Act section
404 for any project that involves the discharge of dredged and/or fill materials into navi-
gable waters, tributaries, and adjacent wetlands); see also 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012) (re-
quiring a Rivers and Harbors Act section 10 permit for projects that involve construction
and/or dredge and fill activities in the navigable waters of the United States).
40 See Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 119–21.
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C. NEPA Requirements for Assessing Impacts of Fossil Fuel
Supply Projects
NEPA establishes a procedural framework for assessing the envi-
ronmental impacts of federal proposals and using those assessments to
make better-informed decisions about whether and how to proceed with
those proposals.41 The statute recognizes that it is “the continuing re-
sponsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means” to
“improve and coordinate” federal activities such that the nation may
“fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations.”42 To effectuate this policy, it requires
federal agencies to prepare a detailed environmental impact statement
(“EIS”) for proposals that significantly affect the quality of the human
environment, in which the agency must evaluate the environmental effects
of the proposal and reasonable alternatives.43 The statute also estab-
lishes a Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), which is responsible
for issuing regulations and guidance on the implementation of NEPA.44
The CEQ regulations and guidance are supplemented by agency-specific
rules and procedures for NEPA reviews.45
The Supreme Court has interpreted NEPA’s mandates as “essen-
tially procedural” because NEPA does not require agencies to adopt any
particular course of action based on the outcome of the review,46 but has
41 Much has already been written on NEPA’s sweeping environmental policies and review
requirements. See, e.g., Ted Boling, Making the Connection: NEPA Processes for National
Environmental Policy, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 313, 314–20 (2010); Bradley Karkkainen,
Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909–16 (2002).
42 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2006).
43 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
44 NEPA does not expressly state that CEQ shall develop implementing regulations for
NEPA. Rather, CEQ’s authority to issue regulations under NEPA is based on the duties
and functions outlined in Title II of NEPA, as well as two Executive Orders. See 42
U.S.C. § 4344(3) (directing CEQ to “review and appraise” federal programs and activities
to determine the extent to which they fulfill the statute’s stated policy, and to make
recommendations to the President with respect thereto); Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed.
Reg. 4248 (Mar. 7, 1970); Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977). Courts
have consistently deferred to CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989) (CEQ regulations are entitled to “sub-
stantial deference”); see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
45 Agency NEPA Implementing Procedures, CEQ, https://ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/agency
_implementing_procedures.html [https://perma.cc/7AHP-7X7C] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
46 Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 588 (1978).
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also recognized that NEPA serves an “action-forcing” function and its pro-
cedural mandates must be interpreted in light of its twin aims of prevent-
ing uninformed agency decisions and providing adequate disclosure to
allow public participation in those decisions.47 Thus, when assessing the
adequacy of NEPA documentation, courts must consider whether an agency
has overlooked or underestimated an important environmental impact that
is of consequence to the public’s understanding of the proposal and the
agency’s decision about whether and how to proceed with the proposal.48
Below, we summarize NEPA procedures and some of the core
requirements pertaining to the scope and adequacy of environmental
reviews, highlighting areas that are of particular relevance to the analy-
sis of fossil fuel supply projects and their contribution to climate change.
We focus on the requirements outlined in CEQ regulations, as these apply
to all federal projects. We also briefly touch on some aspects of CEQ’s 2016
guidance on climate change and NEPA reviews,49 which was rescinded
by President Trump,50 as well as the new draft guidance that CEQ issued
in June 2019 to take its place.51 Although the 2016 guidance is no longer
in effect,52 it provides some useful insights into how CEQ interpreted
NEPA requirements in the past and contains relatively specific instruc-
tions to agencies on how to meaningfully account for and assess the sig-
nificance of GHG emissions. The 2019 draft guidance, in comparison,
contains a number of provisions which appear aimed at limiting NEPA
disclosures of GHG emissions and climate change impacts, but in many
cases these provisions are too vague to provide meaningful direction, and
in many cases merely restate existing law.53
47 Methow Valley Citizens, 490 U.S. at 349. See also Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490
U.S. 360, 371 (1989) (referring to “the Act’s manifest concern with preventing uninformed
action”).
48 Methow Valley Citizens, 490 U.S. at 349.
49 Memorandum from the Council of Environmental Quality on Final Guidance for Fed-
eral Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the
Effects of Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-regulations-and-guidance/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y9Z7-FE46] [hereinafter CEQ, Final Guidance Memo].
50 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
51 CEQ, Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Green-
house Gas Emission, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (June 26, 2019) [hereinafter CEQ, 2019 Draft
GHG Guidance].
52 Exec. Order No. 13,783, supra note 50.
53 For example, the draft guidance directs agencies to quantify emissions where they are
“substantial enough to warrant quantification” (presumably seeking to curtail quantification)
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1. NEPA Procedures and Documentation Types
There are three types of documentation that can be used to demon-
strate compliance with NEPA. The EIS is the most comprehensive form
of documentation and, as provided in the statute, it is required for any
major federal action that has significant environmental impacts.54 If an
agency is unsure about whether an action will have significant environ-
mental impacts, it may prepare an environmental assessment (“EA”)—a
shorter document used to identify potentially significant impacts.55 Based
on the EA, the agency must either proceed with the preparation of a full
EIS or issue a finding of no significant impact (“FONSI”).56 The regula-
tions also permit agencies to designate categorical exclusions (“CEs”) for
categories of actions which the agency has determined “do not individually
or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment” and
thus do not require preparation of an EIS or EA.57
without providing any guidance on what is meant by “substantial enough” in this context.
CEQ, 2019 Draft GHG Guidance, supra note 51. It also tells agencies that impacts should
be “discussed in proportion to their significance” and tells agencies that they “need not
give greater consideration to potential effects from GHG emissions than to other potential
effects on the human environment.” Id. This is simply a restatement of NEPA require-
ments: agencies need not give greater consideration to any particular type of effect as a
general matter, but they must conduct a more in-depth analysis of potentially significant
impacts. For more on this topic, see Jessica Wentz, New Draft Guidance on Climate
Change and NEPA Reviews Unlikely to Significantly Affect Agency Practice or Judicial
Interpretation of NEPA Obligations, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (June 24, 2019), http://blogs.law
.columbia.edu/climatechange/2019/06/24/new-draft-guidance-on-climate-change-and-nepa
-reviews-unlikely-to-significantly-affect-agency-practice-or-judicial-interpretation-of-nepa
-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/Y92G-ACPU].
54 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1502.9, 1505.2 (2019) (preparing an EIS involves three steps: a
scoping phase, where public input on the scope of the review is solicited; a draft EIS
which is made available for public comment; and a final EIS which is published along
with a record of decision (ROD) indicating the course of action that the agency intends
to take); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b), 1501.4(e)(1) (The regulations are less explicit about the
process for preparing an EA—they state that the agency “shall involve environmental
agencies, applicants, and the public, to the extent practicable” when preparing EAs, and
that FONSIs must be made available to the affected public); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (The
regulations also contain some general provisions pertaining to public involvement, such
as a requirement to “[m]ake diligent efforts to involve the public in preparing and imple-
menting their NEPA procedures.”).
55 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9; see also National Environmental Policy Act Review Process,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process [https://
perma.cc/4MU3-YGNN] (last updated Jan. 24, 2017).
56 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13.
57 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
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2. Scope of Analysis: Actions, Impacts, and Alternatives
The CEQ regulations outline the proper scope of analysis for
NEPA reviews—that is, the “range of actions, alternatives, and impacts
to be considered” in a single impact statement.58
a. Scope of Impacts
First, regarding the scope of impacts, agencies must consider three
types of impacts: (i) direct effects, which are “caused by the action and
occur at the same time and place”; (ii) indirect effects, which are “caused
by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but
are still reasonably foreseeable”; and (iii) cumulative effects, which result
from “the incremental impact of the action when added to other past,
present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what
agency (federal or nonfederal) or person undertakes such other actions.”59
For proposals that involve fossil fuel supply infrastructure, direct
emissions would include emissions from vehicles and equipment used to
construct the infrastructure as well as emissions generated from the op-
eration of the infrastructure (e.g., methane emissions from coal mining).60
Indirect emissions from fossil fuel extraction proposals would include down-
stream emissions from the eventual transport, processing, and combustion
of the produced fossil fuels, and indirect emissions from fossil fuel trans-
port proposals would include not only downstream emissions but also
upstream emissions from the production of the transported fuel.61
As for the requirement to evaluate cumulative effects—there are
two ways that this could be interpreted in the context of a GHG assessment
for fossil fuel supply projects. One interpretation is that the impacts of
climate change (e.g., sea level rise) qualify as cumulative effects of the
proposal, since these impacts will occur when the proposal’s GHG emis-
sions are added to all other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable GHG
emissions. Certainly, a general description of climate change impacts could
be useful to decision makers and the public, but this type of analysis does
58 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.
59 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.8.
60 CEQ, Final Guidance Memo, supra note 49.
61 See Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 142–43, 149; infra Part II; see also CEQ, Final
Guidance Memo, supra note 49, at 13–14, 16. There are other emissions which may qualify
as indirect effects of fossil fuel supply projects, such as the emissions from induced vehicle
trips that occur offsite (e.g., worker commutes), but for the purposes of this Article we
focus on upstream and downstream emissions.
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not provide much insight on the specific action under review.62 Another
interpretation, which would likely generate more useful data for decision-
making on fossil fuel supply proposals, is that NEPA requires consideration
of the cumulative emissions from other reasonably foreseeable actions
affecting fossil fuel supply—for example, the cumulative effects analysis
for a coal leasing proposal should encompass cumulative emissions from
all federal coal leasing in the state, region, and/or nation. This second in-
terpretation is consistent with the CEQ’s guidance on cumulative effects
analysis which directs agencies to consider activities that are of a similar
nature or that have similar environmental effects when setting boundaries
for this analysis.63
b. Scope of Actions
Agencies must consider three types of “related actions” when deter-
mining the scope of an EIS: connected actions, cumulative actions, and
similar actions. Actions are considered “connected” if they: (i) automati-
cally trigger other actions which may require EISs, (ii) cannot or will not
proceed unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously, or
(iii) are independent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger
action for their justification.64 Such connected actions are “closely related
and therefore should be discussed in the same impact statement.”65 Cumu-
lative actions are those that “when viewed with other proposed actions
have cumulatively significant impacts” and like connected actions, they
should be discussed in the same impact statement.66 Similar actions are
62 CEQ, 2019 Draft GHG Guidance, supra note 51. CEQ’s 2019 revised draft guidance
endorses this approach, stating that agencies may satisfy the requirement to evaluate
cumulative effects by: (i) comparing the project’s GHG emissions to local, regional, national,
or sector-wide emissions, and (ii) providing a qualitative summary of the effects of GHG
emissions. This may be sufficient for some types of proposals. However, as discussed in
Section II.B, more may be required in the context of fossil fuel supply projects. There are
at least two recent decisions in which courts have required quantification of cumulative
emissions from federal fossil fuel-related approvals in this context. See WildEarth
Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 53 (D.D.C. 2019); Indigenous Envtl. Network v.
U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 590 (D. Mont. 2018) (requiring the Department
of State to disclose emissions from the Alberta Clipper pipeline as part of its cumulative
effects analysis for the Keystone XL pipeline).
63 CEQ, CONSIDERATION OF CUMULATIVE EFFECTS UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT 13 tbl. 2-1 (1997).
64 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1).
65 Id. (emphasis added).
66 Id. § 1508.25(a)(2).
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those which “have similarities that provide a basis for evaluating their
environmental consequences together, such as common timing or geogra-
phy.”67 The regulations state that “[a]n agency may wish to analyze these
actions in the same impact statement” but that an agency “should do so
when the best way to assess adequately the combined impacts of similar
actions or reasonable alternatives to such actions is to treat them in a
single impact statement.”68
The regulations also prohibit improper segmentation of proposals.
One provision specifies that “[p]roposals or parts of proposals which are
related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action
shall be evaluated in a single impact statement.”69 Reinforcing this point
the section of the regulations which deals with significance determinations
states that an agency cannot break down an action into “small component
parts”—or improperly segment an action—in order to avoid a determina-
tion that the action will have a significant effect on the environment.70
There is overlap between the requirement to review “indirect im-
pacts” and impacts from “connected actions.” Consider a situation where
the federal government is simultaneously reviewing a coal lease applica-
tion and a proposal to construct a railway to transport the coal from the
mine to end-users (or an existing rail system). The emissions from the
railway would qualify as “indirect effects” of the coal mine and vice versa,
and both actions would also qualify as “connected actions” that lack in-
dependent utility and should thus be reviewed in a single NEPA document
(even if two different agencies are responsible for the approvals). How-
ever, if there is no pending federal action for a connected activity, the
proper approach would be to analyze the emissions from the nonfederal
activity as indirect effects of the federal action.
There is also overlap between the requirement to review “cumula-
tive effects” and the requirement to review impacts from cumulative and
similar actions. For example, an agency could treat emissions from
multiple fossil fuel leasing decisions as cumulative effects in the EIS for
an individual leasing proposal, or it could prepare a single EIS to evalu-
ate those leasing decisions as cumulative and/or similar actions. Again,
67 Id. 1508.25(a)(3).
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (emphasis added).
70 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(7). The regulations are not explicit about the relationship between
the prohibition on improper segmentation and the requirement to consider “related actions”
under section 1508.25. One plausible interpretation is that actions which qualify as
“connected actions” under section 1508.25 are “related . . . closely enough to be, in effect,
a single course of action.”
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the best approach depends on whether there are multiple federal proposals
simultaneously under review by an agency.
c. Scope of Alternatives
Finally, regarding the scope of alternatives, agencies must con-
sider alternatives which include a no action alternative, other reasonable
courses of action, and mitigation measures (not in the proposed action).71
The regulations further provide that the analysis of alternatives is the
“heart of the environmental impact statement” and that this analysis
“should present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the al-
ternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and
providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker and
the public.”72 In addition, agencies must “rigorously explore and objec-
tively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which
were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their
having been eliminated.”73
In NEPA reviews for fossil fuel supply projects, the alternatives
analysis can and in many cases should be used to evaluate the merits of
different fossil fuel development and transportation scenarios. For ex-
ample, when preparing an EIS for a resource management plan (“RMP”)
under which federal lands may be opened for fossil fuel development, an
agency must consider different leasing scenarios (with different acreage
and levels of production) as well as different land uses and approaches to
meeting energy demand (e.g., renewable energy development) in addition
to the “no action” alternative.74 This is precisely the sort of analysis that
would facilitate an informed decision about the best uses of public lands.
Agencies may also compare fossil fuel production and consumption
scenarios under the proposal and the no action alternative to estimate the
net impact of the proposal on fossil fuel use and corresponding emissions.
The underlying assumption is that energy demand will be met through
other sources (energy substitutes) if the proposal is not approved, and
these energy substitutes will also generate emissions when they are
produced, transported, and consumed. Thus, the emissions from energy
substitutes under the no action alternative can be subtracted from the
proposal’s gross emissions in order to reach an estimate of net emissions.
71 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(b).
72 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
73 Id.
74 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.
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Alternatively, if an agency finds that there is too much uncertainty to
model the effects on energy markets, it could rely on estimates of gross indi-
rect emissions to measure the proposal’s contribution to climate change.75
3. Significance and Mitigation
The regulations also contain additional instructions on how agen-
cies should go about analyzing environmental impacts and their signifi-
cance. EISs should be “analytic rather than encyclopedic” and impacts
should “be discussed in proportion to their significance.”76 Agencies must
discuss the significance of both direct and indirect effects, taking into
account the context and intensity of the impact as well as other more
specific considerations, such as whether the impact is highly uncertain
or controversial and whether the action is related to other individually
insignificant but cumulatively significant actions.77 The regulations also
address how agencies should handle missing or incomplete information
about potentially significant environmental impacts, including indirect
impacts. In these circumstances, agencies are required to obtain any
missing information that is essential to a reasoned choice among alterna-
tives, unless the costs of obtaining the information are exorbitant or the
information is simply unavailable.78
Finally, the regulations call for consideration of mitigation ap-
proaches for impacts that are found to be significant. “Mitigation” is
defined as:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain
action or parts of an action. (b) Minimizing impacts by
limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its imple-
mentation. (c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabili-
tating, or restoring the affected environment. (d) Reducing
or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and
75 See infra Section III.A.
76 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2.
77 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.27.
78 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b). If an agency cannot obtain the missing information due to exor-
bitant costs or infeasibility, it must provide: (i) a statement that such information is incom-
plete or unviable, (ii) a statement of the relevance of the information, (iii) a summary of
existing credible scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating environmental impacts
in the absence of such information, and (iv) the agency’s evaluation of such impacts based
on theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific com-
munity. Id.
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maintenance operations during the life of the action. (e)
Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing
substitute resources or environments.79
Notably, while the regulations require consideration of such measures,
NEPA and its implementing regulations do not contain a substantive
requirement to actually implement mitigation measures for significant
impacts.80 Agencies, however, do have the authority to require mitigation
of impacts as a condition of agency approvals; agencies also may require
mitigation to avoid a determination of significant impacts and thereby
avoid preparation of an EIS.81
No federal agency has yet established a threshold for what consti-
tutes a “significant” GHG contribution, and the CEQ intentionally omitted
such a threshold from the rescinded guidance.82 That guidance did, how-
ever, contain a recommendation against using comparisons to overall
GHG emissions as a basis for evaluating significance:
[A] statement that emissions from a proposed Federal ac-
tion represent only a small fraction of global emissions is
essentially a statement about the nature of the climate
change challenge, and is not an appropriate basis for decid-
ing whether or to what extent to consider climate change
impacts under NEPA. Moreover, these comparisons are also
not an appropriate method for characterizing the potential
impacts associated with a proposed action and its alterna-
tives and mitigations because this approach does not reveal
anything beyond the nature of the climate change chal-
lenge itself: the fact that diverse individual sources of
emissions each make a relatively small addition to global
atmospheric GHG concentrations that collectively have a
large impact. When considering GHG emissions and their
significance, agencies should use appropriate tools and
79 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20.
80 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.20, 1508.25, 1508.27.
81 CEQ, Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use
of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate use of Mitigated Findings
of No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3843 (Jan. 21, 2011).
82 CEQ, Revised Draft Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in NEPA Reviews, 79
Fed. Reg. 77,802, 77,807, 77,809–11 (Dec. 24, 2014) [hereinafter CEQ, 2014 Revised Draft
Guidance].
444 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 44:423
methodologies for quantifying GHG emissions and com-
paring GHG quantities across alternative scenarios. Agen-
cies should not limit themselves to calculating a proposed
action’s emissions as a percentage of sector, nationwide, or
global emissions in deciding whether or to what extent to
consider climate change impacts under NEPA.83
There is no reason that the lack of a significance threshold should
prevent agencies from reaching significance determinations for GHG
emissions. Agencies frequently assess the significance of other impacts
in the absence of predetermined significance thresholds.84 And even if the
exact threshold of significance for GHG emissions is unknown, there are
circumstances in which an action’s emissions obviously surpass any
reasonable metric of significance when viewed in terms of social costs.85
D. Evolving Federal Policy and Practice on Fossil Fuels and NEPA
Reviews
Federal agencies have made important progress towards meaning-
ful evaluation and disclosure of GHG effects in NEPA reviews for fossil fuel
supply projects. Litigation has played an important role in driving such
disclosures, but executive policies and guidance have also helped to shape
agency practice. Here, we summarize some key policy developments that
occurred under the Obama and Trump administrations and discuss how
federal practice in this area has evolved over the past decade.
1. Policy Developments Pertaining to Fossil Fuel Approvals and
NEPA Reviews
The federal government has long supported fossil fuel production on
federal lands and the expansion of fossil fuel transportation infrastructure.
83 CEQ, Final Guidance Memo, supra note 49, at 11. In contrast, CEQ’s 2019 guidance
recommends that agencies compare the proposal’s emissions to local, regional, national,
or sector-wide emissions as part of the cumulative effects analysis. See supra note 62.
While such comparisons can provide useful information to decision makers and the
public, agencies should not rely on these exclusively for the reasons articulated in the
2016 guidance.
84 CEQ, 2014 Revised Draft Guidance, supra note 82 (examples of impacts for which
agencies lack quantitative significance thresholds include impacts on public health,
species and ecosystems, cultural resources, recreational values, and aesthetic values).
85 The true cost of carbon pollution: How the social cost of carbon improves policies to ad-
dress climate change, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/true-cost-carbon-pollution
[https://perma.cc/NHM6-HUFJ] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
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During the Obama administration, federal agencies approved new coal, oil,
and gas leases, as well as numerous oil and gas pipelines and LNG export
terminals.86 During Obama’s second term the administration adopted
several policies that signaled decreasing support for fossil fuels. First, the
administration offered fewer new leases and less acreage for coal, oil, and
gas development on federal lands and waters between 2012 and 2016.87
Second, DOI Secretarial Order 3338 established a moratorium on federal
coal leasing in 2016 accompanied by a commitment to prepare a program-
matic EIS (“PEIS”) for the federal coal leasing program.88 One of the key
issues to be addressed in the PEIS was the effect of the program on GHG
emissions (including downstream emissions) and climate change.89
In addition to these leasing actions, the administration adopted
the CEQ guidance on consideration of climate change in 2016 which, as
noted above, directed agencies to account for upstream and downstream
emissions in NEPA reviews for fossil fuel supply projects and to quantify
those emissions where tools and data were available to do so.90 The
administration also adopted a number of other relevant policies and
guidance, including federal metrics for estimating the social cost of GHG
emissions,91 department- and agency-specific guidance on accounting for
86 See, e.g., Oil and Gas Statistics, U.S. BUREAU LAND MGMT., tbl. 3, https://www.blm.gov
/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/oil-and-gas-statistics [https://perma.cc/62LE
-A6FZ] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) (BLM issued 7,297 oil and gas leases during President
Obama’s first term, and 3,997 oil and gas leases during his second term.).
87 Id. See also Coal Data: National Coal Statistics Table, U.S. BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://
www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/coal/coal-data [https://perma.cc/74Q5-AXF7]
(last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
88 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3338, DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TO MODERNIZE THE FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM 1, 8–9 (Jan. 15,
2016).
89 U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM PEIS—SCOPING REPORT, 17–23
(2017).
90 CEQ, Final Guidance Memo, supra note 49. Other agencies, such as USFS and BLM,
had also published or were developing their own guidance on accounting for climate
change in NEPA reviews. See, e.g., Climate Change Considerations in Project Level NEPA
Analysis, U.S. FOREST SERV. (2009), https://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nepa/climate_change/in
cludes/cc_nepa_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8A9-9G4X].
91 See INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON THE SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES,
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (May 2013, revised Aug.
2016); see also INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON THE SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES,
ADDENDUM TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGU-
LATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866: APPLICATION OF THE METH-
ODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE THE SOCIAL COST OF METHANE AND THE SOCIAL COST OF NITROUS
OXIDE (Aug. 2016) (These metrics were developed for cost-benefit analyses in rule-makings,
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climate change in public land management,92 and guidance on compensa-
tory mitigation for adverse impacts arising from fossil fuel development
and other extractive uses of public lands.93
The election of President Trump signaled a major shift in execu-
tive policy. The Trump administration made it a priority to support fossil
fuel development and use under the mantra of “energy dominance.”94 In
particular, the administration has taken measures to: (i) scale up fossil fuel
production on federal lands and waters by expanding the areas available
for leasing and removing regulatory barriers to the issuance of leases95
and (ii) expedite the review of pipelines and other fossil fuel transporta-
tion infrastructure.96 These supply-side actions are paired with actions
but can also be utilized in project-level emission assessments and, as noted in Part III,
some courts have required their use in the NEPA context.).
92 See, e.g., Navigating the Climate Change Performance Scorecard, U.S. FOREST SERV.
(2011), https://www.fs.fed.us/climatechange/advisor/scorecard/scorecard-guidance-08-20
11.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4WX-V5JS].
93 See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. MANUAL SECTION 1794—MITIGATION (Dec. 22,
2016); U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. MITIGATION HANDBOOK H-1794-1 (Dec. 22, 2016).
94 See About: Mission, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/whoweare [https://perma
.cc/GA7H-LLFN] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) (“promot[ing] energy dominance” is the first
major goal outlined for DOI).
95 See, e.g., Notice of Availability of the 2019–2024 Draft Proposed Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement, 83 Fed. Reg. 829, 830 (Jan. 2018); 2017–2022 Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: Proposed Final Program, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY
MGMT. (Nov. 2016), https://www.boem.gov/2017-2022-OCS-Oil-and-Gas-Leasing-PFP/
[https://perma.cc/DU63-6T2D]; Coastal Plain Oil and Gas Leasing EIS, U.S. DEP’T IN-
TERIOR (Sept. 2019), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/eplanning/planAndProject
Site.do?methodName=dispatchToPatternPage&currentPageId=152110 [https://perma.cc
/74ZQ-E897] (In January 2018, BOEM issued a proposed National Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program for 2019–2024, which would make over 90 percent
of the outer continental shelf (“OCS”) available for future oil and gas exploration and
development. In comparison with the 2019–2024 Draft, the 2017–2022 offshore leasing
program (which would be superseded by this new program) put 94 percent of the OCS off-
limits to oil and gas development. The Draft Proposed Program (“DPP”) includes forty-
seven potential lease sales in twenty-five of twenty-six planning areas—which, according
to DOI, is the largest number of lease sales ever proposed for the OCS five-year lease
schedule. The administration also took measures to expand leasing areas in the Arctic,
and in December 2018, BLM issued a proposal for a Coastal Plain Oil and Gas Leasing
Program in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (“ANWR”) which would make up to 1.5
million acres of the ANWR open for oil and gas development. In March 2019, BLM lifted
restrictions on mineral development on approximately nine million acres of sage grouse
habitat, opening these previously protected areas for oil and gas leasing and other
extractive uses. Many of these actions were challenged in court, and litigation was, at the
time of this writing, still pending.).
96 See JESSICA WENTZ & MICHAEL GERRARD, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW,
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aimed at lifting “downstream” restrictions on fossil fuel use, such as the
emission standards for power plants and motor vehicles originally pro-
mulgated under the Obama administration.97
Some of the Trump administration’s major executive actions
affecting NEPA reviews for fossil fuel supply projects include:
• The issuance of multiple executive orders directing
agencies to streamline approvals for fossil fuel leas-
ing and energy infrastructure;98
• The revocation of the CEQ’s 2016 guidance on cli-
mate change,99 and promulgation of new draft
guidance;100
• The revocation of the federal metrics developed for
the social cost of carbon (SC-CO2), methane (SC-
CH4) and nitrous oxide (SC-N2O);101 and
• The termination of the programmatic review of the
federal coal leasing and the moratorium that had
been put in place pending that review.102
Acting pursuant to these directives, DOI and its constituent agen-
cies also adopted more specific policies and guidance aimed at expediting
and curtailing reviews of coal, oil, and gas leases. For example, BLM
issued an instruction memorandum to its field offices on January 31,
2018, which establishes a BLM policy “to simplify and streamline the
leasing process [for oil and gas] to alleviate unnecessary impediments
and burdens, to expedite the offering of lands for lease, and to ensure
quarterly oil and gas lease sales are consistently held.”103 The instruction
PERSISTENT REGULATIONS: A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S
EFFORTS TO REPEAL FEDERAL CLIMATE PROTECTIONS (2019); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, ECONOMIC REPORT: FY 2017 5 (Oct. 19, 2018), https://doi.sciencebase.gov/doidv
/files/2017/pdf/FY%202017%20Econ%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJA2-ZKP7].
97 WENTZ & GERRARD, supra note 96, at 39–40.
98 Exec. Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 10, 2019); Exec. Order No. 13,867,
84 Fed. Reg. 15,491 (Apr. 10, 2019); Exec. Order No. 13,807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (Aug. 24,
2017); Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (May 3, 2017).
99 Exec. Order No. 13,783, supra note 50.
100 CEQ, 2019 Draft GHG Guidance, supra note 51.
101 Exec. Order No. 13,783, supra note 50.
102 DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3348, CONCERNING THE FEDERAL COAL MORA-
TORIUM 1 (Mar. 29, 2017).
103 Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-034: Updating Oil and Gas Leasing Reform from
the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Land Mgmt. to all field officials 1 (Jan. 31, 2018),
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memorandum reduces the amount of time that BLM field offices have to
review environmental impacts and receive public feedback. It limits the
time frame for parcel review for a specific lease sale to six months and
limits the amount of time allotted for public protest of lease sales to ten
days after notice is posted.104 It also seeks to eliminate opportunities for
public review and disclosure of environmental impacts from oil and gas
development on public lands.105
These policy changes have resulted in more fossil fuel production
on federal lands. DOI announced that the revenue generated from oil and
gas lease sales on public lands in 2018 was nearly triple that of the next
highest grossing year on record.106 Granted, coal production and use con-
tinued to decline in 2018, but the emissions reduction benefits of declining
coal use were more than offset by increased emissions from oil and gas,
and both oil and gas production are projected to increase significantly
over the next decade.107 The administration also approved several major
coal mining leases that could affect coal prices and consumption in the
years ahead.108 This situation seems untenable at a time when fossil fuel
use needs to be phased out rapidly. The duration of these leasing plans
and anticipated lifetime of these transportation projects range from ten
years to several decades or more—considerably longer than the time
frame in which fossil fuels need to be phased out.109
https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2018-034 [https://perma.cc/WH4L-RVVL] [hereinafter BLM,
Memo No. 2018-034]. The U.S. Forest Service has also signaled its intent to modify its
regulations in order to streamline and expedite the issuance of oil and gas permits on
National Forest lands. See Oil and Gas Resources, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,458 (Sept. 13, 2018).
104 BLM, Memo No. 2018-034, supra note 103.
105 Id.
106 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Energy Revolution Unleashed: Interior Shat-
ters Previous Records with $1.1 Billion in 2018 Oil and Gas Lease Sales (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.doi.gov/news/energy-revolution-unleashed-interior-shatters-previous-records
-11-billion-2018-oil-and-gas [https://perma.cc/4YN6-TXDH].
107 Kate Wheeling, U.S. Oil Production is Set to Rise As Experts Say Fossil Fuels Need to
be Phased Out, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 16, 2019), https://psmag.com/environment/us-oil-pro
duction-is-set-to-rise-as-experts-say-fossil-fuels-need-to-be-phased-out [https://perma.cc
/5942-UUZX].
108 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, The War on Coal is Over: Interior Announces
Historic Coal Projects in Utah (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/war-coal
-over-interior-announces-historic-coal-projects-utah [https://perma.cc/W4ZF-LWEH].
109 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Energy Revolution Unleashed: Interior Shat-
ters Previous Records with $1.1 Billion in 2018 Oil and Gas Lease Sales (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.doi.gov/news/energy-revolution-unleashed-interior-shatters-previous-records
-11-billion-2018-oil-and-gas [https://perma.cc/5Y3X-JGPB].
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It is within this policy context that federal agencies must now
conduct NEPA reviews for fossil fuel supply projects. As discussed below,
agency practice on GHG analysis and disclosures has improved in many
respects—in particular, agencies are more transparent about the down-
stream emissions from combustion of fossil fuels in NEPA reviews for
fossil fuel leasing proposals—and there has not been significant “back-
tracking” during the Trump administration. This is a testament to the
power of litigation and the importance of court decisions. The Trump
administration’s 2019 revised draft guidance on climate change and
NEPA reviews is unlikely to significantly affect agency practice or judi-
cial review in this context, in part for reasons noted above (the guidance
is very vague and primarily a restatement of existing law) and in part
because it would only be entitled to Skidmore deference.110
2. Trends in NEPA Practice
Between 2009 and 2016, federal agencies began to account for
GHG emissions in NEPA reviews for land management plans and leases
authorizing fossil fuel extraction from federal lands and waters.111 However,
many of these proposals were approved without a meaningful assessment
of indirect emissions from the transport, processing and use of the pro-
duced fuels, or cumulative emissions from multiple leasing decisions.112
Some agencies did recognize that downstream emissions—particularly
emissions from the combustion of produced fuels—qualified as “indirect
effects” and quantitative disclosures of combustion emissions became
increasingly common during this period.113 But practice varied consider-
ably both across and within agencies, resulting in inconsistencies across
NEPA documentation.114
In some documents, agencies would argue that authorizing fossil
fuel production on federal lands would have no actual effect on fossil fuel
110 When a court reviews agency guidance documents, the agency’s interpretation is en-
titled to “respect proportional to its power to persuade” in light of the agency’s “thoroughness,
logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight.”
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
111 See Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, for a more detailed discussion of how federal
agencies were accounting for indirect GHG emissions in their NEPA documentation
during this period.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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consumption and downstream emissions because other sources of coal,
oil, or gas would be extracted and used at the same rates if the federal
proposals were not approved (an argument that is often referred to as
“perfect substitution”).115 In effect, agencies were claiming that the GHG
impact would be identical under both the proposed action and the no
action alternative. The problem with this approach was that it ignored
potential effects of production projects on fossil fuel prices and demand.
There were similar inconsistencies in NEPA reviews of fossil fuel
transportation infrastructure. The State Department, DOE, and U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) discussed upstream and downstream
emissions as potential indirect effects in some of the NEPA documenta-
tion prepared for these projects.116 However, FERC—which conducted the
largest number of reviews due to its authority over natural gas pipelines
and export terminals—consistently maintained that upstream and down-
stream emissions did not qualify as indirect effects of its approvals because:
(i) the approvals were not the legally relevant cause of those emissions, and
(ii) even if there was a causal relationship, the emissions were too specu-
lative to estimate.117 Granted, other agencies made similar arguments in
some of their NEPA documentation (and when defending those docu-
ments in court)118 but none had as firm a policy on the issue as FERC.
Even with the inconsistencies in agency practice, there was a
clear trend towards greater disclosure of indirect emissions during this
period.119 This up-tick in federal disclosures was driven, at least in part,
by litigation. By 2017, over a dozen lawsuits had been filed challenging
the approval of fossil fuel leasing and pipeline proposals because the lead
agency failed to adequately consider upstream and/or downstream green-
house gas emissions in its NEPA review.120 The critical question in most
of these cases was whether such upstream and downstream emissions
qualified as indirect effects of these proposals.121 In early decisions in-
volving NEPA reviews for fossil fuel leasing, courts made it clear that
downstream emissions from the consumption of the fossil fuels that would
be extracted under the lease qualified as indirect effects under NEPA,
and that agencies should quantify those emissions wherever tools and
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS, KEYSTONE XL (2014) § 1.4
(“Market Analysis”); Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at Part II.
117 See Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 137.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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data were available to do so.122 Courts also rejected perfect substitution
arguments as a basis for ignoring downstream emissions from leasing.123
The issue was not so clearly resolved in early decisions involving fossil
fuel transportation projects—some courts required disclosure of upstream
and/or downstream emissions; others did not.124 That issue continues to
be litigated.125
The litigation has led to a shift in agency practice, at least for
proposals involving fossil fuel production. For the most part, agencies
overseeing fossil fuel production no longer argue perfect substitution as
the grounds for ignoring downstream emissions.126 Instead, agencies some-
times provide a quantitative estimate of downstream emissions (often
limited to combustion emissions) accompanied by a qualitative statement
about how the actual (net) emissions from the proposal will be much lower
as a result of energy substitution under the no action alternative.127 In
that context, agencies may conclude that it is impossible to measure the
actual effect of the proposal on climate change, and thus there is no sig-
nificance determination or discussion of mitigation measures.128 Another
approach, more common for major leasing proposals, is to use energy
market models to compare emissions from fossil fuels produced under the
proposal with emissions from energy substitutes under the no action al-
ternative to generate an estimate of net emissions.129 While this approach
seems reasonable in theory, there are potential problems in practice. The
model results are dependent on parameters (i.e., assumptions about
122 See id.
123 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 152.
124 Id.
125 See infra Section II.A. At the time of this writing, there is no case invalidating an EIS
for failure to consider upstream emissions, but there are cases upholding EISs because
they properly accounted for upstream emissions. Whether quantification is required under
NEPA depends on whether tools and data are available to do so.
126 See Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 152.
127 Id.
128 See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERV., SUPPLEMENTAL FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT, FEDERAL COAL LEASE MODIFICATIONS COC-1362 & COC-67232 at 128 (2017):
All that can be gleamed from this analysis is that relative to the al-
ternatives themselves, the no action produces the least amount of
incremental GHG increases. This does not however translate directly
into climate change impact reductions due to the complexities involved
with estimating the coal supply market responses to current demand, cur-
rent fuel substitution transitions to non-coal fuels (beyond the scope of
this analysis), and how other governments and sectors of the global eco-
nomy implement or fail to implement GHG emissions reduction strategies.
129 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 179.
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energy resources, price elasticity, and demand) that are highly uncertain
and can be manipulated to achieve an intended result.130 But these are
not necessarily insurmountable problems. Agencies can address uncer-
tainty by using multiple scenarios in their energy market analysis (e.g.,
with different assumptions about energy prices and elasticity) and they
can address concerns about integrity and data manipulation by being
transparent about the assumptions underpinning their analysis.
As for transportation infrastructure: starting in 2016, FERC started
to include increasing amounts of information on upstream and down-
stream GHG emissions in its pipeline orders.131 This appeared to be
driven by the Obama administration’s policy and guidance on NEPA
reviews as well as case law requiring disclosure of downstream emissions
in other contexts. But FERC placed caveats on this information and
analysis—for example, in one EIS where FERC quantified downstream
emissions from a pipeline approval pursuant to a D.C. Circuit Court order,
FERC claimed that it could not use the quantified downstream GHG
emission estimates to evaluate the proposal “[b]ecause the No Action
Alternative could result in lesser, equal, or greater GHG emissions” than
the scenario in which the pipeline is approved.132 FERC has also asserted
that natural gas pipelines would likely decrease emissions (due to fuel
switching from coal to gas) without conducting any analysis to support
this conclusion.133 In 2018, FERC announced that it would no longer even
quantify downstream or upstream emissions for most pipeline orders
because the effect of pipeline approvals on upstream and downstream
emissions was not reasonably foreseeable and therefore not an indirect
or cumulative effect that must be evaluated under NEPA.134
130 Id.
131 See Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (LaFleur, dissenting).
132 FERC, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS, SOUTHEAST MARKET PIPELINES PROJECT, EIS 0279F
at 9 (2018).
133 See, e.g., Petitioners’ Joint Opening Brief at 20, Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, No.
17-1098 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2018).
134 Dominion Transmission, Inc., supra note 131; Gavin Bade, Divided FERC restricts
climate impacts in pipeline reviews, UTILITY DIVE (May 18, 2018), https://www.utilitydive
.com/news/divided-ferc-restricts-climate-impacts-in-pipeline-reviews/523892/
[https://perma.cc/7448-HSAX]. FERC came under considerable scrutiny for this policy
and many of its pipeline approvals are currently being challenged in court. Moreover, two
of the five FERC commissioners—Cheryl LaFleur and Richard Glick—dissented with the
order establishing the policy on the grounds that downstream and upstream emissions
do qualify as indirect or cumulative impacts of pipeline approvals. Dominion Trans-
mission, Inc., supra note 131. Commissioner Glick characterized FERC’s position as a
“remarkably narrow view of its responsibilities under NEPA” and Commissioner LaFleur
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There are also some trends which have become prevalent in NEPA
reviews for all types of fossil fuel supply proposals. One example is that
federal agencies are refusing to disclose social costs of emissions on the
grounds that such a cost disclosure is neither required by NEPA nor
helpful to decision makers.135 Another example relates to significance
determinations for GHG emissions.136 The NEPA documentation for both
production and transportation projects often contains no discussion (or
only a limited discussion) of the significance criteria outlined in the
regulations.137 Instead, the significance “analysis” may entail a comparison
of emissions to state, national, or global totals (contrary to the recom-
mendations in the rescinded CEQ guidance), a statement about uncer-
tainty due to energy market substitution, and/or a statement about how
there is no significance threshold for GHG emissions and thus no way of
defining significance. Based on this cursory analysis, agencies either
conclude that emissions are insignificant or do not reach a conclusion on
the matter.138 We are not aware of any EIS in which an agency has
concluded that emissions from fossil fuel production or transportation
qualify as a “significant” impact, even in the context of proposals that
would generate millions of tons of GHGs.139 It also appears that agencies
are heavily relying on EAs and FONSIs for oil and gas lease approvals,
and hundreds (possibly thousands) of oil and gas leases have been ap-
proved based on FONSIs in the past two years.140
As federal policies and agency practice have changed, so too has
the focus of litigation on the adequacy of the GHG analysis for fossil fuel
noted that FERC’s position was in direct conflict with the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation
of what NEPA required. Id. Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur announced that she would
depart from the commission’s policy and consider upstream and downstream emissions
in her review and consider the broad climate impacts of new natural gas infrastructure
when voting on whether to approve new projects. Id.; see also ROMANY WEBB, SABIN CTR.
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, CLIMATE CHANGE, FERC, AND NATURAL GAS PIPELINES: THE
LEGAL BASIS FOR CONSIDERING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE
NATURAL GAS ACT 4 (2019) (finding that FERC rarely considers climate change effects
when deciding whether to approve pipeline projects).
135 WEBB, supra note 134, at 30.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id at 44.
139 See MADELEINE SIEGEL & ALEXANDER LOZNAK, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW,
SURVEY OF GREENHOUSE GAS CONSIDERATIONS IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS FOR FOSSIL FUEL–RELATED PROJECTS,
2017–2018 at 2–3 (2019).
140 See id. at 15–16.
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supply projects. There are still many lawsuits involving an agency’s
failure to disclose certain categories of emissions—particularly indirect
emissions, cumulative emissions, and emissions from related actions. We
discuss these cases involving the proper scope of analysis in Part II.
There are also a number of lawsuits that address questions related to the
mode or adequacy of analysis—e.g., whether the analysis itself is techni-
cally sound, supported by the record, and consistent with the requirements
of NEPA regulations. The critical questions include:
• What are reasonable assumptions about energy
market impacts, energy substitutions, the “net” ef-
fect of the proposal on fossil fuel production and
consumption (and the corresponding emissions)?
• How should an agency go about assessing the sig-
nificance of emissions? Must agencies use tools
such as social cost estimates or a global carbon
budget to better understand the severity of the
emissions impact?
• What is required in terms of assessing alternatives
and mitigation for GHG emissions?
We discuss these questions on the mode of analysis in Part III.
II. THE REQUIRED SCOPE OF GHG EMISSIONS DISCLOSURE FOR
FOSSIL FUEL SUPPLY PROJECTS
In this section we propose answers to various aspects of two key
questions: (1) To what extent and under what circumstances must
agencies account for upstream and downstream emissions from other
activities on the supply chain for the fuels that will be produced or
transported as a result of federal approvals? and (2) To what extent must
agencies account for cumulative emissions of multiple fossil fuel leasing
and/or transportation approvals in their NEPA reviews for fossil fuel
supply projects? Most of the case law to date focuses on whether such
emissions qualify as indirect or cumulative impacts of federal proposals,
but some decisions grapple with other aspects of NEPA, such as whether
multiple fossil fuel–related approvals constitute “related actions” that
must be reviewed jointly, and whether the required scope of disclosure
is different when an agency has prepared an EA and has found no signifi-
cant impact on GHG emissions.
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A. Upstream and Downstream Emissions from Fossil Fuel Supply
Projects
There are two regulatory requirements that may provide the basis
for evaluating disclosure of upstream and/or downstream emissions in
this context: the requirement to evaluate indirect effects and the require-
ment to evaluate the effects of connected actions. We discuss each ap-
proach in turn.141
1. Upstream and Downstream Emissions as Indirect Impacts
Indirect effects are “caused by the action and are later in time or
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.”142 They
include “growth inducing effects and other effects related to induced
changes in the pattern of land use, population density or growth rate, and
related effects on air and water and other natural systems, including
ecosystems.”143 A sufficient causal connection exists if the proposed action
is a cause-in-fact of the impact (i.e., the impact would not occur but for
the proposed action) and if there is a “reasonably close causal relationship
akin to proximate cause in tort law.”144 An impact is “reasonably foresee-
able” if it is “sufficiently likely to occur that a person of ordinary pru-
dence would take it into account in reaching a decision.”145 Examples of
factors relevant to this analysis include the likelihood of the impact, the
utility of the information to the decision maker, and whether the absence
of such information now would foreclose its consideration later.146
141 There are also some cases in which agencies, parties, and courts have treated these
as “cumulative emissions”—but characterizing upstream and downstream emissions as
cumulative effects fails to account for the causal relationship between the production of
fossil fuels or expansion of transport infrastructure and the eventual use of those fuels.
As discussed below, courts have found that this causal relationship is sufficient to
characterize these emissions as indirect rather than cumulative effects, and this appears
to be the better approach in light of that causal connection.
142 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2011).
143 Id.
144 U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 754 (2004) (citing Metro. Edison Co.
v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)) (internal citations omitted).
145 City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440, 453 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sierra
Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 1992)); see also Mid States Coal. for Progress
v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
146 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 768 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh
769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985)); see also Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952–53
(1st Cir. 1983).
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Although agencies are not required to conduct a “crystal-ball” in-
quiry to identify potential impacts, they must use “[r]easonable forecasting
and speculation” to evaluate impacts even when there is uncertainty about
the nature and timing of those impacts.147 Moreover, the NEPA regula-
tions impose an affirmative obligation on agencies to procure information
regarding reasonably foreseeable impacts when possible.148 The agency
must also respond to information when it is provided through public
comments.149 In determining whether an agency has violated NEPA by
omitting information from its analysis, a court must consider the “useful-
ness of any new potential information to the decisionmaking process.”150
Some courts have used the analogy of “links in a chain” to describe
the scope of indirect effects that should be reviewed in NEPA documents.151
This analogy is helpful for thinking about the scope of NEPA analysis for
GHG emissions from fossil fuel supply projects. The various stages of
fossil fuel production, transportation, processing, and consumption can
also be thought of as “links in a chain” which are inextricably connected
and should thus be analyzed together.152
147 Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that the courts must therefore “reject any attempt by agencies
to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by labeling any and all discussion of future
environmental effects as ‘crystal ball inquiry’ ”); see also City of Davis v. Coleman, 521
F.2d 661, 675 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The nature and extent of development which the project
will induce is still uncertain. Davis’ fears may be exaggerated. But currently available
information and plain common sense indicate that it was hardly ‘reasonable’ for CDHW
or FHWA to conclude, without further study, that the environmental impact of the pro-
posed interchange will be insignificant.”).
148 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2012).
149 Mid States Coal. for Progress, 345 F.3d at 537.
150 U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004).
151 Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 884 F.2d 394, 400 (9th Cir. 1989):
Environmental impacts are in some respects like ripples following the
casting of a stone in a pool. The simile is beguiling but useless as a
standard. So employed it suggests that the entire pool must be con-
sidered each time a substance heavier than a hair lands upon its surface.
This is not a practical guide. A better image is that of scattered bits of
a broken chain, some segments of which contain numerous links, while
others have only one or two. Each segment stands alone, but each link
within each segment does not[.]
See also Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Cohen, 164 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 1998); Fla. Audubon Soc’y
v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 668–70 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Border Power Plant Working Grp. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1013 (S.D. Cal. 2003); Ocean Mammal Inst.
v. Cohen, No. 98-cv-160, 1998 WL 2017631, at *8 (D. Haw. Mar. 9, 1998) aff’d sub nom.
152 See, e.g., Border Power Plant Working Grp., 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1013–17 (holding envi-
ronmental impacts of power plant in Mexico were indirect impacts of decision to construct
electric transmission line because neither facility would exist without the other).
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a. Fossil Fuel Extraction
In our 2017 article, we explained why downstream GHG emissions
from the processing, transportation, and consumption of fossil fuels that
are produced as a result of federal management plans and lease sales
qualify as “indirect effects” that must be considered in an EA or EIS.153
These downstream activities and the emissions they generate have a clear
causal connection to federal authorizations: but for the authorization, the
consumed.154 These downstream activities are also reasonably foreseeable
outcomes of authorizing the extraction of the fuels—indeed, producing fuel
for energy supply is the primary purpose of the authorizations.155 NEPA
thus requires agencies to disclose downstream emissions as potential
effects of fossil fuel supply projects and to quantify the emissions wher-
ever tools and data are available to do so. In particular, where agencies
are able to project the quantity of fuels to be produced, they must also
estimate the GHG emissions generated from the combustion of the fuels.
This is true whether the lease is for coal, oil, or gas.156 When quantifica-
tion is not feasible, this does not mean the emissions can be excluded
from the analysis—to the contrary, agencies have a duty to qualitatively
disclose and evaluate indirect effects where the nature of the effect is
reasonably foreseeable even if the exact magnitude or extent is not.157
Arguments that consideration and disclosure of downstream emis-
sions are not required in the NEPA analysis for fossil fuel production
have proven unpersuasive. One argument, which we call the “status quo”
argument, has arisen in the context of proposals to reauthorize or expand
coal mines that were already in operation. In that context, agencies as-
serted that the continued operation of the mine would not increase the
rate of coal extraction and thus it would not increase the rate of coal
consumption.158 Courts have properly rejected this argument, holding that
the continued operation of mines generates additional emissions over
153 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 112.
154 For a more in-depth explanation of why upstream and downstream emissions qualify
as indirect effects, see generally id.
155 Id. at 128.
156 Whether an agency must quantify processing and transportation emissions may
depend on other aspects of the project, such as whether the agency knows the route and
mode by which the fuels will be transported to end-users.
157 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2012); see also Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp.
Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549–50 (8th Cir. 2003).
158 S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d
718, 725 (9th Cir. 2009).
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time even if it does not change the rate at which those emissions are
generated, and this effect must be considered under NEPA.159
Another argument, which we call the “perfect substitute” argu-
ment, posits that the extraction of fossil fuels will not actually cause an
increase in fossil fuel consumption because the same quantity of fuel would
be produced elsewhere and eventually consumed even if the agency does
not approve the proposal.160 In High Country Conservation Advocates v.
United States Forest Service, the first case that specifically examined an
agency’s obligation to evaluate downstream greenhouse gas emissions
from coal production, a district court rejected this argument as “illogical”
because increasing coal supply would affect coal prices and the demand
for coal relative to other fuel sources.161 Other courts have adopted the
reasoning from High Country in cases involving fossil fuel production.162
Finally, a third argument, which we call the “It’s Not Our Call”
argument, posits that the agency approving fossil fuel production lacks
jurisdiction over downstream activities such as fossil fuel consumption
and is therefore not required to consider the effects of those activities in its
NEPA analysis. The primary basis for this argument was the Supreme
Court’s decision in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen.163 There,
the Supreme Court held that an agency need not consider environmental
effects in its NEPA review when it has “no ability” to adopt a course of
action that could prevent or otherwise influence those effects.164 But
agencies’ reliance on this case in the context of fossil fuel supply projects is
misplaced because agencies do have the power to act on information about
downstream emissions from leased fossil fuels (specifically, by restricting
and limiting fossil fuel leasing from federal lands and waters).165 Most of
159 Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, Reclamation
& Enf’t, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (D. Colo. 2015), appeal dismissed (Aug. 18, 2015); S. Fork
Band Council of W. Shoshone of Nev., 588 F.3d at 725.
160 See Section III.A for an overview of litigation challenging agency assumptions about
energy market substitution.
161 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1198
(D. Colo. 2014).
162 WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir.
2017); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-00080, 2019 WL 2404860, at *30–31
(D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2019); Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, Reclamation
& Enf’t, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1098 (D. Mont. 2017), amended in part, adhered to in part
sub nom.; Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, No. CV 15-106-M-DWM,
2017 WL 5047901 (D. Mont. Nov. 3, 2017).
163 U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004).
164 Id. at 766–70.
165 WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 74 (D.D.C. 2019); Diné Citizens
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the cases that we reviewed in our 2017 article dealt with whether agen-
cies were required to disclose combustion emissions in the context of
federal proposals for coal leasing.166 At that time, there were five district
court decisions on this question, all of which had held that such disclosure
was required.167 Since then, there have been a number of new decisions
reinforcing the idea that downstream emissions from fossil fuel processing,
transportation, and use qualify as indirect effects of fossil fuel production
and clarifying that this basic principle applies regardless of the type of
fuel being produced, the type of proposal, the type of NEPA documenta-
tion (EIS or EA), or the type of downstream emissions.168
Against Ruining Our Env’t v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enf’t, 82 F.
Supp. 3d 1201, 1217 (D. Colo. 2015).
166 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 109, 164.
167 In four of these cases, the courts determined that the responsible agencies failed to
take the requisite “hard look” at downstream emissions from the combustion of the coal:
Diné Citizens, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1211; WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining,
104 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1231 (D. Colo. 2015), vacated as moot 652 Fed. Appx. 717 (10th Cir.
2016); WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, No. CV-14-13-BLG-SPW-
CSO, 2015 WL 6442724, at *7 (D. Mont. 2015); High Country Conservation Advocates v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1195 (D. Colo. 2014). In the fifth case, the court
held that the agency’s analysis of downstream emissions was adequate, in part because the
agency had already disclosed emissions from the combustion of the leased coal. WildEarth
Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1276 (D. Wyo. 2015).
168 Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237
(D. Colo. 2019); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 74 (D.D.C. 2019) (BLM
must analyze downstream emissions in oil and gas lease EAs); WildEarth Guardians v.
Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-00080, 2019 WL 2404860, at *21 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2019) (OSM must
evaluate indirect and cumulative impacts caused by coal trains beyond the area near the
mine, as there was sufficient data to support this analysis); W. Org. of Res. Councils v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:16-cv-00021-BMM, 2018 WL 1475470, at *40 (D. Mont.
Mar. 26, 2018) (BLM must quantify emissions from coal, oil, and gas combustion in RMP
EISs); Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1156 (D.
Colo. 2018) (BLM must disclose emissions from oil and gas combustion in RMP EIS and
also evaluate potential impacts of those emissions in light of revised total GHG projections);
San Juan Citizens All. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1246 (D.N.M.
2018) (BLM must disclose emissions from oil and gas combustion in lease sale EA and also
evaluate potential impacts of those emissions in light of revised total GHG projections);
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1092, 1094
(D. Mont. 2017), amended in part, adhered to in part sub nom. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.
U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, No. CV 15-106-M-DWM, 2017 WL 5047901 (D. Mont. Nov. 3,
2017) (non-GHG effects of coal transport and combustion must also be considered); Wild-
Earth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1234–39 (10th Cir. 2017)
(in a coal lease EIS, agency cannot dismiss the significance of downstream emissions from
coal combustion by claiming perfect substitution).
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1) Type of Fuel
Downstream emissions qualify as indirect effects of oil and gas
production for the same reasons that they qualify as indirect effects of coal
production.169 Some agencies have argued against disclosure on the grounds
that emissions from oil and gas combustion are more speculative than those
from coal combustion because oil and gas are used for purposes other than
energy production.170 As noted above, the inability to quantify indirect
effects does not mean that agencies can ignore these in their analysis.
Moreover, the fact that agencies are already quantifying downstream
emissions (primarily combustion emissions) in EISs for proposals to au-
thorize oil and gas production demonstrates that such quantification is
feasible where the agency has also estimated the amount of oil and gas to
be produced. Recognizing this, courts have explicitly ordered agencies to
quantify combustion emissions in four of the five decisions requiring
disclosure of downstream emissions from oil and gas production.171 In the
fourth decision, the court explained that it was not ordering quantification
because, unlike coal which has a “single downstream use,” oil is sometimes
used for plastics or other products that will not be burned.172 But the court
did note that BLM must “consider whether quantifying GHG emissions
from that use is reasonably possible” and “thoroughly explain” any de-
cision not to quantify emissions, and that “if BLM receives estimates
169 Citizens for a Healthy Cmty., 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1237; WildEarth Guardians, 368 F.
Supp. 3d at 74; W. Org. of Res. Councils, 2018 WL 1475470, at *31–32; Wilderness Work-
shop, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 1156; San Juan Citizens All., 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1242, 1244.
170 Supplemental Brief at 5–6, WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C.
2019) (No. 1:16-cv-01822).
171 Citizens for a Healthy Cmty., 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1237; W. Org. of Res. Councils, 2018
WL 1475470, at *40; Wilderness Workshop, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 1156; San Juan Citizens
All., 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1228. There are also many undecided cases involving failures to
quantify indirect GHG emissions in the context of oil and gas production EAs—the key
issue being that agencies are dismissing the significance of GHG emissions without a
complete assessment of the GHG impact. See Complaint at 29–30, WildEarth Guardians
v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:18-cv-00073 (D. Mont. May 15, 2018) (failure to
quantify downstream emissions in oil and gas leasing EAs); Complaint at 21, 39–40,
Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 1:18-cv-00987 (D. Colo. Apr. 26,
2018) (failure to take hard look at indirect emissions from 53 oil and gas lease parcels—
“BLM’s Determinations of NEPA Adequacy for the lease auctions fail to consider or quan-
tify any site-specific direct, indirect, and cumulative greenhouse gas emissions from leasing
and their resulting climate change effects.”); Complaint at 25, Ctr. for Biological Diversity
v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 2:17-cv-00372 (S.D. Ohio May 2017) (agency failed to take hard
look at GHG emissions and climate impacts of oil and gas leasing in national forest).
172 WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 74.
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from outside parties based on the use of [emission estimating] calcula-
tors, it must assess those estimates and explain why they are unreliable
or otherwise inappropriate to use in its decisionmaking.”173
2) Type of Proposal
Downstream emissions must be disclosed and analyzed in the
context of both project-level leasing decisions and broader management
plans and actions that authorize future fossil fuel development.174 How-
ever, the required depth of the analysis and whether emissions must be
quantified depends on whether the agency has projected or is capable of
projecting the quantity of fuels to be produced. As noted in High Country
Conservation Advocates, in which the court required quantitative disclo-
sure of GHG emissions in the context of a rule amendment which would
allow for coal leasing in previously designated “roadless” areas:
The agency cannot—in the same FEIS—provide detailed
estimates of the amount of coal to be mined . . . and simul-
taneously claim that it would be too speculative to estimate
emissions from “coal that may or may not be produced”
from “mines that may or may not be developed.” The two
positions are nearly impossible to reconcile.175
Courts have also required quantification of downstream (combustion)
emissions in cases involving resource management plans where the
agency had estimated the amount of coal, oil, and/or gas to be produced
pursuant to those plans.176
173 Id. at 75.
174 For examples of decisions requiring disclosure and analysis of downstream emissions
in the context of broader planning actions, see Citizens for a Healthy Cmty., 377 F. Supp.
3d at 1237; W. Org. of Res. Councils, 2018 WL 1475470, at *40 (BLM must quantify emis-
sions from coal, oil, and gas combustion in RMP EISs); Wilderness Workshop, 342 F. Supp.
3d at 1156 (BLM must disclose emissions from oil and gas combustion in RMP EIS and also
evaluate potential impacts of those emissions in light of revised total GHG projections).
175 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174,
1196–97 (D. Colo. 2014).
176 W. Org. of Res. Councils, 2018 WL 1475470, at *13 (In light of the degree of foreseea-
bility and specificity of information available to the agency while completing the EIS,
NEPA requires BLM to consider in the EIS the environmental consequences of the
downstream combustion of the coal, oil and gas resources potentially open to development
under these RMPs. Without such analysis, the EIS fails to “foster informed decision-
making” as required by NEPA”); Wilderness Workshop, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 1156 (“An agency
may not avoid an obligation to analyze in an EIS environmental consequences that
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3) Type of NEPA Documentation
Some agencies have justified decisions not to disclose or quantify
downstream GHG emissions in fossil fuel leasing EAs on the grounds
that the proposals will not generate significant GHG impacts and thus
an in-depth analysis of GHG emissions is not warranted.177 The problem
with this argument is that it is impossible for an agency to gauge the
significance of the GHG impact without analyzing the full scope of emis-
sions that qualify as direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of the project.
Courts have thus properly held that downstream emissions must also be
disclosed and quantified in the context of fossil fuel leasing EAs.178 One
case dealt with a particularly egregious situation in which BLM had failed
to quantify any GHG emissions (direct, indirect, or cumulative) in EAs and
FONSIs issued for 282 oil and gas leases encompassing approximately
303,000 acres of land in Wyoming.179 There, the D.C. district court held that
BLM must quantify direct emissions from oil and gas production and also
account for downstream emissions.180 As we discuss in Part III, the failure
to account for the full scope of GHG emissions that qualify as impacts of
production proposals renders an agency’s FONSI arbitrary and capricious.
A related question is whether an agency can ignore downstream
emissions in a leasing EA or NEPA adequacy determination that is tiered
to a broader PEIS. The answer depends on the level of detail with which
GHGs were disclosed in the PEIS. If an agency fully quantified down-
stream emissions for a leasing area in a PEIS, it could potentially rely on
that analysis in its tiered EA or adequacy determination. But if the
programmatic analysis is too broad or too course (e.g., a purely qualita-
tive analysis of potential GHG impacts) or out of date, then it would be
foreseeably arise from an RMP merely by saying that the consequences are unclear or
will be analyzed later when an [Environmental Assessment] is prepared for a site-specific
program proposed pursuant to the RMP.”) (quoting Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
284 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
177 We discuss the adequacy and reasonableness of such significance determinations in
Part III. Here, we focus on whether the failure to disclose emissions can be justified by
a finding of no significant impact.
178 WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 75; WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-
cv-00080, 2019 WL 2404860, at *11 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2019); San Juan Citizens All. v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1228 (D.N.M. 2018); Mont. Envtl.
Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1098–99 (D. Mont. 2017),
amended in part, adhered to in part sub nom. No. CV 15-106-M-DWM, 2017 WL 5047901
(D. Mont. Nov. 3, 2017).
179 WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 55.
180 Id. at 85.
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necessary for the agency to conduct a more detailed examination of
downstream GHG emissions when issuing lease sales.181
4) Type of Downstream Emissions
As noted above, transportation and processing emissions (including
leakage that occurs during transport) also qualify as indirect effects of fed-
eral approvals for fossil fuel production. Unlike with combustion emis-
sions, it is not always possible to quantify processing and transportation
emissions even where the agency has projected the amount of fossil fuel
production. Estimating transportation emissions, in particular, may be
impossible if the agency does not know the route or mode by which the
fuels will be transported to end-users. For this reason, agencies sometimes
ignore transportation and processing emissions in NEPA documentation
even where they acknowledge and disclose combustion emissions as in-
direct effects of proposals.182 But NEPA requires more: agencies should
discuss these emissions qualitatively at minimum183 and should conduct
a quantitative analysis where tools and data are available to do so. For ex-
ample, where agencies know the rail routes and shipping destinations for
coal that would be mined as a result of federal authorizations, the review-
ing agencies must calculate the GHG emissions from rail transport.184
181 See id. There have been at least two instances in which courts have upheld the NEPA
documentation (or lack thereof) for oil and gas lease sales that were tiered to program-
matic reviews despite plaintiffs’ contentions that the sales were issued without adequate
analysis of downstream GHG emissions. But neither decision involved a careful analysis
of whether such emissions qualified as indirect effects. In one case, the reviewing court
did not even address plaintiffs’ arguments about climate change. See N. Alaska Envtl.
Cent. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 3:18-cv-00030, 2018 WL 6424680 (D. Alaska Dec. 6,
2018). In the second case, the court held that BLM’s very limited analysis of GHG emis-
sions, which did not include downstream emissions, was sufficient because BLM had
estimated that the emissions would represent only a small increase in state emissions
and were therefore significant. Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 312 F.
Supp. 3d 1031, 1096 (D.N.M. 2018), rev’d sub nom Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t
v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 831 (10th Cir. 2019) (on appeal, the 10th Circuit did not reach the
arguments related to GHG emissions because it concluded that Appellants had not provided
a record from which it could assess the adequacy of BLM's air pollution analysis).
182 N. Alaska Envtl. Cent., 2018 WL 6424680; Diné, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 1031.
183 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22; see also Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345
F.3d 520, 549–50 (8th Cir. 2003).
184 There are two decisions requiring further analysis of impacts from coal transport in
the context of federal approvals for coal mining, but in both cases the agencies had
already disclosed GHG emissions from transport and thus the decisions focused on the
need to disclose other impacts (e.g., conventional air pollutants). These cases thus expand
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One scope-related question which has not been directly addressed
is whether non-CO2 GHGs such as methane must also be disclosed in the
downstream emissions analysis.185 The answer is an obvious “yes”—there
is no rationale for treating these differently than CO2, although there
may be instances in which it is not possible to quantify these emissions
in the same fashion as CO2.186 Agencies may also argue against disclo-
sure on the grounds that these emissions are relatively insignificant as
compared with CO2, but arguments about insignificance would need to
be supported by the sort of quantitative analysis which considers not
only the tonnage of non-CO2 GHG emissions but also the global warming
potential of those emissions.187
In sum: the cases generally support the proposition that down-
stream emissions fall within the scope of indirect impacts that should be
disclosed in NEPA reviews for federal proposals that will result in the
extraction of fossil fuels. The decisions also provide insight on the cir-
cumstances in which NEPA requires quantitative disclosure of such
impacts. We return to questions about the adequacy and reasonableness
of the technical assumptions and findings encompassed within the GHG
disclosure in Part III.
the obligation to evaluate transportation-related impacts to include non-GHG emissions.
See WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-00080, 2019 WL 2404860, at *7 (D. Mont.
Feb. 11, 2019) (OSM must evaluate indirect and cumulative impacts caused by coal trains
beyond the area near the mine, as there was sufficient data to support this analysis);
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1098–99 (D.
Mont. 2017), amended in part, adhered to in part sub nom. No. CV 15-106-M-DWM, 2017
WL 5047901 (D. Mont. Nov. 3, 2017) (non-GHG effects of coal transport and combustion
must also be considered). There have not yet been any decisions on the failure to disclose
or quantify processing emissions, but one can infer from the case law that these should
also be disclosed and quantified where possible. There is also a pending lawsuit in which
the alleged failure to account for downstream emissions appears to encompass processing
as well as transportation emissions. Complaint at 5, S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Bernhardt,
2:19-cv-00266 (D. Utah 2019) (alleging that BLM’s analysis of twenty oil and gas leases in
Utah was flawed because it failed to address GHG emissions from activities that occur after
production, but before combustion, such as fugitive emissions that leak from pipelines).
185 There is one lawsuit involving BLM’s issuance of twenty oil and gas leases in Utah in
which plaintiffs have alleged that the NEPA analyses is flawed due to BLM’s failure to
disclose non-CO2 GHGs, particularly methane. Complaint at 17, S. Utah Wilderness All.
v. Bernhardt, No. 2:19-cv-00266 (D. Utah Apr. 19, 2019).
186 Tools are available to calculate N2O and methane emissions from combustion, at a mini-
mum. See EPA, GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY GUIDANCE: DIRECT EMISSIONS FROM STATION-
ARY COMBUSTION SOURCES, APPENDIX A (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files
/2016-03/documents/stationaryemissions_3_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDH5-N7L8].
187 See WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 71–74 (D.D.C. 2019).
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B. Fossil Fuel Transportation
Both upstream and downstream emissions typically qualify as
indirect effects of fossil fuel transportation projects.188 These emissions
are reasonably foreseeable because agencies know that the fossil fuels to
be transported via the approved infrastructure will be extracted, and all
or most of the fuels will be processed and combusted.189 These emissions
are also causally linked to the approval of the transportation infrastruc-
ture because: (i) agencies approve these projects based on findings that
additional transportation capacity is needed to transport the fuels to end-
users,190 and one can therefore infer that (ii) without the necessary
capacity addition, the same quantity of fuels would not be produced and
transported to end-users.
Some agencies (primarily FERC) have argued that the approval
of transportation infrastructure does not cause upstream production or
downstream consumption because there are other ways in which fuels
could be transported to end-users if a project is not approved.191 The prob-
lem with this argument is that it assumes that transportation capacity
exists elsewhere to transport the fuels to the market, which undermines
the required determination that the project is necessary due to capacity
constraints. It also ignores basic market principles of supply and de-
mand. Relatedly, agencies have argued that upstream and downstream
emissions are not reasonably foreseeable because of uncertainties about
market impacts and energy substitution.192 But this argument fails as
well. As noted by FERC Commissioner Richard Glick in a dissent to a
FERC order issuing a certificate for a natural gas pipeline project:
It is reasonable to assume that building incremental trans-
portation capacity will spur additional production and result
in some level of combustion of natural gas, even if the
exact details of the method or location are not definite. . . .
[W]hen the nature of the effect (end-use emissions) is
188 WEBB, supra note 134, at 21.
189 As discussed above, there are multiple end-uses for oil and gas but the vast majority
of produced oil and gas is combusted for energy generation (whether in power plants,
industrial sources, or vehicles) and agencies have nonetheless been able to estimate
combustion emissions for these fuels.
190 WEBB, supra note 134, at 17; Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 166.
191 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 109, 137.
192 Id. at 132.
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reasonably foreseeable, but its extent is not . . . an agency
may not simply ignore the effect.193
The case law generally supports the treatment of both upstream
and downstream emissions as indirect effects of transportation infra-
structure, but courts have not fleshed out or enforced the requirement to
analyze these emissions with the same clarity or assertiveness as they
have in cases involving fossil fuel production.194 This may be due to the
fact that there are fewer decisions on transportation approvals.195 It may
also be the case that courts are not enforcing NEPA requirements as
assertively in this context because they do not think that the approval of
transportation infrastructure is as significant a driver of fossil fuel
consumption as federal fossil fuel leasing programs.
The early case law on the requirement to evaluate upstream and
downstream emissions from authorizations of fossil fuel transportation
infrastructure is illustrative. The first two decisions on this question both
involved STB’s approval of rail lines built to transport coal. In Mid States
Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals required the STB to evaluate downstream emissions
from the combustion of the transported coal, and in Northern Plains
Resource Council, Inc. v. Surface Transportation Board, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals required STB to consider upstream emissions from the
mining of the coal.196 In those cases, the courts confronted and dismissed
several of the same arguments related to causation and foreseeability
that were raised in the coal extraction cases.197 In particular, the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Mid States Coalition found that the development of
infrastructure intended to transport coal would affect the price of coal
relative to other energy sources and this would affect patterns of coal
193 Texas E. Transmission, LP, 164 FERC ¶ 61,037 (2018) (internal quotations omitted).
194 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 142–43.
195 Id. at 143.
196 Notably, in the case involving the failure to evaluate upstream emissions, petitioners
argued that methane emissions and other environmental impacts from the connected coal
mines should be analyzed as cumulative effects (these are typically treated as indirect
effects). The court’s analysis therefore focused on whether these effects were reasonably
foreseeable, since a cumulative impact need not be “caused” by the project. N. Plains Res.
Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011). But as discussed
below, the rationale for concluding that a transport project “causes” downstream emis-
sions applies in equal force to upstream emissions.
197 N. Plains Res. Council, 668 F.3d at 1082; Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface
Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
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production and consumption, and thus downstream emissions were an
indirect effect of the railway.198
However, courts reached different conclusions in early cases in-
volving natural gas and oil pipelines. There were two early decisions
finding that an analysis of upstream emissions (from production) was not
required in the NEPA review for oil and gas pipelines because those
pipelines would not cause upstream production.199 A third decision which
pertained to the scope of review for non-GHG air pollutants upheld FERC’s
review of a pipeline precisely because “FERC explicitly considered the
environmental impact of downstream emissions and imposed what it
reasonably believed to be effective measures to mitigate the impact.”200
At that time, neither courts nor agencies had offered a principled basis
for why the scope of indirect emissions analysis should differ for coal rail
lines and pipelines, nor had they offered a compelling argument for find-
ing that pipelines do not affect natural gas production and consumption
in the same fashion that coal railways affect coal production and con-
sumption.201 We argued then that the reasoning which controlled the
outcome of the coal production and coal railway cases should apply in
equal force to other forms of transportation infrastructure.202
There were also some early decisions on LNG export decisions
which held that FERC need not address the indirect effects of natural gas
exports in its NEPA review because it was DOE and not FERC that was
ultimately responsible for approving those exports.203 But in those cases,
the D.C. Circuit made clear that it was not expressing any opinion on
DOE’s independent NEPA obligations to address such indirect effects in
its review of LNG export authorizations.204 Those decisions are the result
198 Mid States Coal. for Progress, 345 F.3d at 549.
199 In one of those decisions, the court found that the Department of State’s adminis-
trative record for an oil and gas pipeline contained at least some information to support
this finding (e.g., about oil production rates and other transportation options). Sierra
Club v. Clinton, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1045 (D. Minn. 2010). In the other (unpublished)
decision, the court simply deferred to FERC’s unsupported claim of perfect substitution
for a natural gas pipeline without conducting any analysis whatsoever. Coal. for Respon-
sible Growth & Res. Conservation v. FERC, 485 F. App’x 472, 474 (2d Cir. 2012).
200 S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2010).
201 See generally Coal. for Responsible Growth & Res. Conservation, 485 F. App’x at 472, 474;
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 621 F.3d at 1093–94; Sierra Club, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1044.
202 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 109, 157.
203 Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Sierra Club & Galveston
Baykeeper v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2016); EarthReports Inc. v. FERC, 828
F.3d 949, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
204 Sierra Club & Galveston Baykeeper, 827 F.3d at 45.
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of the unique division of authority between DOE and FERC and are thus
of little relevance to interpreting agency obligations in other contexts.
More recent decisions on natural gas pipelines and LNG export
terminals have made it clear that downstream emissions typically fall
within the scope of indirect impacts that should be evaluated in NEPA
reviews for these projects.205 One of the most important decisions on this
issue was a D.C. Circuit case involving FERC’s review of an interstate
natural gas pipeline: Sierra Club v. FERC.206 There, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals found that downstream emissions from natural gas combustion
were an indirect effect of the proposed pipeline project, as they were both
foreseeable and causally linked to the approval of the pipeline project.207
In regards to foreseeability, the court noted that the project was intended
to transport the gas to power plants in Florida, some of which already
existed, others of which were in the planning stages.208 Thus, the court
noted that the combustion of the gas “is not just ‘reasonably foreseeable,’
it is the project’s entire purpose.”209 With regards to causation, the court
held that because FERC can act on information about GHG emissions and
climate change impacts when deciding whether to issue a pipeline certifi-
cate, and because FERC can deny the certificate if it finds that the proj-
ect would be too harmful to the environment, FERC’s approval is a “legally
relevant cause” of the downstream effects of combusting the gas.210
The court also held that quantification of the downstream GHG
emissions was required.211 FERC had argued that it is impossible to
know exactly what quantity of GHGs will be emitted due to the approval
of the pipeline because it depends on uncertain variables such as the
operating decisions of individual plants and demand for electricity in the
region.212 The court disagreed, noting that NEPA requires “reasonable
forecasting” and that FERC had already estimated how much gas the
pipelines would transport and had provided no good reason as to why
this number could not also be used to estimate combustion emissions.213
The court explained that quantification was necessary because it would
205 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Freeport LNG
terminal); Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 68; Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State,
No. 4:17-cv-00029, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164786, at *68 (D. Mont. Nov. 8, 2018).
206 Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
207 Id. at 1374.
208 Id. at 1371
209 Id. at 1372.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 1374.
212 Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d at 1373–74.
213 Id. at 1374.
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“permit the agency to compare the emissions from the project to emissions
from other projects, to total emissions from the state or region, or to
regional or national emissions-control goals” and “[w]ithout such com-
parisons, it is difficult to see how FERC could engage in ‘informed deci-
sion making’ with respect to the greenhouse-gas effects of this project, or
how ‘informed public comment’ could be possible.”214
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided another case, Birckhead
v. FERC, in which it sought to clarify its position on FERC’s obligation
to address downstream emissions in its review of natural gas transporta-
tion infrastructure.215 Plaintiffs alleged that FERC violated NEPA by
failing to disclose emissions from the consumption of natural gas when
the record contained information about the amount of gas to be trans-
ported (200,000 decatherms) and its destination (southeast markets).216
FERC maintained that the emissions were neither caused by its approval
nor reasonably foreseeable and that Sierra Club v. FERC was not appo-
site because FERC did not know the exact power plants at which the
natural gas would be used.217 The court quickly disposed of FERC’s causa-
tion and foreseeability arguments, just as it had in Sierra Club v. FERC,
and noted that it was “troubled . . . by the Commission’s attempt to justify
its decision to discount downstream impacts based on its lack of informa-
tion about the destination and end use of the gas in question” because
FERC had an affirmative obligation to at least attempt to obtain infor-
mation necessary to fulfill its statutory duties and had made “no effort”
to do so in this case.218 But the court ultimately dismissed the complaint
on the grounds that petitioners “failed to raise this record-development
issue in the proceedings before the Commission.”219 In doing so, it implic-
itly accepted FERC’s argument that additional information was needed
to assess downstream emissions and the court mischaracterized the
petitioners’ complaint (which alleged a failure to estimate emissions
based on information that was already on the record).220
214 Id. The court also rejected FERC’s arguments about perfect substitution, which we
return to in Part III.
215 Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
216 Final Opening Brief of Petitioners at 39–40, Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1218). Commissioner LaFleur actually performed this very calculation
to demonstrate that it was feasible. Id. at 12.
217 Birckhead, 925 F.3d at 518.
218 Id. at 519–20.
219 Id. at 520.
220 One possible explanation for the court’s approach is that it wanted to allow this
particular project to go forward without formally curtailing NEPA requirements. The
project at issue was a compressor station that would enhance the capacity of an existing
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The decision in Birckhead v. FERC thus raises a number of ques-
tions for future litigants seeking to compel FERC disclosures of down-
stream emissions regarding the manner in which plaintiffs must frame
their claims, the extent to which FERC can rely on claims about “uncer-
tainty” or “inadequate information” to avoid disclosing downstream emis-
sions, and the circumstances in which emissions from downstream natural
gas combustion are not a reasonably foreseeable outcome of natural gas
transportation infrastructure. But it does not disrupt or significantly modify
the holding in Sierra Club v. FERC, which remains the primary author-
ity on FERC’s obligation to evaluate downstream emissions from natural
gas pipelines.221
The same rationale for requiring analysis of downstream emis-
sions applies to upstream emissions: if a transportation project causes an
increase in fossil fuel consumption, then there must be a corresponding
increase in fossil fuel production on the other end of the supply chain.222
Thus, induced natural gas production is as much an “indirect effect” of
the transportation infrastructure as induced consumption. As noted
above, disclosure of upstream emissions has been explicitly required in
the context of a federal approval of a coal railway. Although no decision
has yet been issued finding inadequate analysis of upstream (i.e., produc-
tion) emissions in the context of pipeline projects, there are at least two
decisions finding adequate analysis because the agency incorporated
quantitative analysis of upstream emissions in its review.223
First, in Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of Energy, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals held that DOE had adequately assessed the indirect
emissions from LNG exports by incorporating general assessments of life-
cycle GHG emissions from LNG exports (which included both upstream and
pipeline, whereas the project at issue in Sierra Club v. FERC was a new multistate
pipeline project. Although the court did not hold on what NEPA actually requires for a
compressor station, it did state that emissions from downstream natural gas combustion
are not “as a categorical matter” always a reasonably foreseeable outcome of natural gas
transportation projects. Id. at 519. This conclusion is debatable: if the project is intended to
meet a need for increased transportation capacity, then it will presumably enable in-
creases in both natural gas production and consumption, and downstream emissions are thus
a reasonably foreseeable impact even if there is uncertainty about the extent of the impact.
221 Id.
222 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 113–14.
223 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Freeport LNG
terminal); Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D.
Mont. 2018).
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downstream emissions).224 Second, on Indigenous Environmental Network
v. U.S. Department of State, the Montana district court held that the
Department of State had adequately considered upstream emissions
from tar sands oil production in its review of the Keystone XL pipeline
by integrating the Canadian review (which encompassed such produc-
tion) into its review.225 Notably, there was no question about whether the
Department of State must consider downstream emissions—it had al-
ready conducted an in-depth analysis of those as part of its review.226
These decisions support the idea that both upstream and downstream
emissions fall within the scope of “indirect effects” that should be consid-
ered under NEPA for projects involving fossil fuel transportation, and
courts are likely to intervene where such emissions are omitted from the
analysis altogether.227
However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld FERC’s deci-
sion not to disclose upstream emissions for a natural gas compressor
project in Birckhead v. FERC.228 In that case, FERC justified its decision
not to disclose upstream emissions on the grounds that pipeline approv-
als only cause upstream emissions where “the record demonstrates that
the proposed project represents the only way to get additional gas from
a specified production area into the interstate pipeline system.”229 Peti-
tioners responded that FERC had determined there was a “need” for the
project “based on the fact that [the production and shipping company]
has executed a binding precedent agreement for . . . 100 percent of the
design capacity” and that this was enough to show that the project would
cause additional natural gas production.230 The court held in favor of
FERC, asserting that petitioners had identified no record evidence to: (i)
“help [FERC] predict the number and location of any additional wells
that would be drilled as a result of production demand created by the
project” or (ii) prove that the natural gas would not be extracted in the
absence of the project.231 Regarding FERC’s public need determination,
224 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d at 202. There are several unpublished
opinions that rely on the analysis in this case: Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 703
F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
225 Indigenous Envtl. Network, 347 F. Supp. 3d at 580.
226 Id. at 576.
227 See, e.g., id. at 575–76; Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d at 201–02.
228 Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 517–18. The court noted that it was “dubious of [FERC’s] assertion that asking
[the natural gas producer and shipper] about the origin of the gas would be futile” but
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the court held that “just because [FERC] is satisfied that there is a market
need for a given project does not necessarily mean that a shipper/producer
would not have the ability to bring the gas to market via another channel
were [FERC] to deny a certificate for the project.”232 The court thus held
that petitioners had not presented enough evidence to rebut FERC’s pre-
sumption that the project would not induce natural gas production.233
The court thus set an extraordinarily high bar for petitioners
seeking to compel disclosure of upstream emissions, without actually de-
ciding whether downstream emissions qualified as indirect effects of the
project. The court’s differential treatment of upstream emissions as com-
pared with downstream emissions is baffling. As noted above, if a trans-
portation project causes an increase in natural gas consumption then it
also causes an increase in natural gas production—these are two sides
of the same coin—the additional gas cannot be consumed if it is not
produced. And upstream emissions can be estimated in the same fashion
as downstream emissions (by multiplying the transported natural gas by
an emissions factor).234 There are also more sophisticated energy market
modelling techniques which FERC could use to estimate the net increase
in upstream production and emissions (we return to these in Part III).235
In our view, the D.C. Circuit has failed to justify its differential
treatment of upstream and downstream emissions, and also erred in con-
cluding that a binding precedent agreement for 100 percent of transporta-
tion capacity is insufficient to establish a causal link between the project
and natural gas production.236 NEPA requires “reasonable forecasting”
that this was not dispositive in its ruling because petitioners had not claimed that
FERC’s failure to seek out additional information violated NEPA.
232 Id. at 518.
233 Id.
234 See, e.g., GHG Emissions Associated with Two Proposed Natural Gas Transmission
Lines in Virginia, OUR ENERGY POL’Y 1, https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/up
loads/2016/02/GHG-Emissions-Associated-with-Proposed-Natural-Gas-Transmission
-Lines-in-Virginia_Final-edit5-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/56T5-HFV4].
235 Rick Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change, 40 ENERGY L.J. 1,
14 (2019), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2019/05/06/document_gw_02.pdf [https://perma
.cc/BQ7F-2ZHA]. Commissioner Glick argued that FERC
must also consider the secondary effects [of pipelines]. For example, an
increase in interstate pipeline capacity may also, by decreasing the
price of delivered gas, increase the demand for that gas and, in turn
increase its production—which can lead to a significant increase in up-
stream emissions, through flaring of natural gas, fugitive methane
emissions, etc.
236 Birckhead, 925 F.3d at 517–18.
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of probable impacts,237 and it is highly probable that a fully subscribed
transportation project will enable additional natural gas production. In
sum: there are a number of cases which support the idea that upstream
and downstream emissions fall within the scope of indirect impacts from
fossil fuel transportation infrastructure.238 However, there are some judi-
cial interpretations which may pose challenges for plaintiffs seeking to
enforce this requirement, especially as it applies to upstream emissions.
In particular, the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of FERC obligations in
Birckhead v. FERC places a significant burden on potential plaintiffs to
rebut FERC assumptions that transportation projects do not cause an
increase in upstream production239 and also raises questions about how
plaintiffs can adequately frame arguments about the requirement to
disclose downstream emissions.
1. Upstream and Downstream Emissions as Effects of Connected
Actions
Upstream and downstream emissions may also be conceptualized
as the effects of “connected actions” when such emissions occur as a
result of other federal approvals in the fossil fuel supply chain that must
also undergo NEPA review.240 As discussed in Part I, federal actions are
“connected” if they: “(i) automatically trigger other actions which may
require EISs, (ii) cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken
previously or simultaneously, or (iii) are independent parts of a larger
action and depend on the larger action for their justification.”241 The re-
quirement to evaluate connected actions in a single NEPA review is often
referred to as a rule prohibiting the “segmentation” of actions and their
environmental impacts, reflecting the language in section 1508.27 of the
CEQ regulations.242
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that “[t]he justifica-
tion for the rule against segmentation is obvious: it prevent[s] agencies
from dividing one project into multiple individual actions each of which
individually has an insignificant environmental impact, but which
237 Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
238 See, e.g., Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th
Cir. 2003).
239 Birckhead, 925 F.3d at 518–19.
240 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 113–14.
241 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1).
242 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27; Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 169.
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collectively have a substantial impact.”243 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has
stated that the purpose of NEPA “cannot be fully served if consideration
of the cumulative effects of successive, interdependent steps is delayed
until the first step has already been taken.”244 Applying the regulatory
standards, courts have held that agencies have a mandatory obligation
to conduct a joint review of actions that either have no independent
purpose or utility,245 or “the dependency is such that it would be irratio-
nal, or at least unwise” to undertake one action if the other(s) were not
also undertaken.246
Most of the cases involving claims that an agency failed to review
connected actions pertaining to fossil fuels involve claims that an agency
has improperly segmented its review of a pipeline (and different pieces
of the pipeline), thus failing to evaluate all emissions (and other impacts)
from the pipeline in a single, comprehensive review.247 In one noteworthy
case, Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit held that
four segments of a pipeline project were connected actions because they
were physically connected, they were being constructed in relatively the
same time period, and they lacked independent utility.248 The pipeline
243 Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing NRDC
v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
244 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1985).
245 Custer Cty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1037 (10th Cir. 2001).
246 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1974).
247 See, e.g., Twp. of Bordentown v. FERC, 903 F.3d 234, 250 (3d Cir. 2018) (two pipelines
were not connected actions because they had independent utility); Sierra Club v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 31, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (USACE not required to review mul-
tiple pipeline segments as connected actions because the other segments did not require
federal approvals); Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133 (D. Minn. 2010)
(three pipelines were not connected actions because they had independent utility and
different approval timelines); Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 253 (D.D.C.
2005) (BLM must either review two pipe segments as connected actions or make a more
thorough and factually supportable finding of independent utility).
248 Del. Riverkeeper Network, 753 F.3d at 1308–09. That decision can be contrasted to
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, where the D.C. Circuit
district court held that different federal approvals that were pending for the Dakota
Access Pipeline had “substantial independent utility” as “each would allow a portion of
pipeline to proceed as planned, while any denial would result in re-routing—with no
apparent impact on the other federally regulated components of the project” and thus
they did not constitute connected actions which must be reviewed in the same EIS.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 301 F. Supp. 3d 50, 68–69
(D.D.C. 2018). The court asserted that the “limited federal involvement with [the Dakota
Access Pipeline] and the potential for re-routing” distinguished the case from the facts
of Delaware Riverkeeper—and in particular, because this was an oil pipeline and not a
natural gas pipeline, it was “not so beholden to overall federal approval.” Id. But the
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cases help to clarify some of the specific factors that are relevant to the
segmentation analysis, such as whether the allegedly connected actions
are subject to federal approval, whether they are occurring at roughly the
same time, and whether they are physically connected (this last factor
being informative but not dispositive in the analysis).249
The same factors are relevant when determining whether differ-
ent types of infrastructure or activities within the fossil fuel supply chain
(e.g., production and transport) are connected actions that must be re-
viewed in the same EIS. But the analysis of whether the supply chain
components lack “independent utility” is trickier because these components
are, in many cases, more interchangeable than pipeline segments.250 Con-
sider, for example, a situation in which the federal government is simul-
taneously reviewing and issuing approvals for a coal mining lease and a
rail project that would transport coal from the mine to end-users. Whether
these qualify as connected actions would depend on factors such as whether
the coal mining “cannot or will not proceed” without the coal rail project,
and whether the coal rail project will service other mines (or transport
other goods).251 There are only a handful of decisions that directly address
the connected actions requirement in this context,252 and two of them
were dismissed because the allegedly connected action was not a “federal
action” under NEPA.253 The one case that dealt with two federal approvals,
Myersville Citizens for a Rural Community v. FERC, involved FERC’s re-
view of an LNG export terminal and a natural gas storage project which
court’s decision in Standing Rock was clearly wrong, as it failed to substantiate its
assumption that the pipeline would be re-routed in the absence of federal approvals—an
assumption which, if applied to other oil pipelines, would render the prohibition against
segmentation meaningless.
249 See, e.g., Del. Riverkeeper Network, 753 F.3d at 1308–09.
250 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 170–71.
251 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.
252 The complaint in Diné Citizens also alleged that OSM had violated the requirement to
review connected actions in its review of a coal mining proposal when it failed to consider
emissions from a connected power plant that would combust the coal, but the reviewing
court held that it was unnecessary to reach that argument because it concluded that the
combustion-related impacts were indirect effects of the proposal. Diné Citizens Against
Ruining Our Env’t v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1212 (D. Colo. 2015).
253 Big Bend Conservation All. v. FERC, 896 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that
a natural gas pipeline which serviced an LNG terminal was not a connected action be-
cause it was not an interstate pipeline subject to federal jurisdiction); Wilderness Workshop
v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
authorization of a natural gas pipeline and “future gas well development” were not con-
nected actions within the meaning of NEPA, because there was no imminent government
action to develop natural gas resources that would also require an EIS).
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were physically connected and under review by FERC at roughly the same
time.254 FERC asserted that the projects were not connected because the
additional natural gas storage and transportation capacity associated with
the storage project had been “fully subscribed” to other (domestic) uses.255
Petitioners countered that the projects were connected because the storage
facility would produce “excess natural gas capacity” that was destined for
export through the LNG terminal.256 Relying heavily on FERC’s asser-
tions, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the projects were not con-
nected actions because “neither depends on the other for its justification”
and the two projects were not “financially and functionally interdepen-
dent.”257 This decision illustrates the challenge of establishing a lack of
“independent utility” for interconnected fossil fuel supply infrastructure
as well as the deference granted to agency conclusions on this issue. It
does not entirely foreclose on the application of the rule prohibiting segmen-
tation to other federal approvals, but makes clear that the circumstances
in which courts will intervene to enforce this rule are relatively narrow.
C. Cumulative Emissions from Fossil Fuel Leasing and Transport
Approvals
Another key scoping question confronting federal NEPA reviews
of fossil fuel projects is whether agencies must analyze the cumulative
effects of decisions involving fossil fuel extraction or transportation.
Whereas upstream and downstream emissions analyses look “vertically”
at the fossil fuel supply (focusing on emissions associated with the same
fuel as it moves from production to transport, processing, and combus-
tion), cumulative emissions analyses look “horizontally” at the aggregate
effect of multiple leasing and transportation infrastructure approvals.258
One key difference between these two axes is that there is a causal
relationship between different activities on the vertical axis,259 but this
is not necessarily the case for activities on the horizontal axis.
There are two provisions in the NEPA regulations that would
potentially require an analysis of cumulative emissions in this context:
254 Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
255 Dominion Cove Point LNG, LP, 148 FERC ¶ 61,244 (2014).
256 Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., 783 F.3d at 1326.
257 Id.
258 Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 128.
259 Without each “link” in the fossil fuel supply chain, the fuels would never be produced,
transported to markets, or consumed.
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(i) the requirement to evaluate cumulative effects, and (ii) the require-
ment to evaluate “cumulative actions” and “similar actions” in a single
review. The precise legal obligations are murky under either framework,
as the regulatory language is very broad; the case law under both provi-
sions is sparse. We discuss both frameworks below.
1. Cumulative Emissions as Cumulative Impacts
The NEPA regulations require agencies to evaluate cumulative
effects, which result from “the incremental impact of the action when
added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions
regardless of what agency (federal or non-federal) or person undertakes
such other actions.”260 Cumulative effects “can result from individually
minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of
time.”261 As with other effects, agencies must take a “hard look” at cumu-
lative impacts and the analysis and data presented should be “useful” to
decision makers.262 Such cumulative impacts must be taken into account
when assessing the significance of an action’s environmental impacts,
and the regulations specify that “significance exists if it is reasonable to
anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment.”263
The cumulative emissions from multiple decisions involving fossil
fuel supply projects are precisely the sort of cumulative impact that
should be evaluated under NEPA to help serve the twin goals of informed
decision-making and public disclosure. There has been a series of deci-
sions involving the federal government’s responsibility to account for the
cumulative emissions from fossil fuel leasing and transport approvals,
including at least five cases involving production and one involving
transportation (the Keystone XL pipeline).264 Generally speaking, courts
260 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
261 Id.
262 See League of Wilderness Defs.—Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Allen, 615
F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2010); Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1075
(9th Cir. 2002).
263 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). For more on this point, see infra Section III.B.
264 There are at least four pending cases alleging failures to quantify cumulative emis-
sions in the context of oil and gas leasing and the decisions in those cases may help
further shape agency obligations in this context. Complaint at 23–24, S. Utah Wilderness
All. v. Bernhardt, No. 2:19-cv-002660RJS (D. Utah Apr. 19, 2019) (failure to consider
cumulative effects of multiple oil and gas leases); Complaint at 33, Rocky Mountain Wild
v. Zinke, No. 1:18-cv-02468 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2018) (BLM failed to take a hard look at
cumulative climate impacts “in conjunction with other past, present, and future lease
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are deferential to agency decisions about the proper scope of the cumula-
tive impacts analysis because the regulatory requirement is so broadly
worded, and agencies must therefore exercise discretion in deciding which
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions to focus on.265 But there
are some examples of judicial intervention—specifically, where an agency
has ignored the cumulative emissions of multiple leasing decisions that
are simultaneously pending before the agency. Two more specific trends
in these cases are (i) some courts have adopted a very narrow definition
of what constitutes a “reasonably foreseeable” action, holding that agencies
are not required to consider other pending approvals for fossil fuel pro-
duction until a final EA or EIS has been issued for those approvals and
(ii) in several instances, courts have conflated petitioners’ arguments that
agencies should evaluate cumulative emissions with arguments about the
need to evaluate the actual effects of climate change caused by those
emissions in the cumulative impacts analysis, and have held that quanti-
fication of the cumulative emissions was not required because quantifica-
tion of actual climate impacts was not feasible. For reasons discussed
below, we think courts have erred in both respects.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of fore-
seeability in WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell. There, plaintiffs argued that
BLM’s analysis of GHG emissions from a coal lease was inadequate
because BLM failed to consider its cumulative impact along with emis-
sions from eleven other pending lease applications in the Powder River
Basin.266 At the time the EIS was prepared, BLM had issued draft EISs for
four of the eleven leases; the other seven leases were still in the scoping
stage.267 The D.C. Circuit held that the approval of the eleven other leases
was not reasonably foreseeable at this stage and thus BLM was not
required to evaluate them in its cumulative effects analysis.268 This decision
thus set a very high bar for what constitutes a “foreseeable” future action.
sales in the Uinta Basin”); Complaint at 24, WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., No. 4:18-cv-00073 (D. Mont. May 5, 2018) (BLM “failed to quantify cumulative
emissions” in oil and gas leasing EA); Complaint at 4, Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau
of Land Mgmt., No. 1:18-cv-00987 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2018) (failure to account for cu-
mulative effects of multiple oil and gas leases). There are also cases in which petitioners
are primarily relying on the “cumulative effects” framework to argue that agencies should
take a harder look at the actual impacts of emissions—that is, the impacts of climate
change on human and natural systems. As such claims do not implicate the proper scope
of the emissions analysis but rather the mode of analysis, we discuss them in Part III.
265 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 413–14 (1976).
266 WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
267 Id. at 310.
268 Id.
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This rationale for this standard is questionable, especially as ap-
plied to pending actions for which a draft EIS or EA has been prepared.
The draft document is the final step in the agency review process before
the agency commits to a final action,269 and preparing this document
requires a considerable commitment of time and resources270—and such,
it is a strong indicator that an agency intends to proceed with the action.
To illustrate this point, when WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell was being
tried, BLM had already published EISs for all of the leases, issued Records
of Decisions (“RODs”) for three leases, had RODs pending for four leases,
and held a sale for one lease.271 This is such a narrow interpretation of
“reasonably foreseeable future actions” that it almost eliminates the
requirement to look at future federal actions altogether. If a proposal for
which a draft EIS or EA has been prepared does not qualify as a “foresee-
able future action,” then what does? Only actions that have been approved
but not yet implemented? This is too lenient an interpretation to support
NEPA’s goals of informed decision-making and public disclosure.
That being said, even under this very narrow interpretation, there
is ample room for greater disclosure of cumulative emissions from fossil
fuel supply projects. This is illustrated by a decision from the D.C.
district court in a case involving BLM’s failure to look at the cumulative
effects of hundreds of oil and gas leases in Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado.
In that case, the court found that BLM had violated NEPA by failing to
quantify the aggregate emissions from eleven lease sales encompassing
473 oil and gas leases.272 The court explained that “considering each
individual drilling project in a vacuum deprives the agency and the
public of the context necessary to evaluate oil and gas drilling on federal
land before irretrievably committing to that drilling.”273 There was no
question as to whether the 473 lease sales were “reasonably foreseeable”
as the sales had already been issued. But the court also noted, consistent
with the D.C. Court of Appeals standard, “[t]o the extent other BLM
actions in the region—such as other lease sales—are reasonably foresee-
able when an EA is issued, BLM must discuss them as well.”274 The court
noted that BLM must “consider these cumulative impacts when assess-
ing the contribution of the leasing program to climate change” even if it
269 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1.
270 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2–1502.3.
271 WildEarth Guardians, 738 F.3d at 310.
272 WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 55, 71 (D.D.C. 2019).
273 Id. at 83.
274 Id. at 77.
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determined that each individual lease sale would have a “de minimis
impact on climate change.”275
The three other decisions on the required scope of cumulative
emissions analysis for fossil fuel production approvals all illustrate how
deferential courts are to agencies on this question. Two of these decisions
were issued by the same judge in the Colorado district court.276 In both
cases, plaintiffs
contended that NEPA required BLM to evaluate all emis-
sions from its oil and gas leasing approvals in its cumula-
tive impacts analysis.277 The judge disagreed, finding that
BLM had taken an appropriately hard look at cumulative
impacts by providing a qualitative analysis of climate
change and its potential impacts.278 In the later of the two
decisions, the judge cited two factors that informed its
decision: (i) the general principle of deference to agencies
(“it is not the role of the court to decide whether Defen-
dants choices were ideal; I am merely tasked with deter-
mining whether Defendants’ analyses met the minimum
threshold necessary to constitute a ‘hard look.’ ”); and (ii)
BLM’s determination that it was “impossible to attribute
a particular climate impact in any given region to GHG
emissions from a particular source” because “tools did not
exist that would allow [BLM] to predict how a project’s
emissions would impact global, regional, or local climate
because, at the time, government agencies did not have
standardized protocols or specific levels of significance by
which they could quantify climate impacts.”279 While this
general principle of deference may be true, it appears that
the court’s deference in this context was misplaced insofar
as the court was deferring to BLM’s explanation of why it
could not quantify climate impacts when deciding that
BLM was not obligated to quantify cumulative emissions
275 Id.
276 Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (D.
Colo. 2019); Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145
(D. Colo. 2018).
277 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Opening Merits Brief at 16, Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bu-
reau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (D. Colo. 2019) (No. 1:17-cv-2519-LTB-GPG).
278 Citizens for a Healthy Cmty., 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1239.
279 Id. at 1239.
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from BLM leasing. The court’s decision did not contain
any assessment of whether such quantification would be
feasible or and to what extent it was necessary for in-
formed decision-making.
The Montana district court made a similar logical error in an
unreported opinion involving BLM’s cumulative impact analysis for oil
and gas leasing. There, petitioners alleged that BLM should have quanti-
fied emissions from the entire mineral estate managed by BLM, or at
minimum, eight revised RMPs that were approved by a single ROD on
the same date (and thus there was no question about whether they were
“foreseeable”).280 Petitioners also alleged that BLM should have used the
global carbon budget and/or social cost estimates to evaluate the actual
impacts of those cumulative emissions (but this was distinct from their
claim that quantification was required).281 The district court conflated
these two arguments in its analysis, finding that “[a]nalysis of the
cumulative impacts of climate change would require not only quantifica-
tion, but a standard by which to measure the impacts,” and although
plaintiffs presented two possible standards (global carbon budget and
social cost metrics), no courts had yet required the use of these tools in
that manner.282 At the same time, the district court stated that GHG
emissions can be used as a proxy for the consideration of global climate
change effects.283 The reasoning behind this decision is dubious for several
reasons. First, the court never explained why quantification of the
cumulative emissions from leasing decisions should not be required as a
“first step” in the cumulative impact analysis regardless of whether metrics
were available to further evaluate the actual impacts of those emissions.
Second, despite acknowledging that GHG emissions could themselves
serve as a proxy for impacts, the court still held that quantification was
not required. Third, if the court was correct that the cumulative effects
analysis required an additional “standard by which to measure the im-
pacts,” then should not BLM be required to use the tools that were at its
disposal (specifically the global carbon budget and the social cost of car-
bon) to perform a sound cumulative effects analysis? Ultimately, it
280 W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 2018
WL 1475470, at *13 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-3583618, 2019
WL 141346 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2019).
281 Id. at *14.
282 Id. at *13–14.
283 Id. at *18.
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appears that the court may have conflated the two arguments presented
by the petitioners (that BLM should quantify cumulative emissions from
fossil fuel leasing, and that BLM should look at the actual impacts of
those cumulative emissions) and thus failed to adequately address the
first argument about quantification.
Finally, the one case addressing the requirement to look at cumu-
lative emissions in the transport context was Indigenous Environmental
Network v. U.S. Department of State, which involved the environmental
review for the Keystone XL pipeline.284 There, the Montana district court
found that emissions from two transboundary oil pipeline projects that
were being reviewed by the State Department at the same time (Keystone
XL and Alberta Clipper) must be considered in the cumulative impacts
analysis for Keystone XL.285 The two pipeline projects shared a geographic
nexus in that they originated in the same region (Alberta oil sands) but
transported the oil to very different markets in the United States.286 This
decision provides some insight on the minimum requirements for cumu-
lative effects analysis in the pipeline context and suggests that NEPA also
requires FERC to consider the emissions from multiple pipeline projects
that are undergoing FERC review in its cumulative impacts analysis,
particularly pipelines that are located in the same region and/or service
the same natural gas production sites or end-user markets.287
2. Cumulative Emissions as Impacts of Cumulative and Similar
Actions
The regulatory requirements for analyzing cumulative and simi-
lar actions together also provide a basis for arguing that agencies should
look at the aggregated effects of multiple fossil fuel extraction and
284 Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mont. 2018).
285 Id. at 577–78.
286 Id. at 577.
287 Granted, the facts underpinning Indigenous Environmental Network were somewhat
unique: the State Department had treated the Keystone XL pipeline as a cumulative
action in the Alberta Clipper EIS (and had calculated cumulative emissions from the two
projects in that EIS), and thus it was irrational to take a different approach in the
Keystone XL EIS. Id. at 578. But the scope of an agency’s cumulative effects (or actions)
analysis on one NEPA review should not be a dispositive factor in determining whether
an agency has taken an adequately hard look at cumulative effects in another NEPA
review. To hold that an agency is not required to evaluate certain cumulative effects
because it did not evaluate them in a past review would be irrational and would under-
mine NEPA’s core purposes.
2020] THE EFFECTS OF FOSSIL FUEL SUPPLY PROJECTS 483
transportation proposals. These provisions are useful because they require
a more comprehensive review of the combined impacts of multiple federal
actions—in effect, a joint EA or EIS that looks at the actions themselves in
the aggregate, as opposed to just looking at certain effects in the aggregate.
The CEQ regulations require a joint review of federal actions that
“have cumulatively significant impacts and should therefore be discussed
in the same impact statement.”288 The regulations also recognize a
prohibition of segmentation of reviews for cumulative actions, similar to
that recognized for connected actions. Specifically, in the paragraph di-
recting agencies to consider “whether the action is related to other actions
with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts,” the
regulations state that “[s]ignificance cannot be avoided . . . by breaking
[the action] down into small component parts.”289
In contrast, the regulations state that an agency “may wish” to
analyze “similar actions” in the same NEPA document—similar actions
being defined as those which “have similarities that provide a basis for
evaluating their environmental consequences together, such as common
timing or geography” and that an agency “should do so when the best
way to assess adequately the combined impacts of similar actions or
reasonable alternatives to such actions is to treat them in a single impact
statement.”290 Due to the more permissive language here, courts have
granted considerable deference to agencies’ decisions about whether to
prepare a single EIS for similar actions.291
Decisions striking down agency reviews due to failure to prepare
a joint (or programmatic) EA or EIS for cumulative and similar actions
are rare.292 In the 1976 case Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the federal government was obligated to prepare a
programmatic review for coal leasing in the Great Plains Region.293
There, the Supreme Court explained that:
A comprehensive impact statement may be necessary in
some cases for an agency to meet [its duty to evaluate en-
vironmental impacts]. Thus, when several proposals for coal-
related actions that will have cumulative or synergistic
288 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2).
289 § 1508.27(b)(7).
290 § 1508.25(a)(3).
291 See Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, at 173–74.
292 See id. at 171–75.
293 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
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environmental impact upon a region are pending concur-
rently before an agency, their environmental consequences
must be considered together. Only through comprehensive
consideration of pending proposals can the agency evalu-
ate different courses of action.294
However, in that case, the court held that PEIS for the Great
Plains Region was not required because (i) all proposals for coal leasing
were either national or local in scope (there was no regional development
plan in the works), and (ii) the federal government had prepared a na-
tionwide PEIS for a new national coal-leasing policy as well as EISs for
proposed local coal leasing actions.295 In this context, the Court held that
it was appropriate to defer to the federal government’s determination
that “the appropriate scope of comprehensive statements should be based
on basins, drainage areas, and other factors.”296
The Ninth Circuit addressed the narrower question of whether
the federal government had improperly piecemealed its analysis of coal
mining operating in a particular leasing area in Cady v. Morton.297 There,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that DOI had improperly isolated
the impacts of coal leasing activities when it approved coal leases covering
30,876 acres of land and up to twenty years of mining but then prepared
an EIS for a mining plan which covered only five years of mining on 770
acres.298 DOI argued that the EIS was appropriate in scope because an
EIS need not be prepared covering an entire project when an adequate
EIS covering a discrete phase or segment thereof has been prepared, but
the court disagreed, explaining that:
While it is true that each mining plan prepared for tracts
within the leased area is to a significant degree an inde-
pendent project which requires a separate EIS with re-
spect to each, it is no less true that the breadth and scope
of the possible projects made possible by the Secretary’s
approval of the leases require the type of comprehensive
study that NEPA mandates adequately to inform the
Secretary of the possible environmental consequences of
294 Id. at 409–10.
295 See id. at 399–401.
296 Id. at 414.
297 Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975).
298 See id. at 794–96.
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his approval. Westmoreland’s massive capital investment
and extended contractual commitments present a situa-
tion in which “it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to
undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not
also undertaken.” However, even were this not true, it can-
not be denied that the environmental consequences of sev-
eral strip mining projects extending over twenty years or
more within a tract of 30,876.45 acres will be significantly
different from those which will accompany Westmoreland’s
activities on a single tract of 770 acres.299
This case was decided before the CEQ regulations were promulgated and
thus the court did not discuss whether these were “connected,” “cumula-
tive,” or “similar” actions under 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25—but the analysis here
suggests that the actions had some characteristics of connected actions
but would best be characterized as “cumulative” or “similar” actions
under the current regulations as they had a “significant degree” of inde-
pendent utility.300
Federal approvals for fossil fuel production and transportation
can be characterized as both “cumulative” and “similar” actions—most
of these approvals have independent utility,301 but these actions have
“similarities which provide a basis for evaluating their consequences to-
gether” as well as “cumulatively significant effects” on fossil fuel use and
the corresponding emissions. NEPA’s twin aims of informed decision-
making and public disclosure would also be best served through a com-
prehensive assessment.
However, as noted above, courts tend to be deferential to agency
decisions about the scope of their NEPA assessments for cumulative and
similar actions. One important factor is whether there is a statutory man-
date compelling the agency to prepare and/or periodically update a national
or regional program, which would in turn trigger NEPA review of the pro-
gram. For example, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act requires BOEM
to prepare five-year programs for offshore leasing covering broad geo-
graphic areas, and it would be plainly arbitrary and capricious for BOEM
to forgo a programmatic NEPA analysis of those five-year programs.302
299 Id. at 795 (internal citations omitted).
300 See id.; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.
301 As discussed in Section II.B.1, authorized projects which lack independent utility
would best be analyzed under the “connected actions” framework.
302 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
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But there is no comparable requirement for onshore leasing or for fossil
fuel transportation infrastructure. Prior to authorizing fossil fuel devel-
opment on public lands, agencies are required to prepare RMPs,303 but
these plans cover much smaller geographic units than the outer conti-
nental shelf (“OCS”) five-year program documents (and in many cases
have not been updated with an analysis of potential GHG emissions from
fossil fuel leasing). The result is that agencies are approving fossil fuel
supply projects without any programmatic analysis on the cumulative
effect of multiple approvals across broad geographic regions.304
Two other lawsuits challenging the federal government’s failure
to conduct an updated programmatic review of the federal coal leasing
program to address climate impacts, among other things, are relevant.
In Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Zinke, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that BLM was not required to update the
PEIS for the federal coal leasing program as there was no new proposal
requiring NEPA review.305 The “action” at issue in this case was the 1979
PEIS for the federal coal leasing program, and plaintiffs argued that this
needed to be updated to reflect significant new information about climate
change.306 The D.C. Circuit noted that plaintiffs had raised a “compelling
argument” for BLM to re-evaluate the federal coal leasing program in
light of climate change concerns, but held that the action contemplated
in the 1979 PEIS had been completed in 1979 and no new nationwide
action had been proposed.307 The court suggested that the plaintiffs might
pursue these claims through an alternate approach:
Appellants may, when appropriate, challenge specific li-
censing decisions on the ground that the EIS prepared in
support of any such decision fails to satisfy NEPA’s man-
date to consider the cumulative environmental impacts of
coal leasing. Such a claim might challenge any attempt by
303 See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.
304 While this may have been understandable at an earlier point in time, when adverse
environmental effects were understood to be relatively local, or regional in some instances,
at this point agencies understand that the GHG emissions from these approvals have a
global effect and can be analyzed on a regional or nationwide basis. Congress could
address this gap through legislation requiring programmatic reviews, but in the absence
of congressional action, NEPA requirements can play a role in compelling such analysis.
See supra Section I.C.
305 W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234, 1245–46 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
306 Id. at 1236–37.
307 Id. at 1244–45.
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BLM to rely on (or tier to) the 1979 PEIS on the ground
that it is too outdated to support new federal action.308
The court noted that such a lawsuit was not foreclosed by its decision in
WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell (holding that eleven pending coal leases
were not reasonably foreseeable), because that case did not involve any
allegations about improperly tiering to an outdated PEIS.309
In Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. Department of the Interior,
the Montana district court held that the Trump administration’s decision
to terminate the federal coal leasing moratorium was a major federal action
with environmental implications requiring some form of NEPA review.310
The court did not go so far as to require a PEIS but rather directed DOI
to consider what form of NEPA documentation would be required for this
action.311 Granted, neither of these two decisions on the federal coal leasing
program address whether there are “cumulative” or “similar” actions that
must be reviewed in a joint PEIS—rather, they deal with whether there
is a major federal proposal that triggers NEPA requirements—but they
do bear on agency obligations to evaluate the cumulative effects of coal
leasing decisions on a nationwide basis.
Two notable decisions address agency obligations to review con-
nected, cumulative, or similar actions involving fossil fuel supply in the
same EIS,312 but both decisions were more limited in scope insofar as
they dealt with only two potentially related actions of the same sort. In
one case, a federal court found that emissions from two oil pipelines must
308 Id. at 1244.
309 Id. at 1245.
310 Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 384 F. Supp. 3d 1264, 1271,
1279 (D. Mont. 2019).
311 Id. at 1281.
312 There are also at least two pending cases alleging that oil and gas leases sales were
“cumulative actions” that should be reviewed in the same EIS due to their cumulatively
significant impacts, and that BLM unlawfully segmented its analysis of the sales into
multiple EAs thus underplaying the significance of the impacts. These complaints deal
with approved oil and gas lease sales, thus avoiding the need to demonstrate that a
pending sale is “reasonably foreseeable.” The two pending cases alleging improper segmenta-
tion of oil and gas leasing EAs also allege inadequate analysis of cumulative effects, and
it remains to be seen whether the courts will resolve these under the cumulative impacts
framework (requiring supplementation of the existing EAs) or cumulative actions
framework (requiring preparation of a comprehensive EIS). Complaint at 27, 30–31,
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:18-cv-00073 (D. Mont. May 15,
2018); Complaint at 76–77, W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke, No. 1:18-cv-00187 (D. Idaho
Apr. 30, 2018).
488 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 44:423
be reviewed as cumulative impacts and also described these two projects
as “cumulative actions”—but because the analysis focused on the require-
ments for assessing cumulative impacts rather than actions and the
remedy was to update the cumulative impacts analysis for the one
project, the decision does not provide much guidance on the question of
when a joint EIS is required for cumulative actions.313 In another case,
a federal court held that BLM had not improperly piecemealed its analysis
in a coal lease EA when it failed to prepare a comprehensive EIS encom-
passing (i) another mining plan modification that would expand the mine
by another 498 acres and 48 million tons of coal and (ii) an application
for another coal lease at the mine that would add 1,600 acres and 198
million more tons of coal to the mine.314 The court reasoned that the plan
modification was not a “reasonably foreseeable future action” at the time
the EA was prepared because there it was only a pending application
that had not yet been approved.315 As discussed above, the rationale for
adopting such a narrow definition of foreseeability is questionable—the
entire purpose of the provisions directing agencies to review cumulative
and similar actions in the same EIS is to facilitate consideration of the
combined effects of those actions before an agency makes a final decision.
Limiting the analysis of cumulative and similar actions to actions which
have already been approved completely undermines this purpose.
III. THE ADEQUACY OF GHG EMISSIONS ANALYSIS FOR FOSSIL FUEL
SUPPLY PROJECTS
As questions about the proper scope of review for direct, indirect,
and cumulative GHG emissions from fossil fuel supply projects are
resolved, new questions naturally arise about the adequacy and reason-
ableness of agencies’ calculations, disclosures, and determinations of the
significance of GHG impacts. This section explores four key areas for
environmental impact assessment of these projects: (i) the net impact of the
proposal on fossil fuel use and corresponding emissions (i.e., the “energy
313 Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 578 (D. Mont.
2018).
314 WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-0080, 2019 WL 2404860, at *13 (D. Mont.
Feb. 11, 2019); Complaint at 17, WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-0080 (D. Mont.
June 8, 2017).
315 WildEarth Guardians, No. 1:17-cv-0080, 2019 WL 2404860, at *5, *13. Oddly, the court
did not address whether the other coal lease application was reasonably foreseeable, but
this narrow definition of “foreseeable future action” would presumably exclude that
pending application as well.
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market analysis”); (ii) non-CO2 emissions such as methane; (iii) the
significance of GHG emissions; and (iv) alternatives and mitigation options
to reduce GHG emissions. In reviewing the adequacy of environmental
reviews, courts tend to be deferential to agencies, particularly as com-
pared with situations where agencies have wholly omitted an impact
from the scope of their review. Yet, judicial discretion to agency expertise
only goes so far, and where an agency has clearly stepped outside the
realm of reasonable analysis, it is proper for a court to intervene.
A. Energy Market Impacts and Net Emissions
In assessing upstream and downstream GHG emissions of feder-
ally approved fossil fuel supply projects, agencies may seek to under-
stand the net emissions impact of the proposal based on an assessment
of how the projected increase in fossil fuel production or transport capac-
ity will affect broader patterns of energy production and consumption.
The net emissions analysis is essentially a comparison between emissions
under the “no action” and “action” alternatives, although it is not always
framed as such.316 One approach to this analysis is to deflect it with a
“perfect substitution” argument; that approach is born of faulty logic and
has been roundly rejected by the courts. Another approach involves em-
ploying energy market models to quantify emissions effects; however, in
some instances agencies have concluded that it is impossible to accu-
rately project such effects, in others they have conducted analyses that put
a thumb on the scale, and in others they have undertaken more rigorous
analyses. The critical question is whether agencies are adequately sup-
porting their findings, one way or the other. The validity of agency findings
on energy substitution and net emissions depends on the nature of the
proposal. The nationwide federal coal leasing program, for example, pre-
sumably has a much larger effect on net emissions than the approval of
an individual pipeline. But even a single pipeline or lease approval may
have some effect on fossil fuel prices and markets. Recognizing this, courts
have flatly rejected “perfect substitution” in the context of coal leases and
coal railways, and have made it clear that perfect substitution claims for
other types of proposals must be supported by adequate analysis.317 And
316 Courts have held that it is reasonable to use several different scenarios to frame the
“no action” alternative where there is uncertainty about energy markets and substitution.
See, e.g., Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 574–75
(D. Mont. 2018).
317 See Section II.A.1.
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this is exactly what many agencies have begun doing: incorporating
models and quantitative analysis into their NEPA documentation to
support their findings on energy market substitution, and in some cases
finding that the project will have little or no net impact on emissions.
Agency arguments about energy market substitution can be difficult to
parse because (i) the assumptions and calculations often are not fully
disclosed in the NEPA documentation and can be easily manipulated to
achieve an intended result; (ii) there is so much uncertainty in the results
that it is difficult if not impossible to definitively say that an agency
reached the wrong conclusion; and (iii) courts are deferential to agencies
on such technical issues. There may be instances where the analysis of
energy market impacts is so egregiously flawed that a court will remand
the issue back to the agency for supplementation or revision of the analysis,
but where agencies can show their math they often pass the test.
1. Fossil Fuels and “Perfect Substitution”
Federal courts have rejected perfect substitution arguments as
irrational and/or unsubstantiated in a number of cases involving both
fossil fuel production and transportation infrastructure. As a threshold
matter, agencies cannot rely on unsupported assumptions of perfect
substitution as a justification for ignoring downstream GHG emissions.318
As the court in High Country Conservation Advocates explained, this as-
sumption was “illogical” in the context of a coal lease approval because the
production of coal resulting from the proposed action would “increase the
supply of cheap, low-sulfur coal” and “this additional supply will impact
the demand for coal relative to other fuel sources, and coal that otherwise
would have been left in the ground will be burned.”319 Similarly, in Mid
States Coalition v. Surface Transportation Board, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that downstream emissions must be disclosed in the con-
text of a coal railway because the increase in coal transportation capacity
would affect the price of coal relative to other energy sources and this
would affect patterns of coal production and consumption.320 In Sierra
318 As discussed below, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Birckhead v. FERC
raises questions about whether courts will defer to perfect substitution arguments as a
justification for ignoring upstream emissions in the context of fossil fuel transportation
approvals. See supra notes 215–23.
319 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174,
1197–98 (D. Colo. 2014).
320 Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549–50 (8th Cir.
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Club v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected FERC’s argu-
ment that it need not quantify combustion emissions in the context of a
natural gas pipeline review because some of the natural gas would re-
place dirtier fossil fuels, thus offsetting the project’s emissions estimates.321
The court found that a purely qualitative analysis of substitution was in-
adequate because “[a]n agency decisionmaker reviewing this EIS would . . .
have no way of knowing whether total emissions, on net, will be reduced
or increased by this project, or what the degree of reduction or increase
will be.”322
It is also arbitrary and capricious for agencies to estimate down-
stream emissions for the proposed action but then claim that the emis-
sions impact will be identical under the “no action” alternative due to
perfect substitution.323 In one case involving an EA where OSM estimated
downstream emissions from coal leasing but declined to estimate the
social costs of those emissions based on its conclusion that the leasing pro-
gram would have no effect on emissions due to substitution, the review-
ing court explained that:
This conclusion is illogical, and places the Enforcement
Office’s thumb on the scale by inflating the benefits of the
action while minimizing its impacts. It is the kind of “[i]nac-
curate economic information” that “may defeat the purpose
of [NEPA analysis] by impairing the agency’s consider-
ation of the adverse environmental effects and by skewing
the public’s evaluation of the proposed agency action.”324
2003). On remand, STB prepared an EIS in which it modelled the effects of the coal
railway on coal production and use, and petitioners challenged the supplemental analysis
on the grounds that STB continued to rely on the assumption that “not all of the . . .
transported coal would represent new combustion, that some would be simply a substitute
for existing coal supplies.” Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545, 556 (8th Cir.
2006). But the Eighth Circuit upheld STB’s review as the conclusions about market
substitution were supported by quantitative analysis and energy market models. Id.
321 Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (qualitative discussion of sub-
stitution not adequate).
322 Id. at 1375.
323 WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1235–36 (10th
Cir. 2017); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 75 (D.D.C. 2019); Mont.
Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1103 (D. Mont. 2017).
324 Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1098 (D.
Mont. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Notably, in an EA prepared on remand, OSM
revised its annual production and emissions estimates downwards (from 23.16 million tons
to 13.1 million tons CO2 / year) even though the scope and duration of the action had not
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Another decision which also involved OSM’s review of coal mining im-
pacts held that this rule was also applicable where OSM had declined to
estimate the social costs of emissions because it was uncertain whether
emissions would actually be reduced under the no action alternative due
to the possibility of energy market substitution. While OSM had shifted
its position from “no impact” to “uncertain impact” due to substitution,
the court found that this was still “arbitrary and capricious” because the
“alternative source substitution assumption is not supported by any mar-
ket data, even though modeling systems exist to evaluate market effects
of changes in coal supply.”325
In addition, agencies cannot justify claims of perfect substitution
by relying on incomplete or irrational analysis of energy markets. This
was the focus of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in WildEarth
Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management, which contained one of the
most detailed assessments of an agency’s perfect substitution argument
to date. That case involved BLM’s EIS for coal leases that would have
extended the life of two coal mines (the “Wright Area” mines) that ac-
counted for nearly 20 percent of U.S. annual domestic coal production.326
BLM had quantified downstream emissions from combustion of the coal
(approximately 382 million tons of annual CO2 emissions—roughly 6
percent of U.S. total 2008 emissions) but concluded that the same
amount of coal would be sourced from elsewhere if it did not approve the
proposed leases and thus there was no difference between the proposed
action and the no action alternative with respect to coal production and
consumption.327 Thus, as noted by the court, the issue was not that BLM
had completely ignored the effects of increased coal consumption, but
rather that it had analyzed them irrationally.328
The court found that BLM’s “long logical leap presumes that either
the reduced supply will have no impact on price, or that any increase in
changed and the total projected production of “saleable” coal had actually increased from
eighty million tons to 86.8 million tons, and then replaced the statement about perfect sub-
stitution with a claim that the proposal would have a “very small impact” on emissions.
This illustrates how easily agencies can adjust their quantitative analysis to achieve an
intended result. See OFF. OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BULL MOUN-
TAINS MINE NO. 1 FEDERAL MINING PLAN MODIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 2-9,
4-3 (2015); OFF. OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BULL MOUNTAINS MINE
NO. 1 FEDERAL MINING PLAN MODIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 18, 57–58 (2018).
325 WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-00080, 2019 WL 2404860, at *11.
326 WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1226–27 (10th
Cir. 2017).
327 Id. at 1228.
328 Id. at 1237.
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price will not make other forms of energy more attractive and decrease
coal’s share of the energy mix, even slightly” and found that this assump-
tion lacked any support in the administrative record.329 The court ex-
plained:
BLM did not point to any information (other than its own
unsupported statements) indicating that the national coal
deficit of 230 million tons per year incurred under the no
action alternative could be easily filled from elsewhere, or
at a comparable price. It did not refer to the nation’s
stores of coal or the rates at which those stores may be
extracted. Nor did the BLM analyze the specific difference
in price between PRB coal and other sources; such a price
difference would effect [sic] substitutability.330
The court also noted that BLM’s assumption was contradicted by one of
the principle resources on which it relied: the EIA’s 2008 Energy Outlook.
While the report generally predicted an increase in coal production, it
also found that different assumptions for coal mining and transportation
costs affected delivered coal prices and demand, and that higher coal
costs resulted in much lower U.S. coal consumption.331 Thus, the court
found that “the [EIA] report supports what one might intuitively assume:
when coal carries a higher price, for whatever reason that may be, the
nation burns less coal in favor of other sources.”332 The court held that
BLM’s “blanket assertion that coal would be substituted from other sources,
unsupported by hard data[,]” did not provide sufficient information to
permit a reasoned choice between the preferred alternative and the no
action alternative.333 In addition, the court noted that, even if BLM had
hard data to support this statement, “we would still conclude this perfect
substitution assumption arbitrary and capricious because the assump-
tion itself is irrational (i.e., contrary to basic supply and demand princi-
ples).”334 The court concluded that it was “an abuse of discretion” to rely
on such a baseless economic assumption to distinguish between the no
action and preferred alternatives.335
329 Id. at 1229.
330 Id. at 1234.
331 Id. at 1234–35.
332 WildEarth Guardians, 870 F.3d at 1235.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 1236.
335 Id. at 1237–38.
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Another key takeaway from WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of
Land Management is that perfect substitution claims are readily distin-
guishable from other types of agency assumptions that warrant judicial
deference. The primary authority on this issue is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, which upheld the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (“NRC”) conclusion that permanent
nuclear waste storage would not have a significant environmental impact,
which was based on the Commission’s assumption that waste reposito-
ries would perform perfectly.336 There, the Supreme Court deferred to
NRC’s assumption because (1) it had a limited purpose in the overall en-
vironmental analysis (i.e., it was not the key to deciding between two
alternatives); (2) overall, the agency’s estimation of the environmental
effects was overstated, so this single assumption did not determine the
overall direction the NEPA analysis took; and (3) courts are most defer-
ential to agency decisions based not just on “simple findings of fact,” but
in the agency’s “special expertise, at the frontiers of science.”337
Applying those factors to BLM’s perfect substitution assumption,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that:
Here, the BLM’s substitution assumption appears to be
quite different from the Commission’s zero release as-
sumption under the three factor analysis in Baltimore Gas.
First, the BLM’s perfect substitution assumption was key
to the ultimate decision to open bidding on the leases. In
each of the four RODs, the “Reasons for Decision” section
first discusses the leases’ effect on coal combustion in the
nation overall, then lists the other facts that influenced its
decision in bullet points. In each ROD, the discussion opens
with the assertion that: “Denying this proposed coal leasing
is not likely to affect current or future domestic coal con-
sumption used for electric generation.” Prioritizing the car-
bon emissions and global warming analysis in the RODs
suggests that this question was critical to the decision to
open the leases for bidding. Prioritizing the perfect substi-
tution assumption within that analysis suggests it was
critical to deciding between two alternatives: whether or not
to issue the leases. The perfect substitution assumption
336 Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
337 Id. at 102–04.
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was more than a “mere flyspeck” in the BLM’s NEPA
analysis.
Second, the BLM’s carbon emissions analysis seems to be
liberal (i.e., underestimates the effect on climate change).
The RODs assume that coal will continue to be a much
used source of fuel for electricity and that coal use will
increase with population size. We do not owe the BLM any
greater deference on the question at issue here because it
does not involve “the frontiers of science.” The BLM ac-
knowledged that climate change is a scientifically verified
reality. Climate science may be better in 2017 than in 2010
when the FEIS became available, but it is not a scientific
frontier as defined by the Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas,
i.e., as barely emergent knowledge and technology. More-
over, the climate modeling technology exists: the NEMS
program is available for the BLM to use.338
Although the court remanded to the agency to modify and supple-
ment its analysis, it declined to specify the exact approach that BLM
must take. The court held that: “NEPA does not require agencies to
adopt any particular internal decisionmaking structure”339 and that
“[c]hoosing not to adopt a modeling technique does not render the BLM’s
EIS arbitrary and capricious; its irrational and unsupported substitution
assumption does.”340
Most of the case law addressing perfect substitution claims as ap-
plied to downstream emissions is consistent with the principles described
above.341 In sum, courts have rightfully rejected perfect substitution
338 WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1236–37 (10th
Cir. 2017).
339 Id. at 1238 (citing Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 100).
340 WildEarth Guardians, 870 F.3d at 1238.
341 There is one unpublished opinion from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that does not
fully reflect these same principles. That case involved a situation similar to that which
has arisen in the context of coal leases. FERC quantified downstream emissions for a
proposed pipeline project but then stated that: (i) actual emissions would be fully offset
by other sources of natural gas, resulting in no change in GHG emissions, and (ii) the
downstream effects are “not reasonably foreseeable” and “not indirect impacts” and the
commission was merely quantifying downstream emissions “outside the scope of [its]
NEPA analysis.” Petitioners claimed that this was not an adequate assessment of down-
stream impacts. The D.C. Circuit, however, held that it was not necessary to consider Pe-
titioner’s arguments about whether an increase in downstream emissions was foreseeable
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arguments in the context of both fossil fuel production and transporta-
tion approvals. However, FERC has nonetheless relied on unsubstanti-
ated perfect substitution arguments as the basis for either excluding
upstream and downstream emissions from its environmental reviews or
else discounting their importance in its significance analysis. There have
been a number of lawsuits pending against FERC due to this practice.342
FERC’s position has been that “a causal relationship sufficient to war-
rant Commission analysis of the non-pipeline activity [i.e., production
and consumption] as an indirect impact would only exist if the proposed
pipeline would transport new production from a specified production area
and that production would not occur in the absence of the proposed pipe-
line (i.e., there will be no other way to move the gas).”343 FERC has
simultaneously argued “it is unknown—and virtually unknowable—
whether the gas to be transported on [a specific pipeline] will come from
new or existing production” and “absent that basic information, it is
nearly impossible to assess whether there will be any additional produc-
tion activities in connection with the gas to be transported on the Pro-
ject.”344 In addition, FERC maintains that, “even accepting, arguendo,
that a specific pipeline project will cause natural gas production, we have
because “FERC provided an estimate of the upper bound of emissions resulting from end-use
combustion.” Thus, the court upheld FERC’s analysis without really confronting whether
FERC’s conclusions about perfect substitution were reasonable or supported by the record.
See Appalachian Voices v. FERC, No. 17-1271, 2019 WL 847199 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2019).
342 Several of these lawsuits challenge unsubstantiated assumptions from FERC about
the effect of pipeline authorizations on fossil fuel production and consumption, including
assumptions that pipeline development does not induce upstream natural gas production
(or downstream consumption) and assumptions that pipeline development may actually
reduce emissions by offsetting the use of higher carbon emitting fuels such as coal and
fuel oil. See, e.g., Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, No. 18-1128 (D.C. Cir. May 8, 2018);
Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, No. 17-1098 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 23, 2017); Catskill Moun-
tainkeeper, Inc. v. FERC, No. 16-345 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2016). A lawsuit has also been filed
against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for authorizing activities required
for the construction of an oil pipeline without conducting a NEPA analysis to evaluate,
among other things, “the climate impacts of ‘locking in’ future reliance on fossil fuels with
a massive infrastructure investment.” Complaint at 23, Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 715 Fed. Appx. 399 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-30257). There are also
numerous administrative challenges involving FERC’s failure to quantify/disclose. See
Dominion Transmission, Inc., 163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2018); Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 161
FERC ¶ 61,042 (2017); Algonquin Gas Transmission, 161 FERC ¶ 61,255 (2017).
343 Petition for Review at 72, N.J. Div. of Rate Counsel v. FERC, No. 18-1233 (3d Cir.
Sept. 4, 2019).
344 Pamela King, Climate impacts are ‘virtually unknowable’—FERC, E&E NEWS (Jan. 28,
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060118701/print [https://perma.cc/GL79-3XNZ].
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found that the potential environmental impacts resulting from such pro-
duction are not reasonably foreseeable.”345
FERC’s position with respect to both upstream and downstream
emissions is untenable.346 Granted, courts have not specifically accepted
or rejected perfect substitution claims as applied to upstream emissions
from natural gas transportation infrastructure,347 and the D.C. Circuit
deferred to FERC’s conclusion that it lacked the information necessary
to determine whether an increase in natural gas transportation capacity
would cause an increase in natural gas production in Birckhead v. FERC
(which is very similar to arguments that were rejected by other courts).348
But in that case, the D.C. Circuit also stated that FERC was “wrong to
suggest that downstream emissions are not reasonably foreseeable simply
because the gas transported by the Project may displace existing natural
gas supplies or higher-emitter fuels” and described this position as a “total
non-sequitur.”349 The same finding should apply to upstream emissions.
For reasons discussed in Parts I and II, we believe that the differ-
ential treatment of upstream and downstream emissions in reviews for
fossil fuel transportation projects is illogical: if the project causes an
increase in consumption of a fuel, then there must be a corresponding
increase in production of that fuel. Courts should therefore apply the
same scrutiny to perfect substitution arguments used to justify omitting
upstream emissions from the analysis.
2. Energy Market Analysis and GHG Emissions
In response to judicial decisions, agencies have also shown some
greater reliance on energy market models to quantitatively estimate
345 Petition for Review at 73, N.J. Div. of Rate Counsel, No. 18-1233.
346 The effect of natural gas transportation projects and consumption is reasonably fore-
seeable, and tools are available to estimate the effect of increasing natural gas transport
capacity on fossil fuel production and consumption and the corresponding emissions. If
FERC uses these tools and finds that a natural gas transportation project will have no
impact on natural gas production or consumption because the gas will simply be trans-
ported via different channels, then this raises an important question about how FERC
can justify a finding of public need for the pipeline project.
347 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did require consideration of upstream emissions
in Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. However, because petitioners argued that up-
stream emissions should be evaluated as cumulative rather than indirect effects, the
court did not confront questions pertaining to causation and perfect substitution. N.
Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011).
348 Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
349 Id. at 518.
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energy substitution and net emissions impacts. The highly technical
nature of these energy market analyses stand in contrast to the blunt
instrument of “perfect substitution” arguments and may well warrant
more deference from the courts. Thus far, there have been at least three
cases in which courts have issued decisions on the adequacy of such
analyses,350 as well as a number of undecided cases which will further
reinforce and shape agency obligations in this context.351
There are several interrelated questions pertaining to the legal
adequacy of agencies’ energy market analyses: (i) whether the agency has
made reasonable assumptions about the technical parameters used to
project energy prices, demand, and consumption; (ii) whether and under
what circumstances the agency has a duty to update or supplement its
analysis to reflect new developments such as changes in climate policy;
and (iii) whether the analysis is sufficiently tailored to the proposal
under review. The latter two questions are most likely to arise where an
agency has tiered its analysis to an earlier programmatic review.
Regarding the reasonableness of technical parameters, agencies
must use parameters that are reasonably close to real-world conditions
in their energy market models in order to generate findings that are
accurate enough to support informed decision-making. Courts have only
begun to define what is “reasonable” in this context with decisions ad-
dressing the adequacy of assumptions pertaining to energy substitutes
and energy price and demand forecasts.
As a threshold issue, we argue that the inclusion of non–fossil fuel
energy resources (particularly renewable energy) as potential energy
substitutes is essential for an accurate analysis. Excluding other energy
sources from the analysis is tantamount to assuming that we inhabit a
world where fossil fuels are the only energy sources, and this assumption
inevitably leads to underestimation of the effects of fossil fuel supply.
Consider a proposal to increase natural gas supply: such a proposal would
almost certainly decrease GHG emissions in a world where fossil fuels
are the only energy source (as natural gas displaces higher emitting coal),
but may actually increase GHG emissions in a world with other energy
350 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2017); High Country
Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 333 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (D. Colo. 2018);
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mont. 2018).
351 See Complaint, Healthy Gulf v. Bernhardt, No. 1:19-cv-00707 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2019)
(challenging BOEM’s analysis as well); Complaint, Gulf Restoration v. Zinke, No. 1:18-cv
-01674 (D.D.C. July 16, 2018) (challenging BOEM’s analysis of energy market impacts
from Gulf Leasing Program); see also challenges to FERC reviews, supra note 342 (pending
perfect substitution cases noted above).
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resources (as natural gas may displace zero-emitting renewable energy
sources). There are a number of models available which account for the
effects on renewables, many of which have been used by agencies in en-
vironmental reviews and regulatory impact analyses,352 and it would
therefore be arbitrary and capricious for agencies to use a model which
does not account for those effects.
We recognize that this position is at odds with the only decision
on the matter—specifically, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision
in Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of Energy.353 That case involved DOE’s
obligation to evaluate and disclose indirect emissions from LNG exports.354
DOE had relied on EIA studies projecting how LNG exports affect energy
markets and also commissioned a report from the National Energy
Technology Laboratory (“NETL”) on the life-cycle greenhouse gas emis-
sions of LNG exports.355 The NETL report assessed the life-cycle emis-
sions (production, transportation, consumption) of exported natural gas
and compared these with emissions from electricity generated from coal
or other sources of gas but did not consider possible substitution by al-
ternative energy sources such as renewables.356 The plaintiffs contended
that the review was fatally flawed due to DOE’s failure to account for the
possibility that U.S. LNG exports would compete with renewable energy
sources which are already quite prevalent in some of the regions where the
LNG exports would be consumed (Europe and Asia).357 The D.C. Circuit
barely addressed this aspect of the plaintiff’s argument—it merely con-
cluded, in a cursory fashion, that it must defer to DOE’s determination that
adding other variables to the analysis would be too difficult and the results
of the analysis would be too speculative to help inform decision-making.358
For the reasons noted above, we believe that this is the wrong outcome.
Agencies must also use reasonable forecasts for energy prices and
demand. There are two decisions that address what is “reasonable” in
this context, both of which also addressed the question of whether and
352 See PETER H. HOWARD, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGE-
MENT’S MODELING CHOICE FOR THE FEDERAL COAL PROGRAMMATIC REVIEW 1 (2016),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/BLM_Model_Choice.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7
WC-XX3T] (discussing different energy market models that could be used in program-
matic analysis of federal coal leasing program).
353 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d at 192.
354 Id. at 195.
355 Id. at 195–96.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 196.
358 Id. at 202.
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under what circumstances supplementation of an EIS is required to
reflect new information. The NEPA regulations require supplementation
if an “agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are
relevant to environmental concerns; or there are significant new circum-
stances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing
on the proposed action or its impacts.”359
One decision dealt with the adequacy of the EIS prepared by USFS
for coal lease approvals on remand from High Country Conservation
Advocates.360 The USFS had conducted a fairly detailed market impact
analysis in which it estimated the net emissions increase from additional
coal leasing as compared with a no action alternative.361 Plaintiffs argued
that the analysis was flawed because USFS failed to account for potential
increases in electricity demand (and usage) in its energy market model
(the model assumed fixed electricity demand regardless of how electricity
prices changed).362 The USFS had acknowledged in the EIS that an in-
crease in total electricity production may occur as a result of lower fuel
and electricity prices but explained that it believed this effect was too
speculative to model because there were numerous factors other than
fuel prices which affected electricity consumption (and USFS discussed
these factors qualitatively).363 The court found that USFS had adequately
examined the issue of electricity demand and explained the basis for
excluding this from its quantitative projections of energy consumption
and corresponding emissions.364
Plaintiffs also alleged that USFS should have updated its analysis
to account for new developments such as the repeal of the Clean Power
Plan.365 The court found that USFS did not need to supplement its
analysis to reflect new developments such as the repeal of the Clean
Power Plan.366 With regards to the second point, the court noted that the
agencies preparing the EIS had “disclosed and discussed numerous tech-
nological, regulatory, and other factors . . . that influence whether other
fuels can be substituted for a particular type of coal” and that in light of
the overall depth and scope of the analysis, the failure to supplement this
359 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i)–(ii).
360 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 333 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1131
(D. Colo. 2018).
361 Id. at 1121.
362 Id. at 1129–30.
363 Id.
364 Id. at 1130–31.
365 Id. at 1131–32.
366 High Country Conservation Advocates, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 1132.
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analysis with new data was not a significant enough deficiency to war-
rant judicial intervention.367
The second case on technical assumptions and the duty to supple-
ment involved the 2014 EIS for the Keystone XL Pipeline. In Indigenous
Environmental Network v. U.S. Department of State, the Montana dis-
trict court ordered the Department of State to supplement its analysis to
reflect significant new information that had arisen since 2014 about oil
markets, rail transportation, and GHG emissions.368 The original market
analysis, which found that the pipeline would have no impact on fossil fuel
use and emissions, illustrates just how difficult it is to accurately assess
energy market impacts of individual projects and how easy it is for agen-
cies to predicate these assessments on incorrect assumptions and projec-
tions.369 The Department of State had conditioned much of its analysis
on the assumption that the price of oil would remain high—specifically,
that the price would range from $100 per barrel to $140 per barrel over
20 years.370 Shortly after the publication of the 2014 EIS, oil prices fell
to nearly $38 per barrel, and EIA predicts the price of oil will remain
below $100 for decades.371 The Department itself conceded during litiga-
tion that the current price of oil is approximately $60 per barrel, well
below the $100 threshold.372 In presenting these facts, the court noted
that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had even called upon
the Department to revisit its conclusions about oil supply in its com-
ments on the 2014 EIS.373 The court concluded that this new information
was significant enough and highly material to the Department’s consid-
eration of how Keystone would affect tar sands production (and consump-
tion) and thus ordered supplementation of the 2014 EIS.374
367 The court also noted that the failure to supplement was not an actionable problem
because “plaintiffs do not argue that the expected climate impacts of the lease modifi-
cations are anything other than an amount proportionate to the percentage of coal
[subject to the lease]” and thus the information in the EIS was “informative of the climate
impacts expected to occur under the lease modifications”—in effect, the court accepted
the “literalist” approach to calculating indirect emissions here, and relied on this approach
in holding that an updated energy market analysis was not required. Id.
368 Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 575–79 (D.
Mont. 2018).
369 See id. (discussing problems with energy market assumptions).
370 Id. at 576–77.
371 Id. at 577.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 The district court enjoined further activity on Keystone pending supplementation of the
EIS due to this and other deficiencies. But the Trump administration was able to circum-
vent this decision by (i) issuing Executive Order 13,867, which revised the permitting
502 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 44:423
At the time of this writing, there were also two pending cases
where plaintiffs are alleging that EISs need supplementation due to tech-
nical problems with the energy market analysis, both of which deal with
BOEM’s NEPA analysis for offshore oil and gas leasing. The first, Gulf
Restoration v. Zinke, involves a challenge to two oil and gas lease sales
in the Gulf.375 The BOEM prepared a PEIS for the Gulf leasing program
and a subsequent EIS for the lease sales in which it projected the potential
impacts of oil and gas leasing (incorporating certain assumptions about
energy markets from the PEIS) on energy demand and consumption but
also concluded that the exact same impacts would occur if it did not issue
the two leases because the same activities would inevitably occur in the
same manner and magnitude under an unspecified future lease sale.376
Plaintiffs argue that the energy market projections rely on faulty
assumptions—in particular, BOEM used an incorrect royalty rate (as-
suming royalties would be 18.75 percent instead of the new 12.5 percent
rate) and also failed to account for the planned repeal of the Clean Power
Plan—and as a result, its projections of oil and gas demand were arbi-
trarily low.377 Second, plaintiffs argue that it was irrational for BOEM to
assume that the same environmental effects would occur even if it did
not hold the lease sales, and that it provided no support for its conclusion
that an unspecified lease sale would be held in the future and would sell
the same projected number of lease blocks as the proposed lease sale, or
that the same manner and degree of impact-producing factors would re-
sult.378 Plaintiffs note that the assumptions of identical future impacts
were particularly unreasonable because the lease sales at issue in this
case were of an “expansive scope” and BOEM’s practice for the past four
decades had been to offer smaller, discrete portions during lease sales.379
process for transboundary projects and clarified that “[a]ny decision to issue, deny, or
amend a permit under this section shall be made solely by the President” (this provision
was aimed at avoiding a situation where the issuance of such permits was “final agency
action” subject to NEPA review); and (ii) revoking the previous permit issued by the State
Department for Keystone XL and replacing it with a permit issued directly by the
President. Exec. Order No. 13,867, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,491 (Apr. 10, 2019). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals subsequently held that the litigation over the NEPA review of Keystone
XL was moot due to the revocation of the State Department permit. Indigenous Envtl.
Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 18-36068, 2019 WL 2542756 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019).
375 Complaint at 2, Gulf Restoration v. Zinke, No. 1:18-cv-01674 (D.D.C. July 16, 2018).
376 Id. at 32.
377 Id. at 30.
378 Id. at 3.
379 Id. at 32.
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The second case, Healthy Gulf v. Bernhardt, involves a nearly identical
challenge to another lease sale in the Gulf.380
As noted above, a third question is whether an agency has suffi-
ciently tailored its energy market analysis to the project under review.
This issue arose in Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of Energy, the case
involving DOE’s review of LNG exports.381 The reports that DOE used in
its analysis of life-cycle emissions from LNG exports did not consider the
specific effects of the export authorization under review—rather, the
analysis was generalized and applicable to all LNG exports (e.g., life-
cycle greenhouse gas emissions from LNG exports were estimated per
MWh of end-use generation, but there was no estimate of life-cycle emis-
sions for the volume of the exports under review).382
One of the plaintiff’s primary challenges to DOE’s review was that
it did not tailor the indirect and cumulative impacts analysis, including
the greenhouse gas emission estimates, to the specific volume of exports
that would be authorized under the proposal (which the Sierra Club ar-
gued should be evaluated as indirect effects of the proposal) or total amount
of exports from that terminal as well as other pending and anticipated
LNG export facilities (which the Sierra Club argued should be evaluated
as cumulative effects).383 The court agreed that DOE’s “generalized
impact assessment is not tailored to any specific level of exports,” but
nonetheless upheld the analysis.384 It did not articulate a reason why
DOE should not be required to estimate the greenhouse gas emissions for
the specific exports under review.
The lawsuits filed to date illustrate some of the potential problems
with agency energy market analyses and the need for careful scrutiny by
courts to ensure that agencies are not relying on faulty assumptions,
ignoring important developments, or manipulating the analysis to make
the project’s impacts appear less substantial. In many respects, the use
of energy market models is an important and positive development—and
certainly a better approach than relying on unsupported claims of perfect
substitution. But focusing on the project’s “net emissions” is not the only
approach for evaluating upstream and downstream emissions. It would
also be reasonable to treat gross downstream and upstream emissions as
indirect effects of the proposal. Indeed, this is how most impacts are
380 Complaint at 2, Healthy Gulf v. Bernhardt, No. 1:19-cv-00707 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2019).
381 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
382 Id.
383 Id. at 197.
384 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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evaluated under NEPA—agencies focus on the actual impacts of the
proposal under review without attempting to project the possible impacts
of other activities that may occur if the proposal is not implemented. For
example, in NEPA reviews for proposals that involve timber harvests,
agencies focus on the impacts of the harvest under review and do not
project the extent to which timber would be sourced from elsewhere if the
proposal were not approved and then use such projections to derive
estimates of “net impacts.”385 Moreover, in NEPA reviews for fossil fuel
supply projects, more local environmental impacts (e.g., air and water
quality impacts) are also evaluated on gross terms.386
The Stockholm Environment Institute (“SEI”) describes this ap-
proach of focusing on gross emissions as a “literalist” approach to emis-
sions inventorying due to its specific focus on logic: because of a given
project, a certain amount of fuel will be produced, transported, processed,
and consumed, and this will generate a certain quantity of greenhouse
gas emissions.387 The “literalist” approach accounts for the greenhouse
gas impact of the fuel handled by the project without considering how the
project affects broader energy markets.388 As such, it may be viewed as
only a partial analysis of impacts. However, the net emissions analysis,
which SEI characterizes as the “economist” approach, requires decision
makers to “make assumptions about long-term economic responses that
are difficult to assess”389 and thus it is inherently speculative.
One rationale for treating GHG emissions differently than other
impacts is that the effect of the emissions is the same regardless of where
they are generated and thus it is possible to assess net emission impacts
without more precise data about geographic location. But agencies,
courts, and the public should question whether this is a strong enough
rationale for making decisions based on highly uncertain findings about
energy market impacts (or vague statements about possible substitution)
as opposed to a straightforward inventory of gross emissions. The “net
385 See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERV., USDA, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, NATIONAL
FOREST SYSTEM LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING vi (2008), https://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma
/includes/planning_rule/eis.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE9Z-GEQK]; Proposed RMP/Final EIS,
U.S. BUREAU LAND MGMT., DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.blm.gov/or/plans/rmpswestern
oregon/feis/ [https://perma.cc/9AFP-YAYC] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
386 See JAYNI HEIN ET AL., INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, PIPELINE APPROVALS AND GREEN-
HOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 31 (2019).
387 PETER ERICKSON & MICHAEL LAZARUS, STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., ASSESSING THE
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IMPACT OF NEW FOSSIL FUEL INFRASTRUCTURE 2–3 (2013).
388 Id. at 2–3, 6.
389 Id. at 6.
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emissions” analysis may prove too speculative to truly help with decision-
making. Granted, energy market models also have the potential to pro-
vide highly useful information to inform decision-making about fossil fuel
supply proposals so long as the inputs, assumptions, and parameters are
sound—particularly in the context of programmatic-level reviews. The
critical question going forward is whether agencies are capable of setting
reasonable parameters and making reasonable projections, particularly
when conducting project-level reviews (as it becomes more difficult to model
impacts at a smaller scale). It may be the case that the energy market
modelling approach makes the most sense for programmatic reviews and
that simply calculating the gross upstream and downstream emissions
is sufficient for project-level reviews. Granted, some individual supply
projects involve the production or transportation of very large quantities
of fossil fuels, and the modelling approach may be warranted for those
reviews as well.
As discussed above, there are ways in which agencies using en-
ergy market models can improve the accuracy and integrity of their
analysis. To summarize, agencies should (i) consider all possible energy
substitutes, including renewable energy at minimum (and ideally includ-
ing nuclear energy and demand-side energy efficiency as well); (ii) con-
sider multiple energy market scenarios, including scenarios consistent
with 1.5 and 2°C futures; (iii) use the best available and up-to-date pricing
information and projections; and (iv) be transparent about the assump-
tions and parameters of their analysis.
B. Significance of GHG Emissions
The identification of significant impacts is an essential step in the
NEPA process, critical not only to the decision to prepare an EIS but also
for the purposes of informed decision-making and public disclosure and
analysis of mitigation measures. Courts have begun to flesh out agency
obligations with respect to significance determinations for fossil fuel
supply projects. Below, we highlight four key principles from the regula-
tions and case law (some of which overlap with themes we have already
discussed): (i) agencies must account for the full scope of direct, indirect,
and cumulative emissions when evaluating significance; (ii) agencies
must use correct technical assumptions to estimate the magnitude of the
emissions impact; (iii) agencies must apply the regulatory criteria for
evaluating context and intensity; and (iv) agencies must conduct a bal-
anced assessment of costs and benefits.
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Notably, the decisions issued to date and the undecided cases all
deal with the reasonableness of assumptions and analyses underlying
significance determinations; there are no lawsuits directly challenging
findings of insignificance on the grounds that the total magnitude of the
emissions impact is too large to be viewed as insignificant. Such a chal-
lenge may prove difficult, as significance is a highly subjective concept
and courts are deferential to agency conclusions on such matters.390 That
being said, while it is true that significance is subjective and it is difficult
to draw a clear line between the level of GHG emissions that is and is not
significant, there are also instances where the direct and indirect GHGs
from a proposal clearly pass any reasonable threshold of significance,
and in such contexts, courts should intervene.391
1. Agencies Must Take a “Hard Look” at the Full Scope of GHG
Emissions
Section 1502.16 of the CEQ regulations requires agencies to dis-
cuss the significance of both direct and indirect effects, and section 1508.27,
which outlines the criteria for assessing significance, makes it clear that
cumulative impacts are also relevant to the significance determination.392
Part II clarifies the potential scope of GHG emissions that must be
accounted for in NEPA reviews for fossil fuel supply projects (and quanti-
fied where possible). These include direct, indirect, and cumulative
emissions, as well as emissions from related actions, which may include
connected, cumulative, and/or similar actions. There are a number of
cases in which courts have remanded significance determinations—
typically FONSIs—on the grounds that the agencies failed to quantify
indirect or cumulative emissions.393
390 “A court’s role in reviewing an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS is a limited one,
designed primarily to ensure that no arguably significant consequences have been ignored.”
Mayo v. Reynolds, 875 F.3d 11, 15, 19–21 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).
391 See, e.g., MONT. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, OFF. OF SURFACE MINING, WESTERN ENERGY
AREA F: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 473–91 (2018) (the agency estimated
that coal mining proposal would generate 235,355,989 tons of CO2e over the lifetime of
the project but did not reach a conclusion as to whether this was a significant impact).
392 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.
393 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (remanding to
FERC to evaluate significance of indirect emissions); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368
F. Supp. 3d 41, 83, 85 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding inadequate support for EA/FONSI); WildEarth
Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-0080, 2019 WL 2404860, at *12 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2019);
San Juan Citizens All. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1249 (D.N.M.
2018) (finding inadequate support for EA/FONSI); Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of
Surface Mining, No. CV 15-106-M-DWM, 2017 WL 5047901 at *6 (D. Mont. Nov. 3, 2017).
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For example, in San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Bureau of Land
Management, the New Mexico district court found that BLM’s FONSI for
oil and gas leasing was fatally flawed because BLM had failed to account
for both indirect and cumulative emissions.394 The court specifically em-
phasized BLM’s duty to analyze significance in the context of cumulative
effects, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. section 1508.7:
It is the broader, significant “cumulative impact” which
must be considered by an agency, but which was not con-
sidered in this case. Without further explanation, the facile
conclusion that this particular impact is minor and there-
fore “would not produce climate change impacts that differ
from the No Action Alternative,” is insufficient to comply
with Section 1508.7.395
In at least three other cases involving fossil fuel production, reviewing
courts have remanded EAs and FONSIs because the agency did not quan-
tify indirect emissions (and in some cases also cumulative emissions) and
therefore failed to take a hard look at the severity of the emissions.396
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also addressed FERC’s obliga-
tions to discuss the significance of indirect and cumulative emissions in
Sierra Club v. FERC, which involved FERC’s failure to account for down-
stream emissions from a natural gas pipeline project.397 There, the court
held that FERC must amend its EIS to include not only a quantified in-
ventory of indirect emissions but also “a discussion of the ‘significance’
of this indirect effect . . . as well as ‘the incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
actions.’ ”398 The court noted that quantification would be essential to the
evaluation of significance but did not otherwise specify what the signifi-
cance analysis should include.399
394 San Juan Citizens All., 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1244.
395 Id. at 1248.
396 WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 59, 85; WildEarth Guardians, 2019 WL
2404860, at *7; Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 2017 WL 5047901, at *6.
397 Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d at 1374.
398 Id.
399 Id. The court also noted that Sierra Club had “asked FERC to convert emissions
estimates to concrete harms by way of the Social Cost of Carbon” in its rehearing request,
but did not issue a ruling on whether such disclosure was required (as neither party ex-
plicitly raised this in their briefs). Id. at 1375. Rather, the court directed FERC to explain
its position on using the Social Cost of Carbon in the amended EIS. Id.
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The analysis prepared by FERC on remand from this case is illus-
trative of how agencies can avoid significance determinations and why
further judicial intervention may be needed to ensure meaningful analy-
sis of the significance of indirect and cumulative emissions under NEPA.
FERC estimated that the combustion of natural gas from the pipeline
would generate 8.36 million tons per year of CO2 emissions, which is
roughly equal to the emissions from (i) approximately 1.8 million passen-
ger vehicles driven each year or (ii) approximately 1.25 million homes’
electricity use for one year.400 Nonetheless, FERC quickly dismissed the
significance of the emissions on the grounds that it lacked a threshold for
assigning significance to GHG emissions, and it further noted that the
indirect GHG calculations did not alter its assessment of the project
because:
[T]he No Action Alternative would not result in predictable
actions if the SMP Project were not built. For example, the
project’s shippers may seek to transport the same volumes
of natural gas by expanding existing transportation sys-
tems or constructing new facilities. Because the No Action
Alternative could result in lesser, equal, or greater GHG
emissions than the SMP Project, we cannot use the quan-
tified downstream GHG emissions from the SMP Project
to meaningfully compare the two.401
FERC also declined to estimate the social cost of the emissions.402 The
supplemental analysis and significance determination (or lack thereof)
has not been challenged in court, but we note that this analysis is very
similar to arguments about possible perfect substitution that have been
rejected in the context of production proposals.
400 Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse
-gas-equivalencies-calculator [https://perma.cc/VX3S-N72Z] (last updated Oct. 15, 2018).
401 FERC, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 9 (2018), https://www.ferc
.gov/industries/gas/enviro/eis/2018/02-05-18-FEIS/02-05-18-FEIS.pdf [https://perma.cc
/76G4-HHG4].
402 According to estimates set forth in our comments on the DSEIS, the social costs would
be roughly $306 million during the first year of operation and would rise to approximately
$492 million per year by 2040. COLUM. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., COMMENT
LETTER ON DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Nov. 17, 2017),
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2016/05/Sabin_Center_Comments_Southeast
_DSEIS.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YCS-46A4].
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2. Agencies Must Use Sound Technical Assumptions When
Measuring the Severity of the Emissions Impact
If the technical assumptions underlying an agency’s emission
estimates are unreasonable, this would render any significance determi-
nation predicated on that analysis arbitrary and capricious. Above, we
discuss the legal adequacy of assumptions pertaining to energy substitu-
tion and net emissions, as that has been the focus of many lawsuits in
recent years. But there are other types of technical assumptions that are
also critical to accurate emissions quantification. Here, we focus on two
examples which have been the subject of litigation: assumptions about
the global warming potential (“GWP”) of non-CO2 emissions (which are
relevant when converting those emissions to CO2 equivalent (“CO2e”)),403
and assumptions about the amount of methane emissions generated from
natural gas wells and pipeline infrastructure.
Agencies frequently rely on estimates of CO2e to aggregate all
types of GHGs, and using the right GWP is necessary in order to accu-
rately estimate CO2e for non-CO2 emissions. Three lawsuits have been
filed against BLM for using an arbitrarily low GWP value to estimate the
effects of methane in terms of CO2e. Specifically, plaintiffs have alleged
that (i) BLM relied on an outdated 100-year GWP of 21, instead of the
IPCC’s current 100-year GWP of 36; and (ii) BLM should have calculated
methane emissions using the twenty-year GWP of 87, as this more closely
corresponded with the anticipated project duration.404 The consequence
of choosing a lower GWP is dramatic: one complaint alleges that BLM
underestimated the global warming effect of methane by a factor of four.405
In Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, the Montana district court held that BLM’s “unexplained decision
to use the 100-year time horizon, when other more appropriate time horizon
remained available, qualifies as arbitrary and capricious.”406 There, the
403 The GWP is a measure of how much heat a GHG traps in the atmosphere over a spe-
cific amount of time (e.g., 100 years), as compared to CO2. Understanding Global Warming
Potentials, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-poten
tials [https://perma.cc/9GY3-KWM2] (last updated Feb. 14, 2017).
404 Petition for Review at 24, Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 342
F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D. Colo. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01822); Complaint at 35, Wilderness Workshop
v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 1:18-cv-00987 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2018); Amended Com-
plaint at 41, W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:16-cv-00021
-BMM, 2018 WL 1475470 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018).
405 Petition for Review at 24, Wilderness Workshop, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (No. 1:16-cv-
01822 -WYD).
406 W. Org. of Res. Councils, 2018 WL 1475470, at *15.
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court noted that BLM had used the twenty-year GWP in other NEPA
documentation, which demonstrated that BLM was aware of the evolving
nature of the science regarding methane emissions estimation, and BLM
had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for using the 100-year
GWP.407 In contrast, in Wilderness Workshop v. Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, the Colorado district court upheld BLM’s use of a 100-year GWP
of 21 where the court felt that BLM had adequately explained its basis
for doing so.408 The third case has not yet been decided.409
Agencies should also use the best available data to estimate meth-
ane emissions from oil and gas infrastructure. There has not been much
litigation about this issue to date, but there is a growing body of research
suggesting that the federal government has dramatically underestimated
methane emissions from oil and gas infrastructure which may give rise to
future lawsuits.410 There is one case which addresses the adequacy of
agency methane calculations. In Wilderness Workshop, plaintiffs also al-
leged that BLM made improper assumptions about the magnitude of
methane emissions—specifically, that BLM used modeling data to estimate
methane emissions that came solely from survey responses of oil and gas
operators without confirming those answers, that the data was not based
on current or historic emission rates but on forecast emissions in 2028, and
that BLM improperly adjusted the emission rates on a faulty assumption
about the implementation of control technologies on oil and gas sources.411
The plaintiffs offered alternative calculations of methane emissions.412
407 Id.
408 Wilderness Workshop, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 1161.
409 Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 1:18-cv-00987 (D. Colo. Apr. 26,
2018).
410 Ramón Alvarez et al., Assessment of Methane Emissions from the U.S. Oil and Gas
Supply Chain, 361 SCI. 186, 186 (2018), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6398
/186 [https://perma.cc/M3QB-34NY]; Megan Geuss, Study: US oil and gas methane emis-
sions have been dramatically underestimated, ARS TECHNICA (June 22, 2018), https://
arstechnica.com/science/2018/06/study-us-oil-and-gasmethane-emissions-have-been-dra
matically-underestimated/ [https://perma.cc/X54J-VPTD]; Ken Paulman, Study finds EPA
vastly underestimating methane emissions, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (June 22, 2018),
https://energynews.us/digests/study-finds-epa-vastly-underestimating-methane-emissions/
[https://perma.cc/FDT9-2L62]; Bob Weber, New study suggests oils and greenhouse gas
emissions underestimated, CANADIAN PRESS (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.citynews1130
.com/2019/04/23/new-study-suggests-oilsands-greenhouse-gas-emissions-underestimated/
[https://perma.cc/KBD5-RSL2]; Major studies reveal 60% more methane emissions, ENVTL.
DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/methane-studies [https://perma.cc/XS3F-3QTA]
(last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
411 Wilderness Workshop, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 1160–62.
412 Id. at 1161.
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However, the court held that the plaintiffs had not adequately supported
their own calculations and that this left the court “with no reliable way
to sufficiently judge Plaintiff’s analysis on the issue” and, in addition,
that plaintiffs had not persuasively explained how the use of industry
data or assumptions underpinning BLM’s analysis resulted in incorrect
methane calculations.413 It thus held that it must defer to BLM’s calcula-
tions of methane emissions.414
3. Significance Must Be Assessed in Light of Regulatory Criteria
The NEPA regulations direct agencies to consider both context
and intensity when assessing significance as well as a number of more
specific factors relevant to gauging the intensity of the impact.415 These
include, inter alia, “[t]he degree to which the proposed action affects public
health or safety”; “[t]he degree to which the effects on the quality of the
human environment are likely to be highly controversial”; “[t]he degree
to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly un-
certain or involve unique or unknown risks”; “[t]he degree to which the
action may establish a precedent for future actions with significant ef-
fects or represents a decision in principle about a future consideration”;
and “[w]hether the action is related to other actions with individually
insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts.”416 With regards to
cumulative impacts, section 1508.27 notes that “[s]ignificance exists if it
is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the envi-
ronment” and that “[s]ignificance cannot be avoided by terming an action
temporary or by breaking it down into small component parts.”417
The context for federal approvals of fossil fuel supply projects can be
framed as follows: climate change is causing and will cause harm to public
health and welfare, on scales ranging from the global to the highly local,
and to address this problem the United States must rapidly reduce its
dependency on fossil fuels. Where fossil fuel production takes place on pri-
vate lands, the government’s ability to address climate impacts is limited.
But where the federal government has authority over production on public
lands and transportation projects that require federal approval, the gov-
ernment has the opportunity to consider the potential GHG emissions
and act on this information. With this in mind, agencies should look at
413 Id. at 1162.
414 Id.
415 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.
416 Id.
417 Id.
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the proposal’s impact on fossil fuel consumption and emissions in the context
of global, national, regional, or state carbon budgets (or emission reduction
targets) with an eye towards understanding whether the proposal can be
implemented without undermining progress towards decarbonization.
Granted, NEPA does not require an agency to avoid all significant
impacts—and thus an agency may proceed with a fossil fuel supply pro-
posal even if it is inconsistent with decarbonization or emission reduction
goals—but this sort of analysis is needed in order for decision makers to
make informed decisions about how to proceed with fossil fuel–related
proposals when decarbonization is a critical social goal.
Agencies must also consider “intensity”—that is, the “severity of
the impact.”418 There are several ways that agencies can assess the severity
of the emissions impact. One option is to provide a qualitative description
of climate change impacts and use the estimated GHG emissions as a
proxy for the “severity” of the project’s contribution to those impacts. This
approach was endorsed in the rescinded CEQ guidance.419 The one key
limitation to this approach is that CO2e estimates do not, in of themselves,
provide a clear picture of the potential magnitude of the impact on humans
and ecosystems—and when the estimates are compared to global, na-
tional, or state emission totals, they inevitably appear relatively small.
Other tools are available to better understand the magnitude of
the emissions impact. These include (i) the Social Cost of Carbon (SC-
CO2), Methane (SC-CH4), and Nitrous Oxide (SC-N2O) metrics that were
developed through a federal interagency consultation process and ap-
proved by the courts, which can be used to assign a dollar value to the po-
tential impacts of these emissions;420 (ii) the EPA’s quantification threshold
418 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b).
419 CEQ, Final Guidance Memo, supra note 49, at 4. Such a qualitative description of
climate change impacts can also help to satisfy the requirement to look at “cumulative
impacts” of the proposal combined with other foreseeable actions.
420 The Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide, despite being officially “re-
scinded” by President Trump, are scientifically credible estimates of the societal costs of
greenhouse gas emissions, developed through a lengthy process of interagency consultation
and peer review, and that cost is absolutely relevant to assessing the nature and significance
of the proposed program’s environmental consequences. See Zero Zone Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Energy, 832 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding use of methodology for calculating social
cost of carbon used by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon); INTER-
AGENCY WORKING GRP. ON THE SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 2 (May 2013, revised Aug. 2016); INTERAGENCY
WORKING GRP. ON THE SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, ADDENDUM TO TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866: APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE THE
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of 25,000 tons per year of CO2e to identify major emitters for the pur-
poses of GHG reporting (as noted by EPA, facilities that surpass this
threshold are considered the “largest emitters” in the country);421 (iii) the
EPA’s GHG Equivalencies Calculator, which can be used to compare
emissions from the proposal with, for example, emissions from household
electricity use or vehicle miles driven;422 and (iv) evaluating the proposal
and its emissions in the context of global, national, and (where applicable)
state carbon budgets. As climate change attribution science progresses,
it may also become possible to link the emissions from a particular pro-
posal to specific impacts (e.g., a certain amount of sea level rise) based on
the proportional contribution to global emissions.423 Such an assessment
may already be feasible in the context of a very large action, such as a
programmatic review of federal coal leasing, as scientists are already
linking very large emission sources to specific impacts, but would prove
challenging for more discrete proposals with smaller emissions impacts.424
The intensity criteria set forth in section 1508.27 should also be
used in this analysis. Many of these factors weigh in favor of a significance
finding for GHG emissions from fossil fuel supply projects. For example,
one could argue that the effect of these projects—particularly the effects
on fossil fuel consumption and GHG emissions—are “highly controver-
sial” because there are substantial disputes about the accuracy of agency
assessments and the actual magnitude of the emissions impacts from
these proposals. It could also be argued that these effects are “highly un-
certain” and “involve unique or unknown risks” due to the level of uncer-
tainty discussed in NEPA documentation as well as broader uncertainty
about the potential magnitude and impact of climate change. The approval
of fossil fuel extraction and transportation projects (and corresponding
NEPA analysis) can also “establish a precedent for future actions with
significant effects” and “represents a decision in principle about a future
SOCIAL COST OF METHANE AND THE SOCIAL COST OF NITROUS OXIDE 2–3 (Aug. 2016). See
also Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1094–95
(D. Mont. 2017) (requiring disclosure of GHG costs in NEPA review where benefits were
also disclosed, and citing the federal Social Cost of Carbon as an available disclosure
tool); High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174,
1178, 1187 (D. Colo. 2014) (also requiring disclosure of GHG costs in NEPA reviews
where benefits were disclosed).
421 Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgreport
ing/key-facts-and-figures [https://perma.cc/ESK5-KP33] (last updated Oct. 1, 2019).
422 Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator, supra note 400.
423 See Michael Burger, Radley Horton & Jessica Wentz, The Law and Science of Climate
Change Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. (forthcoming Jan. 2020) (manuscript at 53–62).
424 Id. at 53.
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consideration”—specifically, whether the United States should adopt
supply-side constraints on fossil fuels to address climate change and
whether the infrastructure will result in fossil fuel “lock in.” And finally,
there can be no doubt that each of these approvals is “related to other
actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant
impacts”—that is, the approval of other fossil fuel leases, RMPs, and
transportation infrastructure—all of which contributes to the ongoing
supply of and reliance on fossil fuels. As noted in section 1508.27, this
last factor is dispositive: “Significance exists if it is reasonable to antici-
pate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment.”
As discussed in Part I, agencies often fail to assess the significance
of GHG emissions in light of the regulatory factors, and this has resulted
in a number of lawsuits.425 One decision from the D.C. Circuit district
court contained a particularly detailed assessment of the regulatory re-
quirements.426 The critical question was whether BLM had adequately
justified FONSIs that it issued for five oil and gas lease sales covering a
total of 282 leases on 303,000 acres of federal lands in Wyoming.427 The
court explained that the key considerations are whether the agency:
(1) has accurately identified the relevant environmental
concern, (2) has taken a hard look at the problem in pre-
paring its [FONSI or Environmental Assessment], (3) is
able to make a convincing case for its finding of no signifi-
cant impact, and (4) has shown that even if there is an
impact of true significance, an EIS is unnecessary because
changes or safeguards in the project sufficiently reduce
the impact to a minimum.428
425 Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (remanding to FERC to
evaluate significance of indirect emissions); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp.
3d 41, 76 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding inadequate support for EA/FONSI); San Juan Citizens
All. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1247 (D.N.M. 2018) (finding in-
adequate support for EA/FONSI). See also Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 894 F.3d 692, 697–98 (5th Cir. 2018) (alleging that USACE “failed to assess the
climate impacts of ‘locking in’ future reliance on fossil fuels with a massive infrastructure
investment”); Complaint at 27, WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No.
4:18-cv-00073 (D. Mont. May 15, 2018) (alleging that agency failed to disclose social costs,
and failed to evaluate context and intensity); Complaint at 2, 36, Wilderness Workshop
v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 1:18-cv-00987 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2018) (alleging that
the agency failed to prepare EA or EIS for proposal and thus failed to evaluate signifi-
cance of emissions in light of regulatory criteria).
426 WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 63–64, 66–67, 69–71.
427 Id. at 55.
428 Id. at 80.
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Applying these factors, the court held that BLM could not support
its FONSI because it had failed to take a hard look at all indirect and
cumulative emissions.429 However, the court also looked at two other sig-
nificance factors—whether the action is highly controversial and whether
it involves highly uncertain or unique or unknown risks—and found that
these factors, standing alone, would not compel preparation of an EIS.430
With regards to controversy, the court said it could not conclude
that the effects of leasing are highly controversial because controversy in
the NEPA context “is not measured merely by the intensity of opposition”
but whether there is “a substantial dispute . . . as to the size, nature, or ef-
fect of the major federal action” or “scientific or other evidence that reveals
flaws in the methods or data relied upon by the agency in reaching its
conclusions.”431 If there is opposition from other agencies with “special
expertise” or stakes in the decision, this would also support a finding of
controversy.432 Regarding the EA at issue, the court noted that, although
plaintiffs had shown that BLM’s impact assessment was inadequate,
they had not yet showed that there was a significant dispute as to the
magnitude of the impact or the methods and data used in the analysis.433
However, the court recognized that BLM’s analysis on remand would
“more fully illustrate” its position on the magnitude of the emissions
impact.434 Thus, having a more complete assessment which includes
BLM’s assessment of the significance of indirect and cumulative emissions
may make it easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate controversy, particularly
if BLM relies on questionable assumptions about market impacts to dis-
count the significance of the emissions impacts.
With regards to whether the effects were highly uncertain, the
court explained that this factor is implicated when an action involves
new science or when an action’s impact is unknown.435 However, the court
held that uncertainty about the magnitude of the emissions impact in this
case was not enough to trigger the type of “uncertainty” contemplated by
the regulations because all parties agree that GHGs contribute to climate
429 The court emphasized that the potential for cumulative effects was a key consideration
in the significance analysis and found that BLM had failed to adequately assess those
cumulative effects, pursuant to the criteria set forth in the CEQ regulations. Id. at 77.
430 Id. at 80.
431 Id. at 81 (internal citations omitted).
432 WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
433 Id. at 63, 74.
434 Id. at 82.
435 Id.
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change and the impacts of climate change are known as a general man-
ner.436 Thus, the court held that this factor is only triggered where there
is uncertainty about the nature of the impacts, not the severity.
Some litigants have also challenged agency significance assess-
ments for failure to use some of the tools described above for better un-
derstanding the severity and context of emissions impacts. For example,
some litigants have argued that agencies should disclose the social cost
of emissions as this is an easier metric for decision makers and the public
to understand than tonnage of CO2e.437 But under the Trump administra-
tion, agencies have consistently refused to disclose the social cost of GHG
emissions.438 The primary rationales for not disclosing social costs are (i)
the metrics were developed for a rule-making context; (ii) NEPA does not
require a cost-benefit analysis or monetization of costs; (iii) the metrics
do not accurately reflect the incremental emissions impact of the pro-
posal (because there is significant uncertainty about the actual cost of
emissions and the social cost metrics do not capture all costs); and (iv)
the metrics are not useful to decision makers because they are presented
as a range of possible values and there is no criteria or thresholds against
which to gauge the significance of those values.439
As discussed below, courts have only required use of the social
cost metrics where agencies have also disclosed economic benefits,440 but
outside of that context, courts have deferred to agency rationales for not
disclosing social costs without evaluating the merits of these argu-
ments.441 This is unfortunate, as there is good reason to be critical of
these rationales.
436 Id. at 79.
437 Although these metrics do not provide a way of disaggregating emissions impacts into
specific identifiable impacts, they do provide a useful tool for conceptualizing the overall
costs to society of the emissions associated with a proposal. FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH
A. STANTON, CLIMATE CHANGE & GLOBAL EQUITY, CLIMATE RISKS & CARBON PRICES:
REVISING THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 151–86 (2014).
438 See Jessica Wentz, New Draft Guidance on Climate Change and NEPA Reviews Un-
likely to Significantly Affect Agency Practice or Judicial Interpretation of NEPA Obligations,
SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, COLUM. L. SCH. (June 24, 2019), http://blogs.law.co
lumbia.edu/climatechange/2019/06/24/new-draft-guidance-on-climate-change-and-nepa
-reviews-unlikely-to-significantly-affect-agency-practice-or-judicial-interpretation-of-nepa
-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/35HP-JTLY].
439 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, COASTAL PLAIN OIL AND
GAS LEASING PROGRAM DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOLUME II: APPEN-
DICES F-2–F-4 (Dec. 2018).
440 See infra Section III.B.4.
441 See, e.g., EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Appalachian
Voices v. FERC, No. 17-1271, 2019 WL 847199, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2019).
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With regards to the first argument, the metrics may have been
developed for a rule-making context, but they can readily be used in an
environmental analysis to better understand the potential costs associ-
ated with greenhouse gas emissions—and those cost estimates are a
useful proxy for the actual impacts of climate change. The fact that the
metrics were developed for rule-making is irrelevant to the question of
whether they would be useful in NEPA analyses.
With regards to the second argument, while it is true that NEPA
does not require cost-benefit analysis, the disclosure of social costs is
nonetheless useful to decision makers and the public and a relatively
easy exercise (as it simply entails multiplying emissions by social cost
metrics). Agencies also frequently monetize benefits and should monetize
costs for a fair and balanced assessment, even where the EIS does not
contain a complete cost-benefit analysis.
With regards to the third argument (that the social cost metrics do
not measure the actual incremental impacts of a project on the environ-
ment and do not include all damages or benefits from carbon emissions),
this statement is partially incorrect. The SC-CO2, SC-CH4, and SC-N2O
measure the actual incremental impacts of a project on the physical and
human environment by specifying the incremental costs associated with
an incremental increase in GHG emissions. These impacts are expressed
as monetary costs rather than specific physical impacts because this is
a reasonable and comprehensible way to aggregate many different im-
pacts in a single metric. While it is true that the metrics do not capture all
costs associated with GHG emissions, they at least capture a portion of
those costs (and the agency can disclose the costs that are not covered).
With regards to the fourth argument (that the metrics are unhelpful
because estimates are presented as a range of possible values and there
is no threshold for significance), the fact that the estimates are presented
as a range of values is actually beneficial, as it addresses uncertainty,
and such ranges can be used to define the bounds of possible foreseeable
outcomes. This sort of forecasting is common under NEPA. And although
it is true that there is no significance threshold defined for GHGs or social
costs, this is true for many different types of impacts that are evaluated in
NEPA reviews—there are no bright line rules for assessing significance,
and agencies typically must use their discretion to determine when impacts
pass the threshold of significance. The monetization of climate change
impacts, however, is useful in informing significance determinations in-
sofar as it provides a standard metric for comparing different impacts.
The other main disclosure tool that agencies can and should use
to evaluate the significance of emissions impacts is a carbon budget.
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Estimates have been developed for both the global and national carbon
budget, and some states have developed their own carbon budgets as
well.442 At least three of the lawsuits brought to date have also involved
allegations that agencies should have examined emissions in light of a
carbon budget.443 The case law on this matter is less well-developed than
the case law on social cost metrics. In one decision on this issue, Western
Organization of Resource Councils v. Bureau of Land Management, the
Montana district court held that BLM was not required to use a “global
carbon budget” as the standard by which to measure emissions impacts
because “Plaintiffs identify no case, and the Court has discovered none,
that supports the assertion that NEPA requires the agency to use a global
carbon budget analysis.”444 The D.C. district court in WildEarth Guard-
ians v. Zinke also deferred to BLM’s decision not to use the global carbon
budget to evaluate the severity of the emissions, again citing the lack of
any precedent requiring such an analysis in the NEPA context.445 The
third case has not yet been decided.446
It is unsurprising that courts are reluctant to require the use of
a particular analytic tool, but this is one context in which judicial inter-
vention may make sense. Courts in other countries have begun to enforce
national emission reduction obligations based on carbon budgets,447 and
this is arguably the best way to understand the context and intensity
(and thus significance) of both project- and program-level impacts. There
is also a provision in the NEPA regulations which requires agencies to
“discuss any inconsistency of a proposed action with any approved State
or local plan and laws” which could be interpreted as requiring a disclo-
sure of consistency with state and local carbon budgets or GHG reduction
targets, particularly in states that have adopted policies to this effect.448
442 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hayes & Rodrigo Vargas, The North American Carbon Budget, in
SECOND STATE OF THE CARBON CYCLE REPORT: A SUSTAINED ASSESSMENT REPORT 71
(Cavallaro et al. eds., 2018); Corinne Le Quéré et al., Global Carbon Budget 2018, 10
EARTH SYS. SCI. DATA 2141 (2018).
443 See WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019); Wilderness
Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 1:18-cv-00987 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2018); W.
Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:16-cv-00021-BMM, 2018 WL
1475470, at *1 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-35836, 2019 WL
141346 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2019).
444 W. Org. of Res. Councils, 2018 WL 1475470, at *13–14.
445 WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 79.
446 Wilderness Workshop, No. 1:18-cv-00987 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2018).
447 See, e.g., Laura Schuijers, Climate Change in Court, PURSUIT (Mar. 3, 2019), https://
pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/climate-change-in-court [https://perma.cc/3MTB-3DCP].
448 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2(d) (2019).
2020] THE EFFECTS OF FOSSIL FUEL SUPPLY PROJECTS 519
This provision should be interpreted as requiring agencies to consider the
consistency of fossil fuel supply projects not only with state policies in the
state(s) where the project is located but also with any U.S. states with
GHG reduction targets or carbon budgets. It should also be interpreted
as requiring consideration of consistency with global and national carbon
budgets, since exceedance of those budgets would undermine state efforts
to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change.
4. Agencies Must Conduct Balanced Assessments of Costs and
Benefits
Where an agency monetizes the benefits of the proposal, it must
also monetize the costs of the proposal, including the costs of GHG
emissions. This principle was first articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals over a decade ago in Center for Biological Diversity v. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which held that it was arbitrary
and capricious for an agency to ignore the impacts of GHG emissions in
a regulatory impact analysis, even when there is uncertainty about those
impacts: “[W]hile the record shows there is a range of values, the value
of carbon emissions reduction is certainly not zero.”449 Applying this princi-
ple, the Colorado district court in High Country Conservation Advocates
v. U.S. Forest Service held that USFS must monetize climate impacts from
coal leasing where it had monetized economic benefits and directed USFS
to use the social cost of carbon protocol in its cost-benefit assessment.450
However, the application of this rule is not as straightforward as it may
seem. Since High Country, there have been at least six decisions involving
claims about agency failures to use the social cost of carbon in NEPA
documents where benefits were monetized, all of which involved fossil
fuel leasing proposals.451 The decisions reveal that there is room for
449 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008).
450 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1193
(D. Colo. 2014).
451 See Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223
(D. Colo. 2019); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019);
WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-00080, 2019 WL 2404860 (D. Mont. Feb. 11,
2019); Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D.
Colo. 2018); W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:16-cv-00021
-BMM, 2018 WL 1475470 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018); Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off.
of Surface Mining, No. 9:15-cv-00106, 2017 WL 5047901 (D. Mont. Nov. 3, 2017). There
are also several pending cases which involve claims about the failure to use the social
cost of carbon. See WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:18-cv
-00073 (D. Mont. May 15, 2018); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 2:16-cv-00167 (D.
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disagreement on the point at which quantification of benefits rises to the
level of a “cost-benefit analysis” requiring quantification of costs. In all
cases, the reviewing agencies did quantify certain economic benefits in
their NEPA documentation—such as labor income and royalty revenue—
but argued that disclosure of social costs was not required because the
agency had not conducted a complete “cost-benefit analysis” but rather
an “economic impact analysis” (or “regional economic analysis”)452 or the
social cost metrics would not provide a sufficiently accurate and precise
cost estimate so as to be helpful to decision makers.453 But in only two of
these cases did the reviewing courts require disclosure of social costs.454
In the other four cases, courts deferred to agency claims that their
economic impact analysis was not a full cost-benefit analysis, and thus
no quantification of GHGs was required.455
The two decisions requiring disclosure of social costs of GHG emis-
sions were both issued by the Montana district court and both involved
a relatively detailed analysis of the agency’s justification for not disclos-
ing these costs. In Montana Environmental Information Center v. Office
of Surface Mining, the court scrutinized OSM’s argument that it’s “eco-
nomic impact assessment” for a coal lease should be distinguished from
a “cost-benefit analysis.”456 The court noted that OSM had disclosed the
economic benefits of the proposal, including royalty and tax revenue and
local employment impacts—for example, stating that “the proposed
project could contribute $23,816,000 million [sic] annually in tax reve-
nues to the states.”457 In this context, the court found that OSM’s charac-
terization of its analysis was a “distinction without difference where, as
here, the economic benefits of the action were quantified where the costs
were not.”458
Wyo. Apr. 21, 2017); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 2:16-cv-00166 (D. Wyo. Jan. 27,
2017); WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, No. 2:16-cv-00168 (D. Utah Sept. 11, 2015).
452 Agencies will refer to quantification of such benefits as a “regional economic analysis” or
an “economic impact analysis” to avoid the requirement to treat costs and benefits equally
in their analysis. See, e.g., Citizens for a Healthy Cmty., 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1239–40.
453 See, e.g., Brief for Fed. Gov’t, WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, No. 1:17-cv-00080, 2019
WL 2404860 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2019).
454 See WildEarth Guardians, 2019 WL 2404860, at *12; Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 2017 WL
5047901, at *5–6.
455 See WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 79; Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau
of Land Mgmt., No. 1:16-cv-01822-WYD (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2018); W. Org. of Res. Councils
v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 4:16-cv-00021-BMM (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018).
456 Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1096 (D.
Mont. 2017).
457 Id. (internal citations omitted).
458 Id. at 1096 n.9.
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In WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, the Montana district court
addressed other rationales proffered by OSM for not disclosing social
costs.459 There, the focus of the decision was not whether a cost-benefit
analysis was performed (OSM had quantified the benefits of the proposed
action, and thus the court’s prior decision was controlling), but whether
OSM had a reasonable justification for not using the social cost of carbon
in light of the fact that benefits were monetized.460 The OSM’s first jus-
tification was that “there is no consensus on the appropriate fraction of
social cost of carbon tied to electricity generation that should be assigned
to the coal producer.”461 The court found that this was not persuasive
because “it misapprehends NEPA’s mandate”—“[u]nder NEPA, agencies
are not required to apportion responsibility for the impacts assessed, but
rather, they must consider all reasonably foreseeable direct, indirect and
cumulative impacts of a proposed action.”462 Second, OSM argued that it
was “uncertain whether [GHG] emissions would actually be reduced if the
coal associated with the proposed plan was not mined because power
plants have alternative sources for coal.”463 The court quickly dismissed
this as an unsupported perfect substitution argument.464 Third, OSM
argued that there were unspecified “uncertainties associated with assign-
ing a specific and accurate social cost of carbon to the Proposed Action.”465
The court responded that, to the extent the uncertainties OSM cited
referred to the fact that the social cost of carbon is expressed as a range
of values, this was not a valid justification for not quantifying those
costs.466 Finally, OSM argued that, to provide meaningful insight, the
broader benefits of coal production would need to be considered.467 Again,
the court found that this was not a persuasive reason for ignoring social
costs because OSM had in fact attempted to quantify the economic
benefits of the action while ignoring the costs.468 The court also con-
fronted an argument from the mining company (an intervenor) that the
social cost of carbon protocol should not be used because it was rescinded
by the Trump administration.469 It responded that:
459 WildEarth Guardians, 2019 WL 2404860, at *8.
460 Id. at *9–11.
461 Id. at *11 (internal citations omitted).
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 Id.
465 WildEarth Guardians, 2019 WL 2404860, at *12 (internal citations omitted).
466 Id.
467 Id.
468 Id.
469 Id. at *12 n.7.
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Regardless of administration policies that ebb and flow
with the political tides, agencies must nevertheless comply
with their obligation to properly quantify costs when they
have touted economic benefits of a proposed action. The
Court’s decision here does not mandate use of the SCC
Protocol. But it does require OSM to comply with NEPA by
either quantifying the costs associated with greenhouse
gas emissions or by reasonably justifying why that cannot
be done.470
The court’s careful scrutiny of OSM’s justifications in these two cases
contrasted to other cases in which courts have deferred to agency deci-
sions on this matter with relatively little analysis.
For example, in a case involving BLM’s approval of an RMP that
opened lands for fossil fuel development, the Colorado district court ac-
cepted BLM’s argument that its economic impact analysis was not
necessarily the “benefit” side of a cost-benefit analysis without discussing
what exactly that analysis entailed.471 But in the EIS at issue, BLM had
quantified labor income, jobs created, and mineral royalty distributions
from oil and gas leasing.472 The court partially justified its decision on the
grounds that BLM had not “expressly relied on anticipated economic
benefits in its RMP”—but the economic benefits were discussed and ap-
peared to be an important part of the comparison between alternatives
(as evinced by statements about how royalties would be lower under
certain alternatives).473 Similarly, in another case which dealt with BLM’s
approval of several hundred oil and gas leases in Wyoming, Utah, and
Colorado, the D.C. district court deferred to BLM’s assertion that it had
not conducted a full cost-benefit analysis when it discussed the economic
benefits of oil and gas drilling in EAs covering the issuance of 282 oil and
gas lease sales over more than 303,000 acres in Wyoming.474 The court
said that High Country was not controlling because the EIS at issue in
that case predicted economic benefits of nearly a billion dollars, whereas
the oil and gas lease sale EAs’ discussion of economic benefits was more
abbreviated and the quantified economic benefits were much smaller
470 Id.
471 Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1159 (D.
Colo. 2018).
472 Id.
473 Id.
474 WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019).
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(e.g., one EA estimated that a lease sale would yield $152,364 in reve-
nue).475 The court also deferred to BLM’s conclusion that the social cost
estimates were “highly speculative” because they represented a “4,000 per-
cent range in potential costs” under different production scenarios, and this
would be “less than helpful in informing the public and the decision-
maker.”476 The Colorado district court reached the same conclusion with
respect to BLM and USFS’s approval of oil and gas leasing in Colorado.477
C. Alternatives and Mitigation to Address GHG Impacts
NEPA requires federal agencies to consider and disclose mitiga-
tion measures for any impacts which are deemed to be significant.478
Agencies are not required to discuss mitigation for insignificant impacts.479
Thus, in the absence of significance determinations for GHG emissions
from fossil fuel supply projects, it is not possible to challenge agency fail-
ures to discuss mitigation options by relying exclusively on the regula-
tory provisions pertaining to mitigation. But the regulations also require
agencies to “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable
alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed
study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.”480
Plaintiffs have thus relied on this requirement in lawsuits seeking to
compel federal agencies to consider ways in which fossil fuel leasing and
transport proposals could be modified to reduce or eliminate emissions.
It is our view that agencies should more rigorously evaluate
alternatives and mitigation measures aimed at reducing indirect as well
as direct GHG emissions from fossil fuel supply projects, including the
no action alternative and alternatives that involve smaller increases in
fossil fuel supply (either production or transportation capacity). Federal
agencies do sometimes consider alternatives that entail fewer emissions
in NEPA reviews of fossil fuel supply projects. For example, in a NEPA
documentation for a fossil fuel leasing proposal, an agency might con-
sider different leasing scenarios which entail different acreage and levels
of fossil fuel production. And in proposals for broader planning actions
475 Id. at 78.
476 Id. at 79 (internal citations omitted).
477 Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223,
1247 (D. Colo. 2019).
478 40 C.F.R. § 1503.3(d) (2019).
479 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2019).
480 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (2019).
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such as RMPs, an agency may compare alternatives with renewable energy
production as well as fossil fuel production. But in many instances—
particularly where agencies are approving leases or transportation
infrastructure—agencies do not give meaningful consideration to alterna-
tive approaches for meeting energy demand.481 Such alternative ap-
proaches may be briefly discussed (for thoroughness) but then quickly
dismissed from further consideration. This often occurs where the pur-
pose and need of the proposal are framed narrowly—for example, in an
EIS for coal leasing, BLM described the need in terms of the public interest
(“to meet the nation’s future energy needs”) and the purpose in terms of
the applicant’s interest (“to allow the applicant mines access to a continu-
ing supply of low sulfur compliance coal”).482 Notably, in the purpose and
need statement, BLM also asserted that “the continued extraction of coal
is essential to meet the nation’s future energy needs”—effectively fore-
closing arguments that the public need for energy could be met through
other means.483 This is a problematic position, as it assumes a need for
increasing fossil fuel supply at a time when scientific research clearly
indicates that we need to reduce fossil fuel consumption.
The Department of State took a similar approach with the Key-
stone XL pipeline, defining the purpose and need to reflect the devel-
oper’s interest in developing the pipeline as well as the public interest in
energy demand being met. In Indigenous Environmental Network v. U.S.
Department of State, the Montana district court held that this practice
was permitted under Ninth Circuit case law, and that it was therefore
reasonable for the agency to dismiss alternatives that did not satisfy both
the public and private interests at stake.484 The court also held that it
was not necessary to consider a “more environmentally beneficial alterna-
tive” but rather only those alternatives that are “necessary to permit a
reasoned choice” in light of the purpose and need.485 The problem with
481 See, e.g., City of Grapevine v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
482 NAT’L SYS. OF PUB. LANDS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE SOUTH
GILLETTE AREA COAL LEASE APPLICATIONS 1–19 (2009).
483 Id.
484 Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 573 (D. Mont.
2018).
485 Id. at 574. Another lawsuit has since been filed challenging the approval of the Keystone
XL pipeline which alleges, among other things, that the EIS was flawed because it did
not consider an alternative route to avoid the sovereign tribal territory (which was con-
templated in the scoping report). That complaint also argues that the Department of
State’s approval of the Keystone XL Pipeline violates the APA because the Department
failed to justify its reversal in light of the previous factors which led it to deny the permit,
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this interpretation of NEPA is that it allows agencies to define the project
need so narrowly based on private interests that they can avoid any real
consideration of alternatives that may better serve the public interest.
The decision in Indigenous Environmental Network can be con-
trasted to several decisions finding that BLM failed to take a hard look
at alternatives that would have decreased fossil fuel leasing on federal
lands, all of which reflect a more functional interpretation of NEPA re-
quirements for the alternatives analysis.486 First, in New Mexico ex rel.
Richardson v. Bureau of Land Management, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that BLM violated NEPA by failing to consider an alternative
in an RMP that would have closed the managed area to future minerals
development, since such an option was within the scope of BLM’s discre-
tion as well as BLM’s statutory mandate to manage lands on a mixed use
basis.487 The case did not entail any claims related to climate change or
GHG emissions, but it set the stage for two additional decisions which
focused on the need to restrict leasing options in order to reduce the
emissions impact. In one case, the Montana district court found that
BLM had failed to take a hard look at coal leasing alternatives in two
RMP EISs that would have decreased the amount of coal available for
leasing based on climate concerns.488 The BLM had examined a total of
nine alternatives in the two EISs, all of which entailed the same acreage
available for leasing and the same projected coal production.489 The court
held that BLM had discretion to reduce or eliminate areas from lease sales,
and thus the lower production scenarios were reasonable management
in particular its assessment of climate change impacts, but the NEPA claims focus on the
lack of assessment of impacts on and alternatives to the route through tribal lands.
Complaint at 51, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 4:18-cv-00118 (D. Mont.
Sept. 10, 2018).
486 There is another pending case, Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, in which plaintiffs have alleged that the federal government
unlawfully truncated its alternatives analysis for a connected coal mining and coal plant
operation. There, plaintiffs are arguing that the purpose and need statement (“to continue
operations of the Navajo Mine and the Four Corners Power Plant”) is unduly narrow,
thus preventing meaningful consideration of lower GHG alternatives. The case was
dismissed by a district court due to failure to join an essential party and the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the dismissal. Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 932 F.3d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 2019).
487 N.M. ex rel. Richardson v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 703 n.23 (10th
Cir. 2009).
488 W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 2018 WL 1475470, at *13–14,
appeal dismissed, No. 18-35836, 2019 WL 141346 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2019).
489 Id. at *19–20.
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options which should be considered to provide a reasoned basis for decision-
making, particularly in light of the potential emissions from the fossil
fuels produced pursuant to the RMPs and public comments outlining
concerns about the climate impacts.490 However, the court did not agree
with another claim advanced by plaintiffs with respect to the alterna-
tives analysis—specifically, that BLM must also consider alternatives to
reduce methane pollution from oil and gas development contemplated in
the RMPs. The court held that consideration of such measures was not
required at the RMP stage—it characterized the RMP EISs as “program-
matic” reviews—and noted that BLM would retain the ability to impose
specific methane mitigation measures at the leasing stage.491
Similarly, in Wilderness Workshop v. Bureau of Land Management,
the Colorado district court held that BLM should have considered an oil
and gas leasing alternative that would “meaningfully limit” oil and gas
production development.492 Notably, BLM had considered various alter-
natives that entailed less oil and gas leasing—but none of them closed
more than 25.7 percent of the study area to future leasing—and much of
the area left open for leasing under all alternatives had only “moderate
or low” potential for oil and gas development.493 The court held that BLM
must consider an alternative in which more of the lands were closed to
leasing so that it could better evaluate alternate land management options
for the “moderate or low” potential areas—thus, the court’s decision was
predicated more on the need for BLM to meaningfully implement the
principle of “mixed use” on public lands than on the need to evaluate a
more environmentally friendly alternative.494
These three decisions thus demonstrate that courts may intervene
to enforce the requirement that agencies take a “hard look” at alterna-
tives that entail different levels of fossil fuel production at the land use
planning stage, but may be more deferential to agencies about the scope
of other emission mitigation measures reviewed at this stage. The Colorado
district court addressed the obligation to consider methane mitigation
measures at the leasing stage in the context of the EIS prepared for coal
leasing on remand from High Country Conservation Advocates.495 In the
490 Id.
491 Id. at *28.
492 Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1164 (D.
Colo. 2018).
493 Id. at 1166.
494 Id. at 1153.
495 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 333 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1124
(D. Colo. 2018).
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leasing EIS, USFS had briefly discussed methane flaring as a potential
mitigation measure, but put off the decision on whether to require methane
flaring to a later point in time. The USFS stated that it had not considered
methane flaring in detail “because it, like all other methane mitigation
measures, requires detailed engineering and economic considerations
that would occur later in the process.”496 The USFS also incorporated lease
stipulations requiring “additional analysis” of the feasibility of methane
use or capture.497 The court held that USFS’s treatment of methane miti-
gation measures was adequate and that USFS had satisfied its obligation
to “briefly discuss” why the option would eliminate from detailed consid-
eration as an alternative.498
CONCLUSION
The contribution of fossil fuel supply projects to GHG emissions and
climate change is precisely the sort of environmental impact that requires
a “hard look” under NEPA. As detailed in this Article, there are now nu-
merous court decisions fleshing out the required scope and nature of the
GHG analysis that must be performed for fossil fuel projects. In particular,
courts have made it clear that agencies must carefully evaluate indirect
emissions from such proposals, at minimum considering the effect of the
proposal on downstream consumption of fossil fuels, and that emissions
must be quantified wherever tools and data are available to do so. There
are also a number of cases addressing other aspects of the GHG analysis,
such as the proper scope of the cumulative emissions analysis, the ade-
quacy of technical assumptions underpinning estimates of net emissions,
and the contexts in which the social costs of emissions must be disclosed.
These cases show that courts are generally deferential to agencies re-
garding decisions about how to best analyze GHG impacts, but that courts
will intervene as needed to ensure that agencies do not wholly ignore
GHG impacts or analyze them in an irrational way. Here, we summarize
some recommendations to agencies and courts on the best approach for
analyzing GHG emissions from fossil fuel supply projects under NEPA,
496 Id.
497 Id.
498 Id. at 1120–21 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a)). The Court affirmed USFS’s decision to
rule out methane flaring and capture as infeasible at the same mine, because the inter-
vening years have provided “additional evidence . . . that flaring operations are safe” and
plaintiffs provided a report showing that methane flaring would be economically feasible.
Id. at 1125. See also WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1223,
1239 (D. Colo. 2011).
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recognizing that there is not yet judicial consensus that all of these ele-
ments are required under NEPA, but that it makes sense to err on the side
of greater disclosure for public policy reasons as well as legal reasons.499
First, agencies should include a complete inventory of direct and
indirect emissions in NEPA documents for fossil fuel supply proposals,
including all downstream and (if applicable) upstream emissions from other
activities on the supply chain. Emissions should be quantified wherever
possible, and in particular, combustion emissions should be quantified
using emission factors whenever the agency is able to project the amount
of fuel to be produced.500 For larger proposals, agencies may also supple-
ment this gross GHG inventory with a quantitative or qualitative discus-
sion of energy market substitution and net emissions, provided that the
agency uses the best available data on energy markets and substitutes
and is transparent about all assumptions, model parameters, and limita-
tions to that analysis. Where agencies model energy market impacts,
they should use multiple scenarios to account for uncertainty.501
Second, we recommend that agencies consider the effects of other
reasonably foreseeable fossil fuel supply projects in their cumulative
effects analysis for such proposals. Ideally, this analysis should encom-
pass federal activities at both the regional and national scales (e.g., other
federal leases for coal, oil, and/or gas) and should help decision makers and
the public understand both the incremental contribution of the proposal
under review and the aggregate impacts of federal decision-making on
similar projects. One goal of this analysis should be to evaluate whether
the proposal is prudent and whether impacts may be significant in light
of other federal leases or approvals for fossil fuel supply projects. Agen-
cies should also account for such cumulative impacts when modelling
energy market impacts and net emissions (and should consider whether
the market impact analysis should be integrated with the cumulative
effects analysis).
Third, agencies should carefully evaluate the significance of the
emissions impacts in light of the regulatory criteria outlined in the NEPA
regulations. Agencies should not avoid reaching a determination on
499 Most of these recommendations are written in terms of what agencies should do, but
that these are also intended to provide guidance to courts when assessing whether agen-
cies have met their obligations under NEPA.
500 See Burger & Wentz, supra note 11, for more detailed guidance on the preparation of
a GHG inventory for direct and indirect emissions, including a list of tools available to
quantify upstream and downstream emissions.
501 See supra Section III.A.2 for more detailed recommendations on the use of energy
market models.
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significance due to a lack of predetermined significance thresholds for
GHG emissions. Rather, agencies should use all available tools to evalu-
ate the magnitude of the emissions impact and reach a reasonable con-
clusion about significance based on that analysis. Although courts have
not required agencies to disclose the social costs of emissions except where
agencies have conducted a cost-benefit analysis, agencies should consider
using the social cost metrics regardless to aid in their evaluation of sig-
nificance. When determining whether such social costs must be disclosed,
courts should closely scrutinize agency claims that the disclosure of key
economic benefits (such as government revenue or job creation) does not
constitute the “benefits” side of a “cost-benefit analysis.” The relevant in-
quiry is not how the agency has labelled the analysis, but rather whether
the agency has put its “thumb on the scale” by inflating or emphasizing
benefits and downplaying costs.
Fourth, we recommend that agencies carefully consider alterna-
tives to fossil fuel supply proposals that will help meet energy demand
without generating the same amount of GHG emissions in their NEPA
analysis. Agencies should not narrowly frame the purpose and need of
proposals to exclude such alternatives from consideration, particularly
in light of the urgent public need to transition from fossil fuels to alterna-
tive energy sources.
